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Switzerland’s pension system has attracted considerable 
attention, mainly due to its reliance on a three-pillar 
structure. A relatively small pay-as-you-go system (first 
pillar) is complemented by a mandatory, employer-based, 
fully funded occupational pension scheme (second pillar). 
The main goal of this paper is to provide a detailed 
description and analysis of the Swiss pension system. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the second pillar and its 
role in the provision of old age benefits within the Swiss 
social security system. The paper shows, for example, 
that a typical individual with an uninterrupted career 
can expect a net (after-tax) replacement rate of at least 70 
percent. Occupational pension plans are highly regulated. 
Minimum interest rate requirements and minimum 
This paper—a product of the Financial Policy Division, Financial Systems Department—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to contribute to the research on the payout phase of defined contribution pension systems. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The program manager of the project may be 
contacted at rrocha@worldbank.org. 
conversion rates (at which the accumulated retirement 
balances are transformed into annuity streams) introduce 
many elements of defined benefit plans into notionally 
defined contribution schemes. The resulting money’s 
worth ratios are very high (with the exception of single 
males). Switzerland also has a high annuitization rate 
by international standards (approximately 80 percent). 
However, due to high fragmentation of the scheme and 
non-uniform accounting practices, some aspects of the 
system are not very transparent. The paper sheds light 
on the financial health of the pension system and the 
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PREFACE 
 
This paper on the Swiss annuities market is part of a broader project on annuities, 
coordinated by Roberto Rocha, program manager in the unit for Financial Markets for the 
Social Safety Net, of the Financial and Private Sector Development Vice-Presidency of the 
World Bank.  The project was initiated in 2004 to fill an apparent gap in the pensions 
literature, especially in the literature addressing the payout phase of defined contribution 
pension systems.  Many countries that have implemented systemic pension reforms and 
introduced private pension systems are now facing the challenge of organizing the payout 
phase for retiring workers.  Organizing the payout phase entails introducing a well-regulated 
market for retirement products, which involves the effective regulation and supervision of 
retirement products, marketing activities, and intermediaries.  However, the literature on the 
payout phase is generally focused on a few countries and topics, and does not address in 
sufficient detail the institutional and regulatory issues faced by policy-makers in reforming 
countries.  
 
The World Bank project fills the gap by reviewing in detail a number of 
representative country cases, including Australia, Chile, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Switzerland.  These countries have large private pension systems operating primarily on a 
defined contribution basis and have already entered the payout phase.  Moreover, their 
institutional and regulatory arrangements for the payout phase are different in many aspects, 
including decentralized and centralized arrangements for the provision of annuities, different 
menus of retirement products, different approaches to price regulation and risk-sharing, 
different marketing rules, and different capital rules for providers.  Therefore these countries 
provide a rich variety of experiences and policy lessons for other reforming countries. 
 
Switzerland has a large mandatory second pillar that operates on a defined 
contribution base, although with minimum return guarantees.  It has achieved a high degree 
of annuitization in the payout phase, due in good part to restrictions on lump-sums.  The 
provision of annuities is decentralized, as in countries like Chile and Denmark, with many 
private and public pension funds offering annuities, but the pricing of annuities is regulated.  
The Swiss case study shows that price regulation has ensured good outcomes for pensioners 
but also entails challenges for the providers, especially when regulation fails to follow 
market developments.               iii
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Switzerland’s pension system has attracted considerable attention, mainly due to its 
reliance on a three-pillar structure. A relatively small (and for European standards, recent 
(1948)) pay-as-you-go system is complemented by a strong and mature fully funded 
occupational pension pillar. Although the latter was mandated only 20 years ago (1985), 
employer-based pensions have a long history, which is still reflected in the large 
fragmentation of the second pillar. Tax-favored savings instruments constitute the third 
pillar. 
 
The second pillar in Switzerland is based on occupational pensions, mandated by 
law, but organized by employers. There are several possible organizational forms, the two 
polar cases being an autonomous pension fund, on the one hand, and a contract with an 
insurer, on the other. The accumulation of retirement assets and their withdrawal as 
annuities (or, more recently, as capital) are usually organized by the same pension provider. 
The strong link between the accumulation and decumulation phases is an important feature 
of the Swiss system. It may explain some of the surprising facts of the scheme, such as its 
stability and the high annuitization rates. 
 
The institutions that implement occupational pension schemes according to the terms 
of the BVG/LPP
2 must be registered. The managing body must include as many 
representatives of employees as of employers, having the same rights. This type of 
governance using joint management is one of the key characteristics of the Swiss system. It 
may be one of the reasons for its stability. 
 
The BVG/LPP law specifies minimum requirements along several dimensions. 
While a regulation of the contribution rates and certain restrictions on pay-out options are 
not uncommon in an international context, the law also mandates the minimum interest rate 
for old age credits and the conversion factor at which the accumulated pension capital has to 
be translated into a life-long annuity. The pension funds also have to meet certain 
requirements on the degree of funding, their investment structure, as well as on transparency 
issues. There is little regulation (and even less reliable representative data) on the asset and 
liability management of the different pension funds. 
 
There is a vivid debate concerning the current legal conversion factor, at which the 
accumulated pension capital has to be converted into a life-long annuity. The current annuity 
conversion factor (7.2 percent to be reduced to 6.8 percent over the next ten years) does not 
reflect market conditions and survival rates anymore, and thus potentially threatens the 
sustainability of the system. As will be shown in the chapter on Money’s Worth Ratios, the 
statutory conversion factor seems too high given the mortality structure of the population. 
 
                                                 
2 BVG = “Berufliches Vorsorge-Gesetz” (Occupational Benefit Plan) in German, LPP = “Loi sur la 
Prévoyance Professionnelle” in French.    2
The Swiss pension law allows for deviations from the regulations under certain, 
relatively vague, conditions for independent pension funds (i.e., those directly managed by 
the employer). Insurance companies are subject to stricter rules. The independent pension 
fund can, for example, credit a lower interest rate if it is under-funded. More importantly, it 
allows the application of a lower conversion factor, if the additional resources are used to 
index annuities or to finance other (early) retirement benefits, or if the minimum 
requirements can be met by alternative measures, such as an accrual rate that exceeds the 
minimum interest rate requirement during the accumulation phase. These features, together 
with the governance structure of the funds, may explain why—despite the strong (and not 
always sound) regulation—the majority of pension funds are financially healthy, i.e., are 
sufficiently funded. There is considerable room for maneuvering for the independent 
pension funds, which makes it difficult to assess the performance of the system as a whole. 
 
Given that the level of annuitization within the first and second pillar of old age 
provision is very high, there is little scope for additional market-priced annuities. While 
there is full annuitization in the first pillar, the average degree of annuitization in the second 
pillar is approximately 80 percent. For most individuals covered by the second pillar, the 
purchase of an additional annuity does not make sense, as the conditions within the 
occupational pension system are in general considerably more favorable. As a consequence, 
the vast majority of the large volume of annuities in Switzerland is not priced in the market. 
 
The law requires the same conversion factor for men and women, single and married 
individuals, at least within the mandated part of the second pillar. Married people thus 
benefit from a free component in the implicitly joint- and survivor annuities. The uniform 
conversion factor leads to high differences in MWRs between different groups of the 
population. On average a married man, for example, receives approximately 25 percent 
more in expected terms than a single man. 
 
Taking the first and second pillar together, an individual with an uninterrupted work 
career (which is, for men, not unusual for Switzerland) is well prepared for retirement. At an 
average wage and an average annual wage growth of 2 percent, the specified minimal 
criteria in the Occupational Benefit Plan (BVG 1985) achieve a second pillar replacement 
rate of 50 percent based on the final insured salary.
3  This is also the customary target 
replacement rate specified by most pension funds. Together with the benefits from the 
second pillar, the effective gross replacement rate amounts to approximately 65 percent of 
the final wage (net of taxes approximately 75 percent).
4  It is thus not surprising that the 
elderly Swiss do well on average and that poverty among them is rare. Moreover, the 
tendency to retire early might also reflect the generosity of the system at all income levels 
covered by the second pillar. 
 
For future generations, however, the picture may look less bright. In addition to 
unfavorable demographics threatening the financial viability of the first pillar, the current 
                                                 
3 As will be explained later, the final insured salary is the gross salary exceeding a threshold level that is 
assumed to be covered by the first pillar. 
4 If a person has minor children at retirement he gets additional benefits from both pillars. Taking into account 
that taxes are progressive, the net replacement rate can be well above 100 percent.   3
minimal requirements specified in the occupational pension law will not be sustainable 
given the dramatic increase in longevity and the fall in market returns (that are likely to be 
exacerbated by demographic change). While individual pension funds are given some 
margin to adjust the legal requirement (and do so very often in practice), insurance 
companies face stricter regulation. Unless the requirements are adjusted to updated mortality 
tables and market conditions, pension funds and insurance companies will face considerable 
financial difficulties. Already today the large insurance companies, which are crucial in the 
well-functioning of the second pillar, seem to lose interest in providing services within the 
mandatory part of the system. 
 
1.1  The Purpose and Structure of the Paper 
 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the Swiss occupational pension pillar, with 
particular emphasis on the rate of annuitization and the value of second-pillar annuities. The 
paper primarily examines the structure of the second pillar, and its role in the provision of 
old age benefits within the Swiss social security system. It also sheds light on the financial 
health of the system, the value of pension benefits for insured workers, and the evolution of 
the regulatory framework in the last two decades.  
 
The second chapter offers an introduction to the Swiss old-age provision with a 
particular focus on the second pillar. It also specifies the legal requirements concerning the 
minimum interest rate and the conversion factor at which the accumulated capital is 
translated into a life-long annuity. The chapter also discusses early retirement and the choice 
between an annuity and a lump sum payment. 
 
More details about the most important regulatory issues are discussed in the third 
chapter. Not surprisingly, the combination of a minimum return requirement during the 
accumulation period with a direct regulation of the benefit conversion rate is puzzling. As 
will be shown, the Swiss system operates with two different interest rate concepts, a more 
short-term rate for the accrual phase, and a more long-term rate for the computation of 
benefits and funding ratios. Other aspects discussed in this chapter include investment and 
capital regulations as well as transparency issues. 
 
In the fourth chapter, the values of the second pillar annuities are estimated using the 
regulated structure of these benefits. The computation of the annuities' values is shown to be 
complicated by a number of factors inherent in the Swiss system. Given the traditionally low 
risk-free interest rate, the choice of the appropriate discounting schedule is not innocuous. 
Moreover, the flexibility in the design of the pension plan makes comparisons between 
different plans difficult.  
 
Chapter five describes in more detail the organizational structure of the second pillar, 
as well as recent funding problems. Even more than the preceding chapters it suffers from 
the difficulty to get reliable and representative data of the highly fragmented Swiss system. 
 
The voluntary, but tax-favored third pillar, and the system’s major risks are analyzed 
in chapters six and seven. Chapter eight summarizes the main findings and concludes.   4
 
We think that Swiss experience is useful for the design of occupational pension 
pillars and their regulation. The main caveat of our analysis is the difficulty in obtaining 
representative and reliable information along several important dimensions, such as the asset 
and liability management of pension funds. Due to the high fragmentation of the second 
pillar (several thousand individual funds), it is very difficult to obtain a good overview of 
the (financial) situation of occupational pension schemes, as well as of the value that present 
and future annuitants get out of the system. 
 
1.2  Empirical Background: Demographics 
 
As most industrialized countries, Switzerland experienced a baby boom and a 
subsequent decline in birth rates to very low levels. It also witnessed a high level of 
immigration leading to a 20 percent share of foreigners in the resident population. Figure 1 
depicts the size of the population and its growth rate since 1970. High immigration and a net 
birth surplus until the mid-1970s was followed by a negative migration balance as a 
consequence of the oil shock recession (see also Figure 2). Immigration has accounted for 
approximately 80 percent of the population growth rate in recent years. Long-term 
projections on population growth and the age structure of the economy are thus difficult to 
make, especially as migration is also related to the Swiss business cycle and immigration 
policy. The recent opening of the Swiss labor market to citizens of EU accession countries, 
for example, has led to a new inflow of immigrants. 
 







































Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2005, August), p.4 and Bundesamt für Statistik (2004, August), p.6   5
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Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2005, August), p.4 and Bundesamt für Statistik (2004, August), p.6 
 
Figure  3 depicts the current age distribution for Switzerland. As in many other 
countries, Switzerland has experienced a strong decline in the number (and fraction) of 
children and a dramatic increase in the number of retired individuals. The inversion of the 
age pyramid is likely to persist unless the current low fertility rate substantially increases. 
 
Figure 3  Age Pyramid 
 
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2005), p.34, Fig. 1.2 
 
A dramatic increase in life expectancy over the last decades has exacerbated the 
impact of lower fertility rates for the viability of the social security system (see Figure 4). As 
a consequence, there has been a considerable shift in the relative size of different age groups 
as shown in Figure 5. The old-age dependency ratio (defined as the number of people over   6
65 divided by those aged 20–64) is anticipated to increase from 25 percent today to almost 
45 percent in the year 2035
5 . Demographics will also affect the age composition of the 
electorate. The age of the median voter, for example, will increase to approximately 52 until 
2025. The factual veto right of the population will put tight limits on politically feasible 
reform of the pension system. 
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Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2005), p.36 and p. 103 
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Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2005), p. 100 
                                                 
5Foreign immigrants, which make up approximately 20 percent of the work force, are net contributors at 
present. An increase in immigration is not really considered an option due to political resistance and the fact 
that the fertility rate of second generation immigrants is very close to that of Swiss citizens.   7
II.   THE SWISS PENSION SYSTEM 
 
Switzerland was the first OECD country that mandated an occupational pension 
scheme (in 1985) as the second pillar to complement a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system 
(introduced in 1948). This section provides an overview of the most salient features of the 
Swiss pension system with an emphasis on the old-age component. Both the first and second 








The first pillar, the so–called AHV
7 , is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. It was 
introduced after a very successful political referendum in 1948
8 . It aims at providing a basic 
subsistence level of income to all retired residents in Switzerland. 
 
The main features of the first pillar can be described as follows: Although there is a 
small trust fund, the public pension system is a pay–as–you–go system, in which the current 
young have to finance the pensions of the current old. The system is financed mainly with a 
proportional payroll tax on all labor income (see below), and an earmarked fraction of the 
value added tax on consumption. By law, 20 percent of total expenditures have to be 
financed out of general federal government revenues. 
 
For a long time, the first pillar has been viewed as considerably stable, efficient (at 
reducing poverty in old age) and cheap (due to very low administration costs, approximately 
0.33 percent of benefits). But as most PAYG systems in Europe, the Swiss first pillar is 
plagued by unfavorable demographics due to increases in longevity and low fertility rates, 
which have led to a strong rise in the old–age dependency ratio. If the current levels of 
contributions and benefits are left unchanged the present value of future contributions falls 
short of the present value of future claims by about a third. There are virtually no reserves 
— the AHV trust–fund covers less than one year’s worth of benefits (c.f. Table 1) — to 
cushion the anticipated population aging. Table 1 presents the revenues and expenditures of 
the first pillar (forecasted numbers after 2004). After 2008, the first pillar will be in deficit 
with an annual funding gap reaching almost 1 percent of GDP in 2015. 
 
There is no consensus in the current political debate as to how to fix this financing 
problem. Swiss policy makers face strong political constraints for potential reforms. Any 
change of the law can be (and usually is) challenged by an optional referendum. Thus, the 
public possesses veto power for all reforms of the current social security system. This is 
                                                 
6 For a comparative analysis of pension systems across countries refer to OECD (2005). 
7AHV = Alters– und Hinterbliebenen–Versicherung (old age insurance). 
8 Changes to the law are subject to an optional referendum in Switzerland. In Switzerland, 50’000 voters 
(approximately 1 percent of the electorate) can request a public vote regarding law changes previously decided 
by the federal parliament.   8
crucial as the median voter, who is approximately 48 today, is anticipated to have an age of 
52 by the year 2025. 
  
Revisions of the first pillar in the year 2000 have led to a number of important 
structural changes. Firstly, family/household benefits have been replaced by individual 
benefits. Secondly, individuals with responsibilities for children up to 16 years or other 
dependants are now entitled to child care credits. Thirdly, contributions during marriage, 
including child care credits, are split between the spouses. This change led to a substantial 
improvement for divorced women, but reduced the entitlements of couples with a non–
working spouse and no children. Fourthly, the legal retirement age for women has been 
raised stepwise from 62 to 64 years, and most probably, it will be further raised to 65. 
 








as % of GDP 
Gap as 
% of GDP
2000 28,792  27,722  1,070  22,720  415,529 6.67%  0.26% 
2001 29,620  29,081  539 23,259  422,485 6.88%  0.13% 
2002 28,903  29,095  -192  23,067  434,744 6.69%  0.04% 
2003 31,958  29,981  1,977  25,044  446,203 6.72%  0.44% 
2004 31,525  30,588  937 25,981  455,027 6.72%  0.21% 
2005 32,062  31,532  530 26,511  461,917 6.83%  0.11% 
2006 32,349  31,485  864 27,375  468,532 6.72%  0.18% 
2007 32,852  32,817  35 27,410  475,854 6.90%  0.01% 
2008 33,144  33,138  6  27,416  483,875 6.85%  0.00% 
2009 33,767  34,634  -867  26,549  492,086 7.04%  0.18% 
2010 34,001  34,662  -661  25,888  500,043 6.93%  0.13% 
2011 34,553  36,541  -1,988  23,900  507,618 7.20%  0.39% 
2012 34,744  36,664  -1,920  21,980  514,941 7.12%  0.37% 
2013 35,232  38,503  -3,271  18,709  522,208 7.37%  0.63% 
2014 35,340  38,485  -3,145  15,564  529,529 7.27%  0.59% 
2015 35,806  40,508  -4,702  10,862  536,905 7.54%  0.88% 
Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen (2004a), T16 on p.70 
 
2.1.2  Contribution Rates in the First Pillar 
 
The contribution rate is a percentage of all labor income without any lower or upper 
limit. The current rate is 8.4 percent for employed workers, of which the employer has to 
pay half. Self-employed workers pay 7.8 percent on what they declare as income. The 
contributions accumulated during a marriage are split between the partners in case of 
divorce, or when the first partner reaches retirement. 
 
For parents of children up to 16 years, child care credits are automatically granted on 
top of the contributions of regular labor income. The credits are equivalent to a labor income 
of three times the minimum benefits. The same is true upon request for individuals caring 
for sick or frail relatives. 
 
Non-working individuals, including students, are required to contribute at least 425 
Swiss francs a year to insure a full contribution period, unless their spouse contributes at 
least 850 Swiss francs a year. The contributions of individuals without labor income 
increase as a fraction of total wealth, which includes savings, assets and real estate, as well 
as regular benefits (such as unemployment, second pillar income, annuities) multiplied by   9
20
9 . The minimum amount of 425 CHF applies to total wealth strictly below 300,000 CHF, 
increasing by 101 CHF for each additional 50,000 CHF until 1,750,000, and by 151.5 CHF 
for each additional 50,000 CHF. The maximum contribution amounts to 10,100 CHF. 
 
Table 2 offers an overview over the contribution rates and the benefits of the AHV/AVS 
since its onset in 1948. The benefit structure will be explained below. 
 










 (corrected by NLI
10)
Contribution Rates
(as % of wage)
Minimum Maximum (women & 
men)
Minimum Maximum Employees Self-emp.
1948 40 125 407 1,271 4.0% 4.0%
1951 40 125 381 1,191 4.0% 4.0%
1954 60 142 540 1,279 4.0% 4.0%
1956 60 142 505 1,196 4.0% 4.0%
1957 75 155 603 1,247 4.0% 4.0%
1961 90 200 611 1,358 4.0% 4.0%
1964 125 267 685 1,464 4.0% 4.0%
1967 138 294 617 1,315 4.0% 4.0%
1969 200 400 805 1,609 5.2% 4.6%
1971 220 440 719 1,437 5.2% 4.6%
1973 400 800 1,051 2,102 7.8% 6.8%
1975 500 1,000 735 1,089 2,179 8.4% 7.3%
1977 525 1,050 1,094 2,188 8.4% 7.3%
1979 525 1,050 1,026 2,053 8.4% 7.8%
1980 550 1,100 845 1,020 2,041 8.4% 7.8%
1982 620 1,240 966 1,012 2,023 8.4% 7.8%
1984 690 1,380 1,085 1,056 2,111 8.4% 7.8%
1986 720 1,440 1,142 1,032 2,063 8.4% 7.8%
1988 750 1,500 1,201 1,014 2,028 8.4% 7.8%
1990 800 1,600 1,292 985 1,969 8.4% 7.8%
1992 900 1,800 1,465 988 1,976 8.4% 7.8%
1993 940 1,880 1,568 1,005 2,010 8.4% 7.8%
1995 970 1,940 1,632 1,009 2,018 8.4% 7.8%
1997 995 1,990 1,670 1,018 2,036 8.4% 7.8%
1999 1,005 2,010 1,663 1,018 2,036 8.4% 7.8%
2001 1,030 2,060 1,626 1,005 2,011 8.4% 7.8%
2003 1,055 2,110 1,673 998 1,995 8.4% 7.8%
2005 1,075 2,150 1,704 1,007 2,015 8.4% 7.8%
Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen (2005), T4.2 on p.99 
 
2.1.3  Benefits in the First Pillar 
 
The first pillar aims at providing a basic subsistence level of income to all retired 
residents with a full contribution period of 45 years for men and 44 years for women. Thus, 
there is no specified target replacement rate. In reality, the average replacement rate with 
respect to pre-retirement income is approximately 35 percent. It is much higher for low-
income individuals with a full contribution period, and very low for high income people. 
                                                 
9 This second component of the contribution defining total wealth can be seen as an approximation of the 
present value of additional income. 
10 NLI = Nominal Wage Index, 100 = year 2000.   10
 
In the case where the retiree is eligible for a full pension, his insured monthly 
minimum pension is 1075 CHF (in 2005
11). The maximum first pillar benefit is equivalent 
to twice the minimum pension. Although it is difficult to put these numbers in relation to the 
subsistence needs due to the high variability of living costs in Switzerland, even the 
maximum benefit level does not exceed the poverty line by much - if at all. 
 
The first pillar (AHV) distinguishes between “full” and “partial” pensions. Every 
retiree who has worked for at least one year is eligible for pension benefits. He gets a full–
pension if he contributed over the entire mandatory period. Pension benefits can be claimed 
after the legal retirement age (i.e., for women at age 64 and for men at age 65), regardless of 
whether the agent leaves the workforce or not. 
 
In case of death, the survivor can claim a 20 percent increase in his pension as long 
as he qualifies for an old-age pension, provided that the existing pension benefit plus the 
supplement does not exceed the maximal first pillar benefit. If the retired individual has 
children, (s)he can claim children benefits amounting to a maximum of 40 percent of the 
base AHV/AVS benefits per child. If both spouses are eligible for children benefits the sum 
cannot exceed 60 percent of the maximum first pillar pension (per child). A partial pension 
is paid if the contribution has not covered the whole mandatory period. For each 
contribution year missing, AHV/AVS benefits are reduced by at least 1/44. 
 
Pensioners can claim supplemental, means-tested benefits to cover their living costs 
if their combined first and second pillar income is too low. In principle, these supplemental 
benefits are equivalent to the difference between an individual’s or couple’s income and the 
expenditures deemed necessary. The latter include the actual rent (or mortgage payments), 
so-called "basic needs" (a fixed sum per person) and actual health expenditures. Not all 
individuals qualifying for supplemental benefits claim them as they are still associated with 
a certain stigma, especially in rural regions. The take-up rate is approximately 50 percent, 
but no detailed information exists so far. The combination of a relatively flat benefit 
structure and supplementary benefits has led to a low poverty rate among the elderly in 
Switzerland
12, although there are still gaps for low–income earners. 
 
There is a contribution–benefit linkage in Switzerland, but the benefit scheme is 
relatively flat in reality. The qualifying yearly income is a weighted average of all income 
on which contributions have been levied. An adjustment factor is applied on earlier 
contributions to take into account inflation and wage growth. The linkage is depicted in 
Figure 6: Up to an average qualifying income equal to the minimum benefit, the AHV 
pension is also equal to this minimum benefit. It increases linearly to 1.5 times the minimum 
benefit until a qualifying income of 3 times the minimum level. (This latter number is also 
                                                 
11 The minimum pension is linked to a so called “Pension Index”. This index accounts for increasing wages 
and prices and is computed as the arithmetic mean of the wage- and price-index (cf. Art.33ter Para.2 AHVG; 
AHVG = Bundesgesetz über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung). As per 1.1.2005 the “Pension Index” 
reached 195.5 which yields a minimum pension of 1075 CHF. 
12The last comprehensive poverty study in Switzerland dates back to 1992 (Leu et al. (1997)). It reports a 
poverty rate of 5.6 percent for the whole population, and of only 3.6 percent for people beyond the legal 
retirement age. Recent numbers suggest that the general picture has remained unchanged.   11
equal to the child care credits that are granted.) After that, the benefit increases again 
linearly up to the maximum benefit (which is twice the minimum) up to the upper limit of 6 
times the minimum (or 3 times the maximum) benefit. 
 




Minimum Benefit 3 x Min. Benefits 6 x Min. Benefits
Minimum Benefit
1.5 x Min. Benefits
2 x Min. Benefits
 
Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen 
 
As most people earn an average income clearly exceeding the three-times-minimum-
benefit threshold, the effective linkage between pre–retirement earnings and the benefit level 
has become considerably weaker in the last two decades. A large majority of (potential) 
beneficiaries with a full contribution period are entitled to maximum benefits, so that 
earnings history only matters for people with low average wages and/or contribution gaps. 
An average married couple, for example, receives more than 92 percent of the maximum 
benefits. 
 
Notwithstanding the changes in the structure of the first pillar, the payroll tax rate 
has remained unchanged at 8.4 percent since 1975, and the ratio between average pension 
benefits and the average labor income has remained almost constant for more than 30 years. 
Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the first pillar contributions and the relative benefits since 
the beginning of the AHV insurance system. The benefits are deflated by the nominal wage 
growth to depict their relationship to the wage level. Figure 7 as well as Table 3 shows that 
the implied replacement rate as well as the average replacement rate has stayed 
approximately constant in the last three decades.   12
































































































Minimum Maximum Contribution Rates (as % of wage)
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Table 3  Average Pensions, Income and Replacement Rates 
Retirees AHV/IV  1990  1998  2000 
      
Total average monthly income households (CHF)  4,124  6,070  5,761 
Average monthly pension payments (CHF)  1,737  2,301  2,313 
      
Average replacement ratio  42%  38%  40% 
Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2004a), p.6 
 
The number of contribution years, including those granted for childcare, is essential 
in the determination of future benefits. Some special rules apply for couples and survivors: 
Married couples’ entitlements are capped at 150 percent of a single benefit. This reduction 
takes into account that per capita expenses are considerably lower in a two–member than in 
a single household. It is also a compensation for the survivor insurance granted to married 
couples during the working period. The redistribution between single and married 
individuals is relatively small in this pillar. 
 
Since 2002, individuals can also retire one or two full years earlier. The adjustment 
rate at which benefits are reduced is actuarially fair at 6.8 percent annually for men and 
women born in or after 1948. For women born between 1942 and 1947, the rate is only 3.4 
percent per year to cushion the effect of the recent increase in the female retirement age. The 
benefits can also be delayed by one to five years at an annual adjustment rate of 5.2 percent. 
 
2.2  The Second Pillar: Occupational Pension Plans 
2.2.1 Overview 
The Swiss second pillar, organized as an occupational pension system has known a 
long history, but became mandatory only in 1985. As Figure 8 shows, a sizeable fraction of 
the working force had already been covered before such plans were mandated. The figure   13
overstates the true coverage rate due to double–counting of insured individuals (those 
working for more than one employer) at the onset of the mandatory regime. The numbers 
since the mid-1990s are therefore more reliable. They convey a relatively high and stable 
coverage rate for male workers, as well as a slightly increasing coverage for women. 
 

























Source: Own Calculations 
 
The main goal of the second pillar is to maintain the pre-retirement living standard 
together with the benefits stemming from the first pillar. The target replacement rate differs 
between companies, but it is usually in the range of 50-70 percent of pre-retirement labor 
income (before taxes and social security contributions), including benefits from the first 
pillar. Most pension funds specify their target replacement rate as a fraction of the insured 
wage (see below). Apart from retirement income, the second pillar also provides insurance 
for  disability and survivors of insured workers during the accumulation period (see 
section 2.5 for additional information). 
 
As already mentioned, employers organize occupational pension plans, by either 
having an autonomous pension fund or a contract with an insurer. As a consequence of this 
(and also for historical reasons), the system is highly fragmented. In 2002, there were more 
than 8,000 funds, but this number has decreased rapidly since then (c.f. Section 5.1). The 
consolidation process was due to many small firms outsourcing the organization of the 
second pillar, as well as many joint initiatives of groups of firms. 
 
When occupational pension plans were mandated, almost all schemes were operated 
as defined-benefit schemes (DB). At that time the accumulated pension capital was not fully 
portable. However, changes in regulation have mandated the full portability of retirement 
savings and have caused a conversion of schemes so that now more than 85 percent have 
become defined contribution schemes (DC).   14
 
There is a strong link between the accumulation and decumulation phases of the 
second pillar. Both are with the same sponsor with almost no exceptions. Although in some 
plans individuals are allowed to cash out their old-age savings and could, in principle, 
purchase another annuity contract, virtually nobody does that. Occupational pension plans 
offer two advantages over market annuity products. Firstly, they are hardly plagued by 
adverse selection problems. Secondly and far more importantly, the regulated high annuity 
conversion factor has compensated workers for the lower than market returns that have been 
obtained over the accumulation phase, at least during the first twenty years of operation of 
the second pillar. Whether these regulated features of the second pillar are viable in the long 
run is an open question. 
 
2.2.2  Contribution Rates and Capital Accumulation in the Second Pillar 
 
The second pillar is designed to be integrated together with the first pillar. As the 
latter already provides a basic level of income, the BVG
13 usually only insures income 
above a certain threshold level. This so-called coordination offset equals 22,575 CHF in 
2005. The lower threshold explains the lower coverage for female workers (Figure 8), who 
often work part–time and have lower average wages than men. Income above the threshold 
level is called coordinated salary. To compensate for a potential underinsurance of low-
income individuals, a lower entry income (19,350 CHF) into the second pillar was 
introduced in January 2005. For income above the entry threshold (19,350 CHF) and below 
a yearly income corresponding to the maximum first pillar benefit (25,800 CHF), the 
minimum coordinated salary is 3,225 CHF. 
 
There is also a maximum level of insured earnings equal to 77,400 CHF. Pension 
providers are free to offer insurance for income below or above of these two threshold 
levels. While most do for income greater than the maximum — many companies do not 
even have an upper level — very few do for income below the threshold level. Contributions 
paid on the income between the two thresholds are called mandatory, all contributions above 
the upper threshold are part of the super-mandatory insurance. 
 
Contributions to the mandatory part (and in most cases also to the super-mandatory 
part) are a certain percentage of the coordinated (= insured) salary. By law the employer has 
to pay at least half, but many pay more, thus the average fraction paid by the employer is 
approximately 60 percent. The law also mandates minimum contribution rates (as a total for 
employer and employee). They range from 7 percent at an age of 25 to 18 percent from the 
age of 55 onwards, as shown in Table 4.  But as long as average contribution rates are in line 
with the rates mentioned above, pension funds are free to deviate from the specified pattern. 
Many providers use uniform contribution rates for all ages, thus compensating lower rates 
for older workers by higher rates for younger workers. 
 
                                                 
13 BVG = Bundesgesetz über die berufliche Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenvorsorge   15
Table 4  Total Minimal Contribution Rates under BVG law 





Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen 
 
Contributions, which are also called age retirement credits, are accumulated as 
retirement assets and bear an interest rate. The Swiss Federal Council determines the 
minimum rate of return. It remained at 4 percent for 17 years (from 1985 to the end of 
2002). But due to the decrease in capital market returns, this rate has been reassessed so that 
now for the year 2005 it equals 2.5 percent. This minimum interest rate paid on the old-age 
insurance balances is one special feature of the Swiss system. Furthermore, it constitutes 
part of the regulation framework of the second pillar and is therefore discussed more in 
detail in section 3.2. 
 
The accrued capital is fully portable (with minor deductions especially for short 
employment spells) when the insured individual changes employer. By law, an employee 
changing firms gets the accumulated total contributions accrued at the minimum interest 
rate. The law is silent as to how accumulated reserves have to be distributed. In practice this 
implied that job changers got less than their fair share during the high return periods. This 
feature was considered an important obstacle to mobility in the Swiss labor market in the 
1990s. 
 
In addition to the contributions to the old–age credit balances, further contributions 
are needed to cover supplementary insurance or other services. These additional charges 
include:  
•  The mandatory insurance for the risks of death and disability. In the case of death the 
surviving spouse is eligible to an annuity of 60 percent of the level that the deceased 
worker would have received at retirement, orphans can claim a pension of 20 percent 
of this amount. In the case of disability, the insured is eligible for a disability 
pension. To calculate these benefits, the same conversion factor as for the calculation 
of the normal old–age provisions is used, but obviously based on a projected old–age 
credit balance at the age of 65. There are no restrictions on the contributions for 
these additional risks (disability and death). On average, these costs amount to 3 
percent of the insured wage
14.  
•  Special measures
15: Since 1985, the mandatory premia for special measures have 
amounted to 1 percent of the total insured wage bill of all insured individuals in a 
pension fund. In the past these premia were used partly to finance the contributions 
of individuals without a second pillar prior to the BVG. The second use was the 
accumulation of reserves in order to adjust benefits to inflation or to reduce future 
risk premium. The first use is no longer relevant. Also, in practice the second use 
does not seem the most appropriate way of covering inflation. The federal council 
                                                 
14Source: www.vorsorgeforum.ch 
15In German: Sondermassnahmen   16
presently discusses the abolition of this type of contribution.  
•  Guarantee Fund: The contributions amount to 0.1 percent of the covered wages.  
For all these additional contributions, the employer has to pay at least half as well. 
 
2.2.3  Benefits in the Second Pillar: Overview 
 
Upon retirement, the accumulated capital can be withdrawn either as a monthly life–
long annuity or as a lump sum: 
 
Annuity:  
This is always a life–long income stream computed from the fraction of accumulated 
pension capital that is not withdrawn as a lump-sum (see below). There are no other forms 
of annuitization such as phased withdrawals or annuity certain. 
  
Capital payment:  
Depending on the pension fund, a fraction of the capital can be withdrawn as a lump-
sum. Until 2004, pension funds were not required to allow this capital option. From 2005, 
pension funds are required to allow retirees to withdraw at least 25 percent of the old-age 
capital (in the mandatory part) as a lump sum. Many pension funds allow much higher lump 
sum withdrawals. To mitigate adverse selection effects due to short run deterioration of an 
individual’s health status, pension funds can require the capital option to be requested up to 
3 years prior to retirement (see also below). Before 2005 pension funds could voluntarily 
allow lump sum withdrawals. In fact, lump sum withdrawals have been rising over time, 
mainly due to more plans allowing the capital option but they still represent a small 
proportion of accumulated balances. 
 
2.2.4  Annuities in the Second Pillar 
 
Old age pension benefits are strictly proportional to the accumulated retirement 
assets (retirement credits plus accrued interest). The accumulated capital K  is translated 
into a yearly pension B  using the conversion factor γ :  
 
    B =γ K  
 
The legal annuity conversion factor applies to the mandatory part of the second 
pillar. As already mentioned, the annuity conversion factor had been fixed at 7.2 percent 
until the end of 2004 for all retirees retiring at the statutory age regardless of marital status 
or gender (see below). This number was constructed using a discount rate of 4 percent 
(corresponding to the underlying technical interest rate, not to the legal minimum interest) 
and (period) mortality tables that were approximately correct for men at that time, but not 
for women (mainly due to a lower statutory retirement age). As a reaction to the increase in 
longevity and to the fact that the credit balances have to be prorated over a longer horizon, 
the conversion rate will successively be reduced to 6.8 percent in 2014 as shown in Table 5.  
The current temporary wedge between the rate for men and the rate for women is due to a 
political compromise, by which a slower decrease in the conversion factor should   17
compensate women for the increase in the retirement age. In November 2005, the federal 
council announced, that the conversion factor will be gradually further reduced to 6.4 
percent over the next ten years. This initiative has not yet been confirmed by parliament. 
 
Pension funds are free to apply any other conversion rate to the super-mandatory part 
of the retirement savings. Nonetheless, very few companies have used this option until a few 
years ago. This has been changing recently due to financial constraints. The large insurance 
companies providing insurance predominantly for many small and medium companies have 
recently reduced the conversion factor for non-mandatory retirement capital in quite a 
dramatic way to 5.4 percent - 5.8 percent. The fact that virtually all companies came up with 
an identical number for the reduced male conversion factor to the third digit after the 
decimal point (= 5.835) caused a considerable protest. Although insurance companies use 
identical mortality tables, this coincidence does not really suggest a high degree of 
competition among the insurance providers. 
 
It is important to mention that a pension fund can apply a lower rate than the legal 
conversion factor under certain conditions. For this purpose it has to use the resources freed 
up as a consequence of a lower conversion rate to improve the benefits for the covered 
individuals. The law does not put restrictions on how these means should be distributed. In 
practice, many pension funds make use of this possibility, though no data exist on the 
importance of this alternative measure. Most of the funds finance early retirement programs 
and inflation indexing. A deviation from the (too high) legal conversion factor has several 
advantages. It allows the fund to tailor the benefits to the needs of the beneficiaries, and 
gives more flexibility and financial leeway to the fund. However, there is also a risk if the 
supplemental benefits are distributed unequally among different subgroups of the potential 
beneficiaries. 
 
Table 5  Legal Conversion Factors for Women and Men (mandatory part) 
Year Birth  Y.  RA Women Men Women  Men 
 Women Women BVG BVG (lowest) (lowest) 
  2000   1938  62 7.20% 7.20%    
2001 1939  62 7.20% 7.20%    
2002 1940  62 7.20% 7.20%    
2003 1941  62 7.20% 7.20%    
2004 1942  62 7.20% 7.20% 5.454%  (62)  5.835% 
 2005    (64) (7.20%) 7.15% 5.454% (62)  5.835% 
   7.15% 5.718%  (64)  5.835% 
2006 1943  63  (64) 7.15% 7.10%    
2007 1943  64 7.20% 7.10%    
2008 1944  64 7.10% 7.05%    
2009 1945  64 7.00% 7.05%    
2010 1946  64 6.95% 7.00%    
2011 1947  64 6.90% 6.95%    
2012 1948  64 6.85% 6.90%    
2013 1949  64 6.80% 6.85%    
 2014   1950  64 6.80% 6.80%    
The last two columns give the lowest quoted rates for capital exceeding the mandatory level. Retirement ages 
(RA) are for women (RA men = 65), the numbers in parenthesis correspond to the legal, but not effective RA 
(women turning 64 in the years 2005 and 2006 would have retired before). 
Source: www.bsv.admin.ch and own research 
   18
 
Inflation indexation: 
In principle, benefits are fixed nominal annuities, but the law states that pension 
providers have to adjust current old age benefits to inflation within the scope of their 
financial possibilities. Due to the financial strain on most funds, current benefits are 
typically not fully indexed to inflation anymore. This is different from the 1980s and 1990s 
when benefits were not only indexed to inflation, but sometimes even to the growth rate of 
wages. These more generous benefits could be financed because the minimum interest rate 
that had to be granted on old-age credits was considerably below market returns. Given the 
current low inflation situation, the non-indexation of benefits to inflation does not affect 
very much retired individuals. 
 
Single life and joint annuities: 
The BVG/LPP mandates joint annuities; the conversion factor is the same for 
everybody irrespective of gender, family status or income. Children under age 18 (or under 
age 25 if still dependent) of retired persons get an additional pension of 20 percent of the 
main claimant’s benefit. When a retired individual dies, his widow (her widower) receives a 
benefit amounting to 60 percent of the previous pension, his/her dependent children a 
benefit of 20 percent each. Until 2005, surviving husbands of deceased female retirees did 
not get a widower’s pension. The recent change of this law was not disputed mainly due to 
its low cost. 
 
The uniform conversion factor (at least in the mandatory part) generates sizeable 
redistribution especially between married and non-married men as will be outlined in the 
section computing MWRs. The difference between women and men is relatively small due 
to the fact that the higher life expectancy of women is almost compensated by the much 
lower present value of survivor benefits. 
 
2.2.5 The  Capital  Option 
 
As of 2005, pension funds must allow a withdrawal of at least 25 percent of the 
accumulated capital as a lump sum. There are no legal restrictions on how much can be 
cashed out. The decision regarding what fraction of the capital has to be annuitized is left to 
the individual pension fund. 
 
Even before this change to the law, many private pension companies in Switzerland 
had offered a choice between a lump-sum capital payment upon retirement or a life-long 
annuity. The expected return of each of these two options for an individual depends crucially 
on his/her expected life-time, his/her marital status, and on the presence of children under 18 
years old. 
 
The option to withdraw a fraction (or all) of the accumulated capital as a lump sum 
entails in general two potential problems for the pension scheme: 
 
1.  The possibility that individuals withdrawing their capital as a lump sum end up 
having too little resources to live on in old age, once the capital has been depleted.   19
As individuals can claim means-tested additional benefits from the AHV/AVS in 
case of insufficient retirement income, the capital option constitutes a risk for the 
first pillar.  
 
2.  The problem of adverse selection if individuals with a low expected return from an 
annuity are more likely to withdraw their old-age capital as a lump sum, leaving the 
funds with the annuity obligations of the long-lived. The adverse selection problem 
affects the pension funds directly.  
 
There are no conditions on the level of the remaining annuity benefits (including 
survivor benefits) when the capital is withdrawn as a lump-sum. The pension funds do not 
seem to put any restrictions in general, which is not surprising given the fact that the 
shortfall risk lies with the public pension scheme and not with the occupational pension 
provider. For withdrawals within the 25 percent limit as specified by the law, there is little 
concern to allow the lump-sum option. However, many pension funds, in particular those of 
small companies allow the entire capital to be withdrawn upon retirement. In these cases, 
there is a considerable risk to deplete the available resources too quickly, which constitutes 
an even greater risk for surviving spouses. While there are no representative studies that 
estimate the fraction of people choosing the lump sum, it is not uncommon that a large 
fraction of retirees in some companies withdraw the whole pension capital upon retirement. 
Our own data, as well as preliminary results from the pension fund statistics, suggest that 




In reality, the second potential problem, the adverse selection, does not seem to 
represent a threat to the pension funds. This is pretty surprising given the fact that there are 
sizeable differences in MWRs across different subgroups of the population. For example, 
one would expect single men to opt for the lump sum much more often than married men 
due to a lower expected annuity return caused by higher than average mortality rates and the 
absence of survivor benefits. In the data, this does not seem to be the case, as is reported in 
Bütler & Teppa (2005). The most striking outcome is that single men are as likely to choose 
the annuity as married men, although in many cases they get a worse deal from an annuity 
compared to married men. One can only speculate as to why this is the case. The absence of 
family ties may be a factor. Single men may attach greater value to the longevity insurance 
provided by the annuity; in contrast, married men may place greater value to the bequest 
motive and thus opt for partial lump sums to a greater extent than single men. The fact that 
annuities from the mandatory pillar are offered at highly advantageous terms may explain 
the relatively limited use of lump sums by all participants. For women the picture is a bit 
different (but adverse selection effects are also much smaller due to the smaller differences 
in survival rates between different marital status). Married women are more likely to opt for 
the capital option, presumably because they are the second earner in the family and they 
already benefit from a high degree of annuitization stemming from the primary earner. 
                                                 
16 When collecting the data for the paper “The Choice Between an Annuity and a Lump Sum” (Bütler & 
Teppa, 2005) a number of pension funds had to be excluded for the lack of sufficient variability with respect to 
the capital option. A number of pension fund managers reported that virtually all retirees would choose the 
lump sum, others that the capital option was very uncommon.   20
 
The fraction of capital cashed out at retirement as a function of the accumulated old-
age capital, taken from the Bütler & Teppa (2005) sample, is depicted Figure 9.  There are 
several interesting features to be observed: Firstly, small capital balances are much more 
likely to be withdrawn as a lump sum. This small-balance effect can be interpreted as a 
consequence of differential mortality, magnitude effects
17 and additional income support
18. 
Secondly, for very high capital levels, the fraction cashed out is slightly increasing, 
reflecting bequest motives
19, investment opportunities
20, and a preferential tax treatment
21. 
The increase for higher capital balances, however, is not statistically significant, in contrast 
to the statistically highly significant small capital balance effect. Thirdly, the majority of 
retirees opting for the lump sum withdraw the highest possible amount (often 100 percent, in 
some cases 25, 30 or 50 percent).  
 
Figure 9  Fraction of Capital Cashed out as a Lump-Sum 
 
 
Source: Bütler and Teppa (2005). 
 
 
                                                 
17 For small stakes agents generally prefer an early payment to a deferred one even if this choice implies a high 
discount rate. 
18 An annuity, even small, may be detrimental to the eligibility for income support. 
19 The higher the annuity, the lower the marginal utility of consumption at the given level. People might prefer 
to hold their pension wealth in the form of capital to be able to bequeath it to their children (at least partially). 
Of course, agents can save for a bequest independently from the accumulated capital at retirement, but there is 
the risk to die prematurely and thus leave a small amount of money. The lump sum payment guarantees a 
certain level of bequest. 
20 An individual may choose the capital option if he thinks he can obtain a better return than the one offered 
from the annuity scheme. Investment opportunities will most likely depend on the total amount to be invested, 
but also on investment abilities. The higher average capital stock at retirement may facilitate alternative 
investments especially if investment abilities are correlated with wealth. 
21 In Switzerland, there is clearly a tax advantage to withdraw the accumulated pension wealth in the form of a 
lump sum. This effect is much stronger for high and very high levels of capital.    21
2.2.6 Administration  Costs 
 
Administration costs are low by international standards, but still high compared to 
those of the AHV. Table 6 presents the evolution of administration costs since 1970. Current 
administration costs amount to approximately 5 percent of total contributions or 6 percent of 
total benefits. It seems as if the mandatory BVG system increased the cost efficiency of 
pension providers. However, one has to keep in mind that the measurement of 
administration costs is notoriously difficult, since it is not straightforward whether to assign 
the costs to the fund or the employer. Especially for small employers, the operation of the 
pension fund offers quite some synergy gains, as the administration of the first and second 
pillar can be done in tandem.  
 
In addition to the pure administrative costs, there are also the asset management 
costs. Over the period explored in Table 6 the relative costs have remained constant at 
around 0.3 percent. As a comparison, the total administrative costs of the first pillar (i.e., 
operating costs, pure administrative costs, and the costs of the asset management together) 
amount to 0.3 percent of the total contributions. 
 
Table 6   Administrative costs of the Second Pillar 
BVG 1970  1987 1990 1996 1998 2000 2002
In m. CHF   
Total Contributions
22   3458  15,125 20,860 24,709 26,415 25,842 28,394
Total Benefits
23   1,317  6,450 8,737 15,350 17,443 20,236 21,698




n.a. 765 913 1,311 1,335 1,318 1,388
Pure administrative 
costs 
264 339 452 751 963 1,065 1,412
Total administrative 
costs 
n.a. 1,104 1,365 2,062 2,298 2,383 2,800
  
In %:   
Pure admin. cost to:   
- total contributions  7.63% 2.24% 2.17% 3.04% 3.65% 4.12% 4.97%
- total benefits  20.05%  5.26% 5.17% 4.89% 5.52% 5.26% 6.51%
  
Cost of AM to:   
- total assets  n.a.  0.46% n.a. 0.38% 0.31% 0.27% 0.32%
Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2004b), BV1.1. sqq. on p.125 sqq. 
 
2.3  Combined Replacement Rates 
 
As mentioned above, there are no target replacement rates for the first pillar. The 
idea of introducing an occupational system was to ensure a replacement rate of 
approximately 60 percent relative to the pre-retirement income for lower and middle income 
people. The minimum contribution rates in the second pillar are in line with this goal. 
 
                                                 
22(employer & employee) 
23(Annuity & Capital)   22
Most pension funds aim at a replacement rate of approximately 50 percent to 60 
percent of the coordinated (insured) income. Very few specify an upper bound on this 
insured income. Together with the income from the first pillar and the fact that there are no 
social security deductions on pension benefits, the net replacement rate before taxes amounts 
to 70-80 percent for workers with an uninterrupted working history even for high income 
groups as shown in Table 7 and Figure 10. Due to the fact that federal and cantonal taxes in 
Switzerland are progressive, and also as a consequence of the availability of additional 
children pension benefits, the effective net replacement rate can be well above 100 percent 
as illustrated in Table 7. 
 
Table 7  Pension Benefits as a Function of Pre-retirement Income 
Before  retirement           
Gross income  50  100  200 
Marital status  Sing  marr  m+2 sing marr M+2 sing marr m+2 
Net  income  41 42 44 73 77 80 135  143  147 
A f t e r   r e t i r e m e n t            
I  =  First  pillar  20 30 36 25 38 46 25 38 46 
II  =  Second  pillar  12 12 17 37 37 52 87 87  122 
Net (I + II - tax)  30  40  52  55  68  89  92  106  139 
R e p l a c e m e n t   r a t e s           
Gross  0.65 0.85 1.07 0.63 0.75 0.98 0.56 0.63 0.84 
Net  0.75 0.95 1.18 0.75 0.88 1.11 0.71 0.78 0.98 
(in 1000 Swiss Francs) and marital status (sing = single, marr = married with adult children, m+2 = married 
with two children under 18/25). The computations are based on the following (very realistic) assumptions: The 
spouse does not have any second pillar income, but qualifies for the same first pillar pension as the main bread 
winner (mainly through child care credits and part-time income) in the married adult with children case. For 
the married with two minor children case, it is assumed that the spouse (for obvious reasons the wife) is too 
young to claim her own benefits. The pension fund replaces 50 percent of coordinated income (= income - 
25,300) with no upper income limit. Children benefits are 40 percent (first pillar) and 20 percent (second pillar) 
of the main claimant’s benefits each. The tax base is the city of Zürich. 












10% 25% 50% 75% 90% average
Pension 1st Pillar Pension 2end Pillar Other income
 
Note: Only individuals aged between 65 years and 70 years in 2002 are considered. The average monthly 
incomes per percentile are 2,947; 5,155; 7,521; 9,962; 13,263 with an overall average of 5,765 CHF. 
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchserhebung (EVE)  2002   23
 
 
The effective replacement rates can be lower due to interruptions of the work career, 
low income spells and unemployment. Nevertheless, an uninterrupted working history is still 
the rule in Switzerland (thanks to a low unemployment rate), notably for high income male 
individuals. 
 
Figure 11 summarizes the different pension benefits as a function of yearly pre-
retirement income for a typical individual with an uninterrupted career. The assumed second 
pillar replacement rate of 55 percent of coordinated income corresponds approximately to 
the average rate in occupational pension schemes. The schedule for the first pillar benefits 
(PAYG) is the same as the one depicted in Figure 6 (c.f. Chapter 2.1.3.). These first-pillar 
benefits are bounded between 12,900 and 25,800 CHF, which corresponds to a yearly 
average pre-retirement income of 12,900 and 77,400 CHF, respectively. The latter number 
also constitutes the maximum level of insured earnings within the mandatory part of the 
second pillar (OccPens (leg)). As mentioned before, most pension providers insure income 
above the upper threshold level (OccPens (eff)). For yearly pre-retirement incomes of more 
than 47,000, the sum of first and second pillar pension benefits exceeds the subsistence level 
of 34,000 CHF, which is guaranteed by means-tested supplemental benefits. Note that the 
median income of full time workers was 74,200 CHF in 2005. In line with Table 7 and 
Figure 10, the replacement rates before taxes are around 70 percent (Total Replace).  
 














10 0 .0 0 %
12 0 .0 0 %
PAYG OccPens (leg) OccPens (eff) Total (eff)
Subsistence PreRetInc Total Replace
 
Source: Authors' calculations 
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2.4  Early Retirement 
 
Early retirement options are now offered by most companies. For many companies 
this is simply an actuarially fair reduction of the conversion factor in the case of early 
withdrawals. Some companies offer more generous early retirement packages, including 
additional payments to make up for first pillar benefits up to the legal retirement age (refer 
to the appendix for illustrative examples). There are no legal restrictions on how the 
conversion factor has to be adjusted in case of early retirement. As it has been mentioned 
before, pension funds are allowed to deviate from the legal conversion factor, if they use the 
resources to finance other benefits for pensioners, including early retirement options. 
 
Take-up rates for early second pillar benefits are very high. On average, the observed 
retirement in occupational plans is substantially below the statutory age even in funds that 
do not subsidize early retirement explicitly. On the other hand, take-up rates of early 
benefits in the first pillar have been low. Presumably this is due to the fact, that many second 
pillar pension plans allow an anticipation of benefits at actuarially fair rates (or better). This 
latter option is administratively more convenient for most beneficiaries. 
 
In the past many beneficiaries (predominantly middle and high income) have 
received generous early retirement packages from their occupational pension provider, often 
with additional benefits until age 65/62 (64) to bridge the time to the legal retirement age. 
Figure 12 displays the distribution of retirement ages collected from 15 Swiss occupational 
pension funds. One clearly sees that over time the relative importance of the statutory 
retirement age has declined. For the period from 2000-2003 a triple–peak profile for men at 
ages 60, 62 and 65 and a double–peak profile for women at ages 60 and 62 is apparent. The 
peaks at 60 and 62 correspond to the lowest age for which early retirement packages are 
offered at relatively favorable conditions in occupational pension funds. 
   25
Figure 12  Distributions of age at retirement for men (left-hand side) and for women (right-hand side) 
derived form 15 Swiss pension funds. 





































































































































































































Source: Bütler, Huguenin and Teppa (2005) 
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These figures confirm the results found in a recent SAKE/ESPA study
24. According 
to this survey, 53 percent of Swiss men and 44 percent of Swiss women retire before the 
legal retirement age of 65 for men or 62 (since 2005: 64) for women. 
 
Unfortunately, due to the high number of pension funds and the lack of publicly 
available data on early retirement schemes and take-up rates, there are no representative 
studies to analyze the issue of early retirement in the second pillar. Consequently, one does 
not know how the early retirement option performs in terms of MWRs compared to the 
regular retirement age in general. Moreover, the fraction of funds offering more generous 
than actuarially fair early retirement options has considerably decreased in the last two years 
due to the financial constraints faced by most of them. 
 
Bütler, Huguenin and Teppa (2005) try to shed some light on the determinants of the 
retirement decision other than the impact of social security incentives by analyzing 
individual data from a non-representative selection of Swiss pension funds. The unique data 
set of individual retirement decisions used was provided by a number of privately run 
pension funds, allowing control of all company specific pension plan details. 
 
Note that due to the fact that the second pillar has been mandatory in Switzerland 
since 1985 (and had been offered by a majority of companies even before that year), 
differences in accumulated capital at retirement within the same cohort closely mirror 
differences in lifetime income. Moreover, due to the maturing of the second pillar the 
average pension capital, and thus the effective replacement rate, has been steadily increasing 
over the years and now reaches high replacement rates for all income groups. Unlike in 
other countries, the structure of the second pillar leads to replacement rates that are similar 
for lower to upper middle class incomes. 
 
Bütler, Huguenin and Teppa (2005) find that the incidence of early retirement has 
increased considerably over the last decade despite the fact that there were no institutional 
changes throughout that period. The increase in early retirement is more pronounced for 
men than for women, and was found to be especially strong in the last few years. It is 
relatively robust, but differs considerably across pension funds. Due to an increase in the 
effective replacement rate within Switzerland’s second pillar, more people are now able to 
accumulate sufficient funds to pay for an early labor market exit than one or two decades 
ago. But even if one controls for this apparent time trend, wealthier men tend to leave the 
work force earlier. Low-income workers, on the other hand, often work up to the legal 
retirement age, even in pension funds in which early retirement packages are generous. In 
these cases the need to generate income seems to be the only explanation for working until 
the statutory retirement year. For women, the effect of income on the likelihood of exiting 
the labor force is also positive, but weaker than for men. Due to differences in mortality 
rates across income groups, richer individuals thus tend to enjoy a much longer retirement 
spell than poorer people. 
 
                                                 
24SAKE / ESPA is a longitudinal (rolling panel) study of the Swiss labor market, but also covers individuals 
beyond the retirement age.   27
2.5  Disability 
 
Both pillars also include mandatory disability insurance. In the first pillar AHV, old–
age and disability insurance count together as one single social security system and are 
considered as the governmental provision of social security. The contribution is collected in 
the form of a 1.4 percent payroll tax, which is again split between the employer and the 
employee. The federal government covers 50 percent of the cost of first pillar disability 
pensions. The insurance covers disabilities afflicted since birth, or caused by illness and 
accident. Entitled to get disability benefits are individuals who are unable to work to at least 
60 percent of full capacity. The pension claim depends on the degree of disability. As for the 
first pillar, disability benefits of the occupational pension system can be claimed by 
individuals, who are at least 40 percent disabled. 
 
There is also a mandatory accident insurance for employees (paid partly by the 
employer). This service is provided either by the SUVA
25 or any other insurance company. 
Furthermore, each person living in Switzerland needs to have mandatory health insurance
26. 
The coordination of all the different insurance types is explained in Box 1. 
                                                 
25SUVA = Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt, in english: Swiss Accident Insurance Fund 
26cf. Art.1ff KVG; KVG = Bundesgesetz über die Krankenversicherung. This law acts subsidiary to the 
accident insurance mentioned above, i.e., it takes place completely outside the scope of the occupational 
coverage.   28
 
Box 1: Coordination of Different Entitlements to Disability Benefits 
 
First a note on the accident insurance: 
The law requires that all employed workers must be covered by compulsory accident 
insurance, whereas self-employed agents can be insured on a voluntary basis. 
Insurance payments cover claims caused by industrial accidents, vocational diseases 
and non-occupational accidents. The premia for the first two claims are borne by the 
employer, the premia for the latter case have to be paid generally by the employee. 
 
•  Therapy: Therapy is provided exclusively by a single social insurance. In 
compliance with the particular requirements of each institution, charges are 
at the expense of the institutions stated below (in descending order). 
1.  Military Insurance 
2.  Accident Insurance 
3.  Disability Insurance (first pillar) 
4.  Health Insurance 
 
•  In--Kind Transfers: In--kind transfers are granted at the expense of the 
following institutions: 
1.  Military Insurance or Accident Insurance 
2.  Disability Insurance (first pillar) 
3.  Health Insurance 
 
•  Annuity Payments: Annuity payments of different social insurances that are 
intended to compensate for permanent incapacitation, can be accumulated 
as long as no overcompensation
27 occurs. Hence, it is possible that a     
disabled person gets a pension from the first pillar, one from the accident 
insurance and finally one from the second pillar. Still, the order of 
institutions to be followed is: 
1.  Disability Insurance (first pillar) 
2.  Military Insurance or Accident Insurance 
3.  Disability Insurance (second pillar) 
 
If a person involved in an accident is not employed, health insurance covers the cost. 
If this person is employed, the accident insurance is the first contact point (provided 
that the person is not doing his/her military service at that time, otherwise the cost 
would be covered by the military insurance). The ultimate goal of accident insurance 
is the reintegration of the disabled into the workforce. Thus, it covers directly the 
expenditures for therapy or in-kind transfers. Only if a person is permanently 
disabled and cannot be reemployed in any other job, (s)he is eligible for annuity 
payments. In such a case, the accident insurance contacts the disability insurance and 
they both contribute (always assuming that the particular conditions for the different 
insurances are fulfilled). If these payments are less then 90 percent of the 
hypothetical earned income without the accident, the disability insurance pays as a 
third source. 
 
                                                 
27 For the definition of overcompensation refer to Art.~69 ATSG   29
 
III.   REGULATION 
 
The focus of this chapter is a more detailed description and analysis of regulatory 
issues within the Swiss occupational pension pillar. The Swiss second pillar is regulated in 
both the accumulation and decumulation phases. Minimum interest rate requirements 
(section    3.2), contribution rates and the structure of survivor benefits (as outlined in 
chapter  II) specify the conditions for the annuitant. The Occupational Pension Law 
(BVG/LPP) and its amendments also put limits on possible asset structures (see section  3.3) 
and specify capital requirements for the pension funds (section    3.4).  New standards of 
transparency in the realm of the occupational old–age provision are imposed (section  3.5).   
Other regulatory aspects concern the organization, administration and supervision of pension 
funds (section  3.6). 
 
Although the minimum requirements are very strict at first sight, there is 
considerable room for maneuvering, as some rules may be relaxed under certain conditions. 
This is particularly true for the annuity conversion factor and the minimum interest rate in 
autonomous pension funds. Funding regulations have also been very imprecise until very 
recently, and have only required a certified pension expert to attest that a pension fund is 
able to meet its obligations. The funding regulations have become more precise since 2005, 
but the rules are still somewhat discretionary and the issue not as transparent as one might 
wish. 
 
All the requirements mentioned in this section constitute the regulation package to 
protect the insured workers and pensioners. The regulation measures can broadly be 
classified as specifying output and input rules. Output conditions specify the result of 
prudent provision and management. They should be able to be met under prevailing market 
conditions. Examples are the minimum interest rate rule, capital requirements and 
conversion factors. On the other hand, input rules directly regulate the instruments with 
which the schemes should reach certain outcomes. Examples are the specification of 
contribution rates and the regulation of possible investments. The drawback of this latter 
approach is that the required supervision is time-consuming and that the regulation may act 
too much as a straightjacket. 
 
3.1  Important Facts on Interest Rates and the Annuity Conversion Factor 
 
In Switzerland, the minimum interest rate on the accumulated pension capital is 
regulated, but the (technical) rate at which future liabilities have to be computed is not. This 
fact often generates some confusion, notably as the minimum interest rate was equal to the 
customarily used technical interest rate for almost two decades. The technical interest rate is 
also used by the regulatory authorities to assess the annuity conversion factor, albeit in a 
discretionary fashion. There is thus no automatic link between the technical discount rate 
and the conversion factor. 
   30
Let us recall the definition and function of the two different interest rates and the 
conversion factor.  
 
Minimum Interest Rate:  
This rate specifies the minimum rate of return that has to be credited by law on the 
accumulated pension capital during the accumulation period. It can be changed by the Swiss 
Federal Council. The rate had been constant for a very long time
28, but it is now generally 
agreed that it should mirror market conditions in the short and medium run. The minimum 
interest rate is thus not used to compute the liabilities of a pension fund. More information 
on this important regulatory issue is to be found below.  
 
Technical Discount Rate:  
The technical interest rate is used to compute the assets and liabilities of a pension 
fund. It should represent an average rate of return that can be expected to be achieved in a 
longer horizon of 10 to 20 years. In the long run, the average minimum interest rate and the 
technical interest rate should align, although they may deviate from each other in the short 
run. The technical interest rate also plays a crucial role in the determination of the 
conversion factor together with the mortality tables. 
 
Unlike the minimum interest rate, the technical discount rate is not regulated by the 
law!  The Federal Authorities as well as most pension funds had used 4 percent during the 
1980s and 1990s. Most pension funds now use lower rates of 3 to 3.5 percent. There is 
extensive political discussion concerning the correct rate. Up to now, however, the choice of 
the technical interest rate has been left to the discretion of the pension funds.  
 
Annuity Conversion Factor:  
As outlined in the previous chapter and below, this is the rate at which the 
accumulated pension capital is translated into a lifelong annuity. It is directly specified by 
the law, and is not linked to either the minimum interest rate or the discount rate. 
 
3.1.1  The Annuity Conversion Factor 
 
The conversion factor at which the accumulated old-age credits within the mandatory 
part of the second pillar are translated into a lifelong annuity is regulated by the law. Table 5 
in chapter II shows the evolution of this rate over the last 20 years, as well as its likely 
values in the next ten years after the last reform. It is important to mention that the 
conversion factor is directly regulated, that is not by means of a regulated discount rate and 
prescribed mortality tables. 
 
However, there are important exceptions to this rule, as had been mentioned before. 
Autonomous pension funds can reduce the conversion factor, provided the unused resources 
are devoted to an increase in the benefits in some alternative way, such as inflation indexing 
and early retirement benefits. This is usually not an option for insurance companies which 
                                                 
28 There have been several attempts by employees’ associations to increase the rate to much higher market 
returns in the early 1990s. The rate was only adjusted after the fall in market returns to below the minimum 
interest rate at the turn of the century.   31
take care of the occupational pension schemes for smaller companies. There are no formal 
restrictions with respect to the design of such additional benefits. 
 
There are no rules for the adjustment of the conversion factor for early retirement 
benefits in the BVG law. So pension funds are free to offer any early retirement conditions 
without legal restrictions. In theory, it would be possible for a pension provider to use a very 
low conversion factor for all retirement ages below the statutory retirement age, though we 
know of no cases in which this had been done. Common practice is to reduce the conversion 
factor by 0.2 percent for every year of anticipation of benefits
29. However, there are again 
large differences in the early retirement plans across pension funds. 
 
3.2  Minimum Interest Rate Requirement under BVG 
 
The accumulated old–age balances in the second pillar enjoy a guaranteed minimum 
interest rate. This minimum rate of return is periodically reassessed by the Swiss Federal 
Council. Table 8 shows the evolution of the minimum interest rate (MIR). It remained 
constant at 4 percent for 17 years, until the end of 2002. Due to the decline of capital market 
returns, the previous rate was no longer sustainable and was therefore adjusted by the Swiss 
Federal Council. Currently, the rate is fixed at 2.5 percent. 
 
Table 8  Evolution BVG Minimum Interest Rate 
  1985 - 2002  2003  2004  2005 
Min. interest rate  4%  3.25%  2.25%  2.5% 
Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen 
  
The minimum interest rate is supposed to reflect market conditions from a relatively 
risk–averse perspective. If the minimum requirement is set too high, portfolio managers 
have to take excessive risks, for higher expected returns are only attainable with a riskier 
portfolio. In order to avoid such an undesirable behavior and to protect the insured persons 
effectively, the MIR should be linked in some way to the risk–free rate of return on financial 
assets. 
 
To illustrate the evolution of market interest rates with respect to the minimum 
interest rate, Figure 13 shows the MIR and a Swiss zero coupon government bond with 
duration of 10 years
30. Until 1996, the yield on fixed income investments with a duration of 
10 years, represented here by the Swiss zero coupon government bond, was much higher 
than the minimum interest rate under the BVG. Thereafter, it was the other way round until 
the minimum interest rate requirement was adjusted downwards. 
 
                                                 
29 This number can be derived from an actuarially fair adjustment of benefits of 6.8 percent and a technical 
interest rate of 4%. 
30Definitions: The Macaulay Duration is the weighted average maturity of e.g., a bond or series of cash flows 
received.   32
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Data-Source: SNB for the yields on 10-year zero-coupon bonds for Switzerland (10Y TBY) 
 
3.2.1  Comparison of Returns on Investment 
 
Portfolios of pension funds may also take advantage of potentially higher returns in 
stock markets by including risky assets. Figure 14 depicts the annual returns of the Swiss 
Performance Index (SPI), the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI) for 
Switzerland, a bond index from Pictet
31 and the MIR. As riskier assets are associated with 












                                                 
31Bonds: Pictet Sub-index "Domestic Bond Index" with coupon interest payments incorporated; the index is 
based on a sufficiently representative random sample covering 5 different classes of bond issuer according to 
their market capitalization.   33
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Data-Source: SNB, MSCI, SWX and Pictet 
 
Figure 15 depicts the accumulated returns of these indexes, as well as of a “simulated 
portfolio” and an “average empirical portfolio” since 1987. The simulated portfolio 
comprises 30 percent Swiss shares (represented by the MSCI Index), 20 percent foreign 
shares (MSCI World), and 50 percent bonds, thus containing the maximal fraction of shares 
permitted by the BVG law in the mandatory part. The average empirical portfolio consists of 
the average reported fraction of shares held in an average portfolio of a pension fund. The 
remaining fraction is invested in bonds. The yields on portfolios of pension funds 
outperform the MIR yields on average. The performance ratios, which are presented in 
Table 9, represent the return to a portfolio relative to an investment strategy with a fixed 
yield of 4 percent and an investment period from 1987 to 2004. In this setting, the empirical 
portfolio exceeded by 42 percent the return of an investment strategy with a fixed yield of 4 
percent. By investing the maximum fraction in shares at all times, an excess return of 84 
percent could have been achieved. 
 
However, it is important to note that the MIR does not necessarily represent the 
effectively credited return on old-age balances. Nonetheless, most pension funds used this 
rate to calculate the returns on the old–age capital. Excess returns in the past had been used 
to accumulate reserves, to finance early retirement programs and inflation indexing, and to 
take contribution holidays. 
 
 




Figure 15  Cumulative Returns (i.e. Cumulative Log Returns) 
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Data-Source: SNB, MSCI and Pictet 
 
Table 9  Ratio of Investment Portfolio Returns to MIR 
  Ratio over MIR  Annual Excess Return 
MIR BVG  100%   
Bond Index Performance (Pictet)  121%  1.12% 
Empirical Portfolio  142%  2.07% 
Simulated Portfolio  184%  3.66% 
MSCI CH  279%  6.23% 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
3.2.2  How Is the Minimum Interest Rate Determined?  
 
As of today, the Swiss Federal Council sets the Minimum Interest Rate in a 
discretionary way. This procedure has disadvantages as to the adequacy of this requirement. 
Firstly, the discretion may lead (and has led) to considerable pressure on the Swiss Federal 
Council from insurance companies, pension funds and contributing workers. The last 20   35
years have shown that there is a striking asymmetry as to the specification of the rate. High 
risk-free nominal interest rates have not pushed up the MIR despite the fact that for some 
time the MIR was even below the inflation rate. The fall in market returns, however, was 
accompanied by strong pressure on the Federal Council by insurance companies. This 
asymmetry can be well explained by interest group arguments. Secondly, it is unclear on 
what criteria the decision is based. It is thus difficult for pension funds to assess future 
liabilities. 
 
In the current political debate, many players voiced a preference for a simple 
transparent rule to fix MIR, isolating the requirement from political pressure and making the 
choice more transparent. Nonetheless, no consensus has emerged so far as to what criteria 
should be applied to automatically determine the investment rate. 
 
3.3  Investment Regulations of Pension Funds 
 
Investments made by pension funds are regulated both with respect to the type of 
securities permitted to invest in, and with respect to the relative amount of money that can 
be invested in these securities. Assets can be classified as cash, accounts receivable related 
to cash, real estate, investments in real estate companies, as well as shares, participation 
and profit certificates. The quantitative investment rules include limitations on instruments 
and issuers. An overview is given in Table 10.  There are restrictions on each class of assets 
(upper panel in Table 10) as well as restrictions on the distribution of the overall capital 
invested (lower panel in Table 10). The limitations on investments are not very restrictive, 
so that they hardly seem to be binding in practice. 
 
There are also rules on collective investments, on the use of derivatives and, finally, 
on the investment in securities issued by the sponsor of the plan. All assets on a fixed cash 
amount are valued at their face value at most. On the other hand, real estate, shares and 
participation certificates are valued at their market value as a maximum. None of these rules 
depend on the form of pension funds and are therefore equally and legally binding for all 
types of funds. 
 
3.4  Capital Regulation of Pension Funds 
 
As part of the Occupational Pension Law (BVG), the Swiss Federal Council is 
obliged to define minimum capital requirements for pension funds. This rule concerns 
especially provisions for actuarial risks, other provisions and reserves needed to cushion 
fluctuations in the value of assets. These new rules were only enacted in January 2005. No 
detailed implementation regulations have been issued yet.
32  
                                                 
32This is due to the fact that it has not been possible yet to find the appropriate minimum requirements fair to 
all the different forms of pension funds.   36
 
 
Table 10  Investment Restrictions on Pension Funds 
  Quantitative Restrictions on single Asset 
Classes
33 
  Restrictions on Issuers 
      
100% Accounts receivables related to Swiss 
issuers 
15% except for issuers as 
      The Government, Cantons, 
      Banks or Insurance Comp. 
75% Real  Securities     
50%  Real estate (Swiss) and investments in 
real estate 
  
  companies (with at least 50% invested in 
Switzerland) 
  
30%  Swiss shares  10% Per company 
30%  Accounts receivables related to foreign 
issuers 
5% Per  issuer 
20%  Currencies and convertible currency 
receivables 
5% Per  debtor 
25%  Foreign shares  5%  Per company 
5%  Foreign real estate and investments in 
real estate 
  
  companies (with at least 50% invested 
abroad) 
  
      




      
100% Cash and accounts receivables that are 
related to cash 
  
70%  Real estate, Shares and other Securities     
50%  Swiss and foreign shares     
30%  Accounts receivables related to foreign 
issuers and 
  
  currencies and convertible currency 
receivables 
  
30%  Currencies and convertible     
  currency receivables and foreign shares     
Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen 
 
Autonomous pension funds are allowed to have a temporary under-funding (c.f., 
Section   5.4). The missing implementation regulations are thus not crucially important in the 
short run. On the other hand, life insurance companies are not allowed to have any under-
funding. They are subject to more complex capital requirement rules. 
 
The capital regulations of life insurance companies comprise general rules, which are 
legally binding for all life insurance companies, and specific rules for those which act in the 
realm of old–age provisions. The specific rules are listed in Section   3.5.  The main feature of 
the so–called transparency standards is that life insurance companies must build up a 
separate Security Fund for their liabilities related to old–age provisions (see below). Another 
important new feature is the asset segregation rule, which requests the separation of assets 
belonging to the pension funds from other assets. 
                                                 
33c.f. Art. 54 BVV 
34c.f. Art. 55 BVV   37
 
The general capital rules (i.e., rules that have to be met by all insurance companies 
including those offering services in the second pillar) are as follows:  
 
•  The minimum initial capital is specified at a range from 5 to 10 million CHF, 
depending on the anticipated business volume.  
•  The solvency margin defines the own free capital that a life insurance company must 
hold, in case the amount of the necessary solvency margin exceeds the minimum 
initial capital. Its specific level depends on the business volume and the risk 
exposure of the insurer. The first component of the solvency margin amounts to 4 
percent of the technical reserves times the fraction of the business volume not 
covered by a reinsurance company. The second component is a function of the 
different risk-capital positions that is not reinsured.  
•  To finance an extraordinary expansion of the business, the insurance company is 
obliged to invest up to 50 percent of the minimum initial capital in an Organization 
Fund.  
•  Insurance companies have to legally bind certain assets to ensure the security of 
policyholders’ claims. The corresponding amount, which has to be invested in a so–
called Security Fund
35, is mainly determined by the legally required capital (i.e., the 
actuarial reserves) and is verified by the supervisory authority on a regular basis. In 
case of an under-funding of the security fund, the insurance company is obliged to 
cover the shortfall within one month. If the insurance company goes bankrupt, 
however, the insured workers and retirees have a privileged claim on the value of the 
security fund.  
 
Table 11 provides an overview on the total provisions for the insurer’s own account
36, 
and the percentage that is attributed to old–age provisions. In 2003, the total provisions for 
own account amounted to 229 billion CHF, of which 54 percent were related to old–age 
provisions. Table 11 also presents the total amount invested in the insurers’ security funds. 
The actual amount invested in the security funds always exceeds the required sum. Assets 
invested in the security funds are subject to special investment regulations and stricter 
valuation rules.  
 
Table 11   Provisions for Own Account and the Security Fund 
  Provisions for Own Account  Security Fund 
in bn CHF  Total Old-Age 
Provision
% Required Actual %
 
1997 167,5 87,8 52.45% 161,5 181,7 112.53%
1998 188,6 96,6 51.20% 182,8 200,3 109.58%
1999 204,6 104,8 51.23% 195,4 211,5 108.25%
2000 217,4 114,1 52.47% 209,0 218,5 104.54%
2001 224,8 119,3 53.09% 215,4 221,9 103.03%
2002 228,2 122,3 53.61% 218,4 225,1 103.12%
2003 229,1 123,7 54.00% 221,0 228,8 103.54%
Source: Bundesamt für Privatversicherungen (2003), p.64 sqq. 
                                                 
35in German: Sicherungsfonds 
36 In German: Versicherungstechnische Rückstellungen für eigene Rechnung   38
 
3.5  Transparency in the Occupational Old–age Provision 
 
A lack of transparency can lead to two important problems. First, the insurance 
companies may be ineffectively supervised and may decide on investment/contribution 
strategies that are detrimental to the interest of the insured employees. Second, individuals 
who are not aware of their fund's financial situation may find it difficult to make the best 
decisions such as (not) changing jobs and accumulating enough private savings.  
 
In April 2004, new standards of transparency were enacted, which are legally 
binding for all the players in the field of old–age provision. All workers and pensioners 
affiliated to a pension provider must be sufficiently informed about the financial situation of 
the fund. 
 
The main additions to the law refer to life insurance companies. The new 
transparency standards comprise mainly three regulations: 
  
1.  Life insurance companies must build up a separate Security Fund for their liabilities 
related to the old–age provision. Before the different businesses within a life 
insurance company could share a security fund.  
2.  The old–age provision business must be reported in a separate annual report.  
3.  Rules regulating the distribution of profit sharing were created. Moreover, a Legal 
Quote was introduced. According to this rule, at least 90 percent of the net yields 
must flow back to the insured individuals.  
 
The Legal Quote was set at 90 percent in order to still guarantee some competition. 
Hence, the remaining 10 percent can be used by the insurer to build up solvency and risk 
capital, which are considered necessary to stay in this business and to protect insured 
individuals against risks. 
 
The regulator, in this case the BPV/OFAP
37, completes the task of supervising the 
insurance companies and it is also responsible for the implementation of the new standards. 
 
3.6  Other Regulatory Aspects 
 
Organization and Administration: 
Each pension fund that offers insurance within the mandatory part of the second 
pillar needs to be registered. Furthermore, it must be organized in the form of a foundation 
or a cooperative. Pension funds under public law, however, are exempt from this rule. Apart 
from these requirements, pension funds are free to design (but still within the limits of the 
pension law) their benefits, their funding, as well as their organization. Employers and 
employees appoint the same number of representatives to the administrative management. 
 
Supervision: 
                                                 
37BPV = Bundesamt für Privatversicherungen / OFAP = Office fédéral des assurances privées   39
Supervision of occupational pension institutions is overseen by the Swiss Federal 
Council. Pension institutions without national or international importance are supervised by 
cantonal supervisory authorities.
38 The Federal Office for Social Insurance supervises the 
cantonal supervisory authorities, as well as pension providers with national or international 
importance. Moreover, the Federal Office for Social Insurance is also in charge of the so–
called Suppletory Institution, and even more importantly, of the BVG/LPP Guarantee 
Fund.
39 It is worth noting that the different layers and the large segmentation of the 
supervisory authority potentially reduce the quality and transparency of supervision. 
 
In case the supervisors detect some irregularities, a pension fund will not be 
penalized, even in the presence of severe problems, such as under-funding (insurance 
companies are only requested to correct the under-funding within one month). The pension 
funds will merely be invited to correct the unfavorable situation without setting deadlines. 
Certain issues, like recovering from a funding gap, can therefore take several years. 
Consequently, there are no penalization rules either for duration gaps in the asset and 
liability management. Sanctions concern only violations against the obligation to disclose 
information, the disclosure of false information, the avoidance of control and the misuse of 
contributions. The fines for such violations reach from 10,000 to 30,000 CHF. 
 
Suppletory Institution and Guarantee Fund: 
The Suppletory Institution covers individuals seeking insurance on a voluntary basis, 
in particular self-employed individuals, as well as employees whose employer is not 
affiliated with an occupational pension provider despite the legal provisions. Finally, it 
fulfils the task of insuring the recipients of unemployment compensation against the risk of 
death or disability. The Suppletory Institution is considered a pension fund. It is financed by 
all concerned parties, like any other pension fund with the exception of some special costs 
that are covered by the Guarantee Fund. 
 
The most important task of the Guarantee Fund is to act as a reinsurance institution 
for the beneficiaries of insolvent pension providers.
40 It covers workers during the 
accumulation phase as well as pensioners with annuities up to 150 percent of the 
corresponding value of the mandatory part. A worker, whose pension fund goes bankrupt, 
receives the capital accumulated by contributions on the coordinated salary plus up to an 
additional 50 percent if he/she has contributed to a super-mandatory part. A pensioner 
receives the annuity corresponding to the mandatory part of the insurance, plus again up to 
50 percent more in case of a super-mandatory insurance. 
 
The Guarantee Fund also subsidizes pension funds with an unfavorable age structure 
(an important issue at the onset of the mandatory occupational system), and reimburses the 
Suppletory Institution for its special expenditures. 
 
The fund is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis and does not primarily accumulate 
                                                 
38 The 26 cantons are the Swiss states. They enjoy considerable independence from the confederation in many 
important areas, such as tax setting, schooling, and regulation. 
39 Sicherheitsfonds 
40Insolvent pension funds were liquidated by the regulatory agency.   40
reserves. In the past, its reserves have always been less than 1/10 of the total accumulated 
retirement assets in Switzerland, and were even negative at times. The contribution rate is 
0.1 percent of the coordinated earnings at present. The PAYG financing has a major 
downside. To cover its obligations in bad times, the fund might have to increase the 
contribution rate when the individual funds face greater difficulties financing their primary 
obligations. If the Guarantee Fund faces a liquidity problem itself, the government can grant 
a (conditional) loan.   41
 
IV.   MONEY’S WORTH RATIOS 
 
This chapter presents estimates of annuity values in Switzerland since 2000. The 
computed Money’s Worth Ratios (MWRs) correspond to annuity values in the occupational 
pension pillar. Due to the large size of this system, there is a little scope for an annuity 
market in the third pillar. The second pillar annuities make up for more than 99 percent of 
all (funded) pension payments paid out in Switzerland.
41 
 
Annuity prices within the mandatory second pillar are regulated to a large extent. 
The corresponding money values of annuities are determined by direct regulation on the one 
hand and by discount rates and mortality rates on the other hand. As outlined before, the law 
specifies the conversion factor at which the accumulated pension capital of the second 
pillar’s mandatory part has to be converted into a life long annuity. However, as has been 
discussed in the previous chapters, pension funds, but not insurance companies, are allowed 
to deviate from the legal value under certain conditions. Moreover, for the capital exceeding 
the mandatory part, pension funds are free to set the rate at which the capital is converted. 
 
Until very recently, however, most pension funds did not distinguish between the 
two components of the accumulated old age capital. As a consequence of the fall in market 
returns and the difficulty to meet the prescribed funding standards, more and more funds are 
reducing the conversion factor in the non-mandatory part. However, there is little publicly 
available information on the pricing of this part, although we do report some calculations 
using the recently published rates of some large insurance companies. The computed MWRs 
using the notional conversion factor will be too high on average. 
 
Money’s worth ratios crucially depend on the discount rates and the underlying 
mortality rates. While problems with the latter, discussed in more details in section   4.1 
below, do not differ from other countries, the correct specification of the used discount rates 
is more controversial. All occupational pension benefits are nominal CHF-denominated 
annuities. Annuities are usually not indexed to inflation, but pension funds are required to 
adjust the benefits to increases in the price level if the financial situation of the pension fund 
allows it.
42 In this chapter we thus compute MWRs assuming a nominal annuity and 
nominal discount rates. The main reasons for this approach are, as will be explained in more 
detail below in section   4.2, a very low inflation rate in recent years, the non-availability of 
reliable real yield curves, and the factual non-indexation of annuities by most pension 
providers. 
 
Within the second pillar there are no variable annuities or annuities denominated in 
other currencies than the Swiss franc. While variable annuities are clearly inconsistent with 
                                                 
41 Meader gives an overview on the issue of Longevity and Annuities in Switzerland and Brown et al. (2001) 
discuss the history of annuity markets in the United States and their role in an individual accounts retirement 
program, new evidence on MWR's, the cost of annuitizing retirement payouts and some tax issues. 
42 In the 1980s and 1990s with much higher levels of inflation and low required returns on accumulated 
pension capital, adjustment of benefits to inflation was almost standard.    42
the BVG law, the case is less clear for the latter. To the best of our knowledge annuities in 
other currencies have not been offered so far, very likely due to a lack of demand. Similarly, 
there are no guaranteed or deferred annuities in the second pillar. The market for these 
products outside the second pillar is simply too small to allow for a meaningful analysis. 
 
By using the nominal yield curves, on the one hand, and a relatively high technical 
discount rate, on the other hand, the chapter provides reliable upper and lower bands for the 
MWRs of non-indexed annuities derived by using the legal conversion rate. For companies 
which use a lower conversion factor but promise inflation indexing, the situation is a bit 
more complicated. The effective MWR depends on how much inflation indexing offsets the 
fall in the MWR generated by a lower conversion factor. Nevertheless, we think that the 
exercise can deliver a reasonable approximation of the return to the accumulated pension 
capital for insured individuals in the mandatory part of the scheme. 
 
The chapter first presents the underlying mortality rates and the discounting strategy. 
It then presents a variety of estimates for MWRs in the second pillar for women and men 
since 2000. As the survivor component of the second pillar benefits is free, we also present 
MWRs as a function of the marital status, demonstrating large differences in the present 
value of benefits between single and married individuals. 
 
4.1  Mortality Rates 
 
Mortality rates are used from two sources, the Federal Insurance Fund (FIF) and the 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO). In both cases, these are period tables. The quality 
of these tables is regarded as high by pension fund experts.  
 
1.  The Federal Insurance Fund (FIF) 
Every ten years, the Federal Insurance Fund (FIF) provides detailed data on the 
evolution of mortality rates and other risks (disability, widowhood) based on the pool of 
insured individuals on pension funds under the control of the FIF. These are used by the 
vast majority of pension funds, including the large insurance companies.
43 The clear 
advantage of the FIF tables is that they are based on the annuitant population. 
 
2.  Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) 
We also use the mortality tables computed by the SFSO in ten years intervals. The 
advantage of the SFSO data is that it is computed from a much larger base than the FIF 
rates. As a consequence, improvement rates computed from this source are more reliable 
and less variable. SFSO mortality tables are also available by marital status (c.f. Figure 
16 and Figure 17 for women and men, respectively). On the other hand, the SFSO 
mortality tables underestimate longevity to some extent, as they are based on the whole 
population and not just the annuitants.  
 
                                                 
43 In German: “Eidgenössische Versicherungskasse (EVK)”, in French: “Caisse fédérale d’assurance (CFA)”. 
Until recently the Federal Insurance Fund (FIF) also managed the Federal Pension Fund (FPF). Furthermore it 
created the new Federal Pension Fund PUBLICA. The latter was legally established in spring 2001 and began 
operating in June 2003.   43
 
















Survival rates as a function of marital status for women (year 1990, data source 
SFSO). The dashed line corresponds to pooled annuitant survival rates provided by 
the FIF (1990). 
Source: SFSO, FIF 
 
















Survival rates as a function of marital status for men (year 1990, data source SFSO). 
The dashed line corresponds to pooled annuitant survival rates provided by the FIF 
(1990). 
Source: SFSO, FIF 
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4.1.1  Mortality Improvement Rates 
 
As already mentioned, improvement rates can be computed from both sources (both 
of which are available at 10-year intervals). As can be seen from Figure 18, the 
improvements are similar, although the FIF data exhibits greater variability with age, most 
probably due to the relatively small number of annuitants on which the mortality rate 
estimates are based. For the computation of MWRs the difference does not seem to be 
quantitatively important. The reported numbers in this chapter are derived with population 
improvement rates. 
 
It is important to mention that most pension funds do not update the mortality rates 
on a yearly base. They compute the liabilities based on the published FIF mortality rates and 
increase these by 0.4 percent to 0.5 percent on a yearly basis until the new FIF mortality 
rates are available, i.e., every 10 years. The 0.4 percent per year delivers an increase in 
longevity over 10 years that coincides almost exactly with the increase in longevity using 
the SFSO or FIF improvement rates for all groups of annuitants. It thus constitutes a good 
approximation for the anticipated increase in longevity. The 0.5 percent is a more prudent 
estimate. 
 
Figure 18  Mortality Improvement Rates 













 Improvement rates per year computed from pooled mortality rates. SFSO 
= between 1980 and 1990, FIF = between 1990 and 2000. 
Source: SFSO, FIF 
 
4.2  Yield Curves and Discount Rates 
 
The choice of the discount rate in Switzerland is somewhat tricky due to the 
specificities mentioned below. We will use three different strategies to discount the annuity 
streams:  
   45
1.  The nominal yield curve.  
2.  The return on a 5-year bond.  
3.  The technical discount factor.  
 
As has been explained, this rate is not regulated per se, but corresponds to the 
customary rate used in the computation of pension liabilities and reserves. It should reflect 
an average long-run return on capital. Most pension providers now use a rate of 3.5 percent 
(or 3.25 percent), a number below the semi-official rate of 4 percent that had been used until 
recently.  
 
Our nominal yield curves are sourced from the central bank and are depicted in 
Figure 19 for end of June since 2000. The low level of interest rates reflects three 
particularities of the Swiss economy: 
  
1.  The traditionally low average inflation rates in Switzerland. Inflation has been even 
lower than usual in the last few years. As the yield curves suggest, inflation 
expectations are equally low.  
2.  A low real interest rate compared to neighboring countries. The Swiss real interest 
rates have been approximately one to two percentage points lower, on average, than 
in Germany.
44   
3.  The extended period of sluggish growth since the early 1990s. Switzerland has 
experienced very low growth rates in recent years.  
 
Real yield curves cannot be computed due to the nonexistence of inflation-indexed 
bonds in Switzerland. The lack of the latter financial instrument reflects the high stability of 
monetary policy in Switzerland and thus the low demand for an inflation hedge. While this 
shortcoming does not pose a problem for estimates of MWRs since approximately 2000, it 
makes it difficult to value the annuities before 2000, when second pillar benefits were 
factually indexed to inflation. 
 
As a consequence, we use nominal yield curves or nominal discount rates together 
with nominal (non-indexed) annuities to compute the MWRs. Inflation has been very low in 
recent years, and indexing is rare, especially in funds using the statutory conversion factor. 
However, the use of the nominal yield curve is not free of problems either. Firstly, due to the 
interest rate differential with neighboring countries, a higher return on assets can be 
achieved at relatively low cost. The exchange between the Euro zone and Switzerland has 
been very stable for a long time, including the pre-Euro time. A well diversified portfolio of 
bonds can thus generate a considerably higher return at almost no additional risk. Secondly, 
it ignores one of the main objectives of the Swiss pension system to keep benefits relatively 
stable over time for different cohorts of pensioners. To get a more precise picture one would 
have to average out MWRs over a longer spell. Thirdly, the use of the nominal yield curve 
ignores the possibility that annuities may be partially adjusted to inflation if the latter 
reaches a sufficiently high level. 
 
The MWRs computed with a constant nominal interest rate of 3.5 percent understate 
                                                 
44 See, for example, Kugler und Weber (2002) and (2003)   46
the value of the annuity, those using the nominal yield curve and the 5-year bond most likely 
overstate the true value, as they do not take into account the possibility of a well-diversified 
portfolio with a higher return. 
 












































Nominal yield curves since 2000 (June 30 of each year, June 15 in 2005). 
The corresponding inflation rates are 1.84 (2000), 1.58 (2001), 0.33 
(2002), 0.55 (2003), 1.12 (2004), and 1.08 (2005). 
Source: Swiss National Bank. 
 
4.3  Money’s Worth Ratios in the Swiss System 
 
Recall that occupational pension benefits are strictly proportional to the accumulated 
retirement assets (retirement credits plus accrued interest). The accumulated capital K  is 
translated into a yearly pension B  using the conversion factor γ :
45   
 
    B =γ K  
 
The BVG/LPP mandates joint annuities for men, but not for women. The conversion factor 
is the same for everybody irrespective of gender, family status or income. Children under 
age 18 (or under age 25 if still dependent) of retired persons get an additional pension of 20 
percent of the main claimant’s benefit. When a retired individual dies, his/her surviving 
spouse receives a benefit amounting to 60 percent of the previous pension, his dependent 
children a benefit of 20 percent each. These survivor benefits are not means tested. 
                                                 
45 This conversion also applies to defined benefit plans; the fund has to make sure that enough capital is 
accumulated to cover the claims made based on previous income.    47
 
The conversion factor has become the key parameter of the Swiss occupational 
pension system. Contracts for annuities in the non-mandatory part have started to be 
specified in terms of applicable conversion factors (which, in this case, can be different for 
men and women). 
 
Recall that a pension fund can deviate from the legal conversion factor even in the 
mandatory part if it uses the freed resources to improve the benefits for the covered 
individuals. Due to the large number of pension funds and the lack of readily available 
detailed data, it is very difficult to obtain reliable information on how this affects the implied 
conversion factor for different groups of insured individuals. This problem is exacerbated by 
the fact that pension providers are required to use the additional resources to increase 
benefits. Unless we know, how this is done, the computation of MWRs is impossible for 
funds with a lower conversion factor, but other relevant benefits. 
 
  4.3.1  Computations of Money’s Worth Ratios 
 
To compute the MWRs in the Swiss second pillar, let us introduce the following 
notation:  M is the main claimant, i.e., the person who has accumulated the claim to the 
pension system, and S  is his/her spouse. The pensioner’s spouse S  is d  years older than 
the main claimant. M  retires at age J  with an accumulated capital stock of K .
46 Upon 
retirement, the accumulated capital is either withdrawn as a lump sum or translated into a 
life–long annuity using the age–dependent conversion factor γ , defined as  
 
    
B
K
γ =    (1) 
 
In case M dies and is survived by his/her spouse S , the latter gets a survivor benefit, 
which is a certain fraction λ  of the main benefit B . For single, divorced or widowed 
agents, the analysis is similar, though much simpler, as joint survival probabilities do not 
have to be taken into account. 
 
When computing the MWR, we have to know the conditional probability of survival 
to age J  for both spouses. Survival probabilities are allowed to depend on marital status, 
and the joint probability of survival is a function of the age difference d   between the 
spouses. The discount rate is denoted ρ . The present value of all future benefits from 
retirement age on can be written as  
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where 
M
J Ψ  is the probability of the main claimant being alive at age J . Combining (2) with 
                                                 
46In a defined benefit system, this is the implicitly defined capital stock that corresponds to the annuity. Note 
that many funds allow a partial withdrawal of capital even in a defined benefit system.   48
(1), we can then compute the MWR for a married individual without children:  
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The derivation for non-constant discount rate is similar, though slightly less elegant. 
In the presence of minor children the benefit level has to be increased by the corresponding 
numbers until the children reach the age of 18 (or 25 if still in school or unable to work). 
 
Note that the pension funds use mortality rates that are pooled over all marital status, 
but of course use different tables for men and women. While the differences for female 
retirees are small (see Figure 16), there are sizeable differences in longevity across marital 
status for men (see Figure 17). Being without a partner in old age (regardless of this being 
caused by widowhood, divorce or never married) constitutes a major threat to a man’s well-
being and survival prospects in old age. Abstracting from survivor benefits, differential 
mortality accounts for a difference of at least 10 percent in the MWR between married and 
non-married men. See also the discussion below in section  4.3.4  Mortality Tables by 
Marital Status. 
 
A MWR exceeding one (or one minus a certain amount to cover administration 
costs) would not be sustainable for the pension provider operating with risk-free assets 
alone. A value of 1.2, for example means that the conversion factor is at least 20 percent too 
high, given the used mortality tables and the underlying risk-free interest rate. As a 
consequence, the used conversion factor is too high by the same percentage. If the 1.2 was 
computed using a conversion factor of 7.2 percent, an actuarially fair and riskless conversion 
rate would be 6 percent, abstracting from administration costs. Recall, however, that a 
higher rate of return can be achieved using an appropriately diversified portfolio. 
 
4.3.2  Money’s Worth Ratios since 2000 
 
Table 12 reports the MWRs for retirees in the second pillar since 2000. As it is 
obvious from the Table, the numbers differ substantially from one year to another when 
using the nominal yield curve to discount future benefits. The most striking feature, 
however, is the average magnitude of MWRs. It is not surprising that many pension funds 
(especially the majority that still uses the legal conversion rate) have faced some difficulty 
in meeting the financial obligations. On the other hand, as is outlined above, discounting 
future income streams with the nominal Swiss bond yield overstates the true cost of an 
annuity to a certain extent. 
 
The uniform conversion factor also leads to dramatically different outcomes for 
different subgroups of the population. In particular, female retirees fare substantially better 
due to the lower statutory retirement age. As the next section will show, this advantage will 
partially disappear with the recent reform of the second pillar. It is important to note that the 
reported numbers also overstate the difference in MWRs as many companies have used 
reserves to finance an equally early retirement age for men also. In some cases, the   49
advantage was even reversed, as male annuitants not only had access to full benefits at age 
62, but also were granted a subsidy out of the fund to replace benefits from the first pillar. 
 
Another striking feature is the difference between single and married men. Due to 
the uniform conversion rate, married men get a higher payoff generated by the present value 
of anticipated survivor benefits. The reported difference underestimates the true magnitude 
of the advantage for married men for two reasons: Firstly, the computations ignore mortality 
differences between married and non-married individuals. As Figure 17 shows, married men 
have a considerably longer expected life-span than single men (see also below). Secondly, 




Table 12  Money's Worth Ratios for Second Pillar Retirees 
Year  Annuitant  SNB Yield  5-year Bond  Fixed 
   Curve  Rate  MWR  3.5% 
2000 female  single  1.069 3.80% 1.117 1.155 
 male  single  0.890    0.917  0.943 
 male  married  1.025    1.068  1.103 
2001 female  single  1.134 3.13% 1.211 1.160 
 male  single  0.937    0.981  0.947 
 male  married  1.086    1.154  1.108 
2002 female  single  1.151 2.73% 1.275 1.165 
 male  single  0.953    1.023  0.951 
 male  married  1.102    1.212  1.112 
2003 female  single  1.242 1.61% 1.475 1.170 
 male  single  1.020    1.152  0.955 
 male  married  1.187    1.393  1.116 
2004 female  single  1.206 2.36% 1.346 1.175 
 male  single  0.991    1.071  0.959 
 male  married  1.152    1.276  1.120 
2005* male  single  1.099  1.42%  1.186  0.963 
 male  married  1.302    1.440  1.124 
2005  female single (62), 5.454%  1.039  1.42%  1.076 0.893 
  male single, 5.835%  0.891    0.961  0.780 
  male married, 5.835%  1.055    1.167  0.911 
MWR calculations for pooled gender survival tables as a function of the 
underlying risk free rate profile since 2000. For all computations, the 
common conversion factor is 7.2 percent, the female retirement age is 62, 
and the age difference of married spouses at retirement is 3.7 years. The 
last three lines (2005, in blue) depict the MWRs using the lowest quoted 
conversion rates to be applied on the non-mandatory capital stock. The 
computations are based on a constant nominal interest rate of 3.5 percent. 
Joint annuities are for men only Mortality rates are updated by 
improvement rates from SFSO. * = no females to retire at statutory 
retirement age.  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Given these numbers, it is surprising, that single men do not take the capital option 
                                                 
47 Retired men with young children get a considerably higher income than younger families as children benefits 
do not exist for working individuals. Although no official statistics exist, evidence from a number of pension 
funds show that young children are predominantly registered for high income individuals. Together with 
differential mortality based on economic well-being, these additional benefits for children increase the true 
MWR for the latter substantially above the values reported in our tables.   50
more often. The data from a number of Swiss pension funds show that this is not the case. 
Bütler and Teppa (2005) argue that this may be due to a lack of alternative longevity 
insurance by the family, and an absence of a bequest motive. It is also not clear, how much 
individuals realize the large differences in the annuity values, especially as a uniform 
conversion factor suggests an equal treatment. Moreover, there are hardly any arbitrage 
opportunities (take the lump sum and buy a private annuity contract), as the offered 
conditions in private annuity contracts are rarely more favorable than those of second pillar 
providers even for single men, possibly due to selection effects. 
 
4.3.3  The Recent Reform 
 
Table 13 reports the MWR based on the slowly decreasing conversion factors and 
the increase in the female retirement age over the next ten years, based on a flat discount 
rate of 3.5 percent. The overall picture is that despite the relatively high chosen discount 
rate, MWRs stay very high. The reduction in the conversion factor comes too late and is not 
large enough. As can be seen from the two columns “single male” and “joint”, the reduction 
is barely able to compensate the expected increase in longevity over the next ten years. It is 
too small to offset the increase in life expectancy since 1985. 
 
Table 13  Projected Money's Worth Ratios 
Year Gender R.A.  C.F.  Single  female  Single male  Joint (F=61.3) 
     FIF  (SFSO) FIF  (SFSO) FIF  (SFSO) 
2004  F  62  0.0720  1.175  (1.191)     
  M  65  0.0720      0.959 (0.904) 1.120 (1.104) 
2005*  M  65  0.0715      0.952 (0.902) 1.117 (1.110) 
2006  F  63  0.0715  1.148  (1.153)     
  M  65  0.0710      0.953 (0.899) 1.113 (1.096) 
2007**  F  64  0.0720  1.133  (1.144)     
  M  65  0.0710      0.957 (0.904) 1.117 (1.100) 
2008  F  64  0.0710  1.122  (1.132)     
  M  65  0.0705      0.954 (0.901) 1.113 (1.097) 
2009  F  64  0.0700  1.111  (1.120)     
  M  65  0.0705      0.958 (0.905) 1.117 (1.100) 
2010  F  64  0.0695  1.107  (1.116)     
  M  65  0.0700      0.955 (0.903) 1.112 (1.096) 
2011  F  64  0.0690  1.103  (1.112)     
  M  65  0.0695      0.952 (0.900) 1.108 (1.092) 
2012  F  64  0.0685  1.099  (1.108)     
  M  65  0.0690      0.948 (0.898) 1.104 (1.088) 
2013  F  64  0.0680  1.095  (1.104)     
  M  65  0.0685      0.945 (0.895) 1.099 (1.084) 
2014  F  64  0.0680  1.098  (1.108)     
  M  65  0.0680      0.941 (0.892) 1.095 (1.079) 
MWRs for the conversion rates specified in the law. The computations are 
based on a constant nominal interest rate of 3.5 percent. Joint annuities are 
for men only (number in parentheses = age of spouse at retirement of main 
claimant). * = MWR for female is not reported as there are no women to 
reach the statutory retirement age. ** = women born in 1943 can choose to 
retire at 63 (at a slightly reduced conversion factor) or at age 64. Mortality 
rates taken from FIS and SFSO (in parenthesis), they are updated by 
improvement rates from SFSO.  
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
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On the other hand, the relative advantage of women compared to married men is 
disappearing with the higher female retirement age. Note again that the MWR computation 
based on pooled survival rates underestimates the MWR of joint annuities to a certain 
degree (especially also considering the fact that many married men can claim additional 
benefits for minor children at no cost). The MWRs for married female retirees are not 
reported here, due to data limitations. However, the increase in the MWR as a consequence 
of expected survivor benefits for insured women is relatively small. Preliminary calculations 
show that the joint annuity MWR for married women is approximately 3 to 4 percent. This 
number looks even smaller when considering the fact, that married women have a much 
lower average capital stock at retirement than other women (approximately half). 
 
4.3.4  Mortality Tables by Marital Status 
 
As Figure 16 and Figure 17 demonstrate, survival rates differ considerably across 
marital status, especially for men. MWRs computed from pooled mortality tables 
considerably overestimate the MWR for single, divorced and widowed men (having lower 
than average life-expectancy).
48 For married men, pooled data is likely to underestimate the 
MWR. Such considerations are especially important in the Swiss context with a uniform 
conversion factor for all individuals. The fact that single men have a lower life expectancy 
than married men reinforces their disadvantage of not having a second claimant in case of 
death. 
 
A second component that has been ignored so far is the age difference between the 
retired spouses. A survivor benefit of 60 percent is of more value for a main claimant with a 
much younger spouse than for somebody with an older spouse. Although benefits can be 
reduced for spouses more than 10 years younger than the main beneficiary, few are and if 
so, in a very moderate fashion. That the age difference matters is illustrated in Figure 20 
below. If the wife is 10 years younger, the implied MWR is approximately 7 percent higher 
than in the case of an equal age for both spouses. The age difference channel increases the 
relative advantage of beneficiaries with children as young children in retirement usually 
mean a much younger wife. For obvious reasons, this does not apply to female beneficiaries. 
 
Unfortunately mortality tables by marital status do not exist for the annuitant 
population, but only for the general population. Nonetheless, the numbers computed for the 
year 2004 are impressive as Table 14 shows. While there is little difference to the previously 
discussed pooled tables in MWRs for women and married men, single men fare 
considerably worse when taking into account mortality differences. The Table also 
illustrates that the availability of a survivor pension increases the MWR by approximately 
20 percent for married men, but only 3 percent for married women. However, more than 10 
percent of the difference in MWRs between married and non-married men can be explained 
by differential mortality. This effect can also be observed for women, albeit to a much lesser 
degree. 
 
                                                 
48For men, mortality differences are negligible between divorced, single and widowed individuals. The new 
law allows survival benefits also for cohabiting couples (same or opposite sex), this amendment is likely to 
increase the MWR for single men to a limited degree.   52
 
Figure 20  MWRs as a Function of Gender and Age 






























married men                       
single men                        
married women, NO widower pension 
married women WITH widower pension
single women                      
 
Money's worth ratios as a function of gender and the age difference 
between spouses (horizontal axis; negative numbers mean than that spouse 
is younger). The figure is drawn for a retirement age of 62, a discount rate 
of 4 percent and a constant annuity. 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
Table 14  MWRs as a Function of Marital Status 
Year Gender  R.A. C.F.  FIF  SFSO  SFSO 
         pooled  marital 
2004            
 female  pooled  62 0.0720  1.175  1.191   
  female married  62 (65.7)  0.0720      1.210 
  female married  62 (—)
49 0.0720      1.171 
 female  single  62 0.0720      1.143 
 female  divorced  62  0.0720      1.108 
 female  widowed  62  0.0720      1.139 
  male married  65 (61.3) 0.0720 1.120  1.104  1.093 
  male married  65 (55)  0.0720      1.148 
  male married  65 (—)
50 0.0720      0.896 
 male  single  65  0.0720  0.959  red 0.904  red 0.805 
 male  divorced  65 0.0720     0.796 
 male  widowed  65  0.0720     0.809 
The computations are based on a constant nominal interest rate of 3.5 
percent. The number in parenthesis corresponds to the age of the main 
claimant’s spouse at retirement, and  0.6 λ = . Mortality rates are updated 
by improvement rates from SFSO. 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
                                                 
49Without survivor benefits 
50Without survivor benefits   53
4.4  Discussion 
 
MWRs in the Swiss second pillar are very high, exceeding one for women and 
married men even at a relatively high discount rate of 3.5 percent. Not surprisingly there is 
considerable pressure by pension funds and insurance companies to lower the conversion 
factor even for the mandatory part of the second pillar. Many autonomous funds have indeed 
already started to use lower conversion factors. The reported MWRs can thus be seen as 
upper bounds. As the computations show, the new conversion factors used by the insurance 
companies for the capital exceeding the mandatory level bring the numbers more closely to 
values computed with the nominal yield curve. 
 
However, there are also certain caveats in our computations: The reported MWR 
correspond to the official picture as stated in the law. But under certain circumstances, the 
conversion factor requirement can be relaxed when the pension fund uses the newly 
available resources to increase the benefits of its retirees. Some pension funds also compute 
the level of pension payments based on conversion factors that are more in line with reality, 
financing the gap between the official and the internal factor with additional levies on 
employees and employer. Needless to say, it is very difficult to obtain confirmed 
information on this practice given the high fragmentation of the system. 
 
As the MWRs demonstrate, uniform conversion factors redistribute resources on a 
remarkable scale. The main losers from this are single men, while the main beneficiaries are 
married men with a younger spouse and young children late in life. As the latter group is 
more affluent on average, the implied shift in resources is probably not socially desirable. 
Due to the increase in the female retirement age, women have “lost” their advantage in the 
scheme. 
 
A stable conversion factor has its merits. Large swings in benefits, caused by 
fluctuations in the market interest rate, can be avoided. This does not only increase the 
intergenerational equity, but also limits the spill-over effects to the first pillar (via means-
tested benefits). But to keep the system financially stable, the conversion factor needs to 
account for increases in longevity and changes in medium-run market conditions. Insurance 
companies, which are crucial to the well-functioning of the system, are now starting to lose 
interest in participating in the annuity market, given that the obligations within the 
mandatory part are more difficult to meet at present. 
 
Future reforms of the BVG/LPP should aim at indexing the conversion rate to 
demographic parameters and long run market conditions (discounting). By this, it would 
contribute to the financial stability of the system and shield it more from political pressure. 
It also has to be discussed, whether a uniform conversion factor (and the implied 
redistribution) should be maintained. Contrary to conventional wisdom, women would not 
lose from such a change. But the occupational scheme would become more flexible and 
better equipped to changes in living patterns and labor market participation. 
 
The calculation of MWRs shows that on the basis of the zero-coupon yield curve 
even the conversion factors used by insurance companies outside the mandatory part of the   54
second pillar veer on the high side for 2005. Abstracting from administrative expenses and 
using the risk-free rates implied by the zero-coupon yield curve on government bonds, a 
conversion factor of 5.53 percent would be justified for married men and a conversion factor 
of 5.25 percent for single women. However, this approach would imply significant 
fluctuations from year to year in annuity conversion factors and would expose retiring 
workers to considerable annuitization risk. Using a long-term rate to determine the annuity 
conversion factor would avoid this risk but would create other problems, such as an 
unintended intergenerational redistribution or potential financial stability issues for annuity 
providers. An alternative that would mitigate these problems would be to allow use of 
installment annuities. This would involve using part of accumulated capital to purchase an 
immediate annuity and part to purchase deferred annuities. Such an approach could also be 
combined with the purchase of variable annuities and use of lump sum payments.   55
 
V.  THE ORGANIZATION AND VOLUME OF SECOND PILLAR 
 
Each employer can choose between different organizational structures. These range 
from setting up a completely autonomous and independent pension fund to outsourcing the 
scheme entirely to an insurance company. Independent pension funds and insurance 
companies are subject to different laws and thus different legal restrictions along several 
dimensions, which can be expected to have an impact on the financial structure of the 
pension scheme.  
 
The second pillar is characterized by a large number of pension funds. Although 
their number has declined considerably over time (Table 15), there is still high 
fragmentation. The number of individuals covered by the pension funds is more difficult to 
determine as some workers/retirees participate in more than one fund (in case of multiple 
employers). 
 
Table 15  Number of Pension Funds and Members 





12,851 11,572 10,409 9,096 8,134 -36.71%
Pension Funds with 
members 
4,727 4,285 3,806 3,418 3,170 -32.94%
Members (in m)  3,24 3,15 3,14 3,23 3,31 2.22%
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004b), p.32, T8 
 
This chapter outlines the different structures of pension funds, their characteristics, 
and their relative importance. It suffers from data limitations due to the large fragmentation 
of the second pillar and somewhat outdated standards on reporting and accounting. These 
shortcomings will be especially important in the section on the volume of the contributions 
and the accumulated old-age capital. A sizable part of the chapter is dedicated to the 
incidence of underfunding within occupational pension plans that has become an important 
policy issue since the turn of the millennium. 
 
5.1  Institutions and Organization 
 
Setting up a pension fund involves decisions on different organizational issues like 
the application for registration, the choice of its legal and administrative form, and finally, 
on how risk should be covered. This section illustrates these three issues in turn. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter    2.2, by law the BVG insures income above the 
coordination offset and below a defined upper bound. In addition, pension providers can also 
offer insurance on a voluntary basis for income above and below the threshold levels: Most 
of them do it for income exceeding the upper level, but very few provide coverage for lower 
income levels. Companies that cover the mandatory part need to be registered. Those that 
only provide supplementary services do not. In 2002, 30 percent of all pension funds were   56
registered, i.e., they insured the mandatory part of the wage income according to Art. 48 
BVG. More importantly, these funds covered 95 percent of all insured individuals. These 
figures have remained relatively constant over the last 8 years. 
 
A further classification of pension funds can be made according to their legal form. 
One distinguishes pension funds under private law or under public law
51. The pension funds 
can freely choose among the different types. Pension funds under public law often serve 
public employees and vice versa.
52 In 2002, 7,999 (2,806,141 members) out of total 8,134 
pension funds (3,311,378 members), or equivalently 98 percent (85 percent) were under 
private law.
53 Even though these relations were quite stable over the last decade, there has 
been a shift toward pension funds under private law since 1998 due to the reorganization and 
privatization of state–owned enterprises. 
 
Another classification of pension funds is based on their administrative form, 
represented by two main classes: A pension fund manages either the credit balances of one 
employer or of a group of several employers. Although about 54 percent of the pension 
funds are dedicated to one employer, 92.1 percent of all insured individuals belong to an 
institution with many affiliated employers. A comparison between 2000 and 2002 reveals 
that the number of single-employer institutions decreased much more than that of multi-
employer ones. Within the group of institutions with many employers attached, the 
“Collective–Institution”
54 is the institution with the largest number of members. This 
administrative form allows a pooling of individual independent employers. Often an 
insurance company administers such institutions. Within a “collective–institution” each 
employer constitutes its own “pension fund entity” and negotiates its own pension plan(s). 
 
The last classification of pension funds depends on the degree of risk coverage. This 
issue defines the risk exposure of the pension scheme with respect to, firstly, longevity, and, 
secondly, premature death or disability. Depending on the way a pension fund bears these 
risks, the following legal forms are distinguished:  
 
1.  Autonomous pension funds without reinsurance policy: The pension fund bears all 
the risks.  
2.  Autonomous pension funds with reinsurance policy: Some of the risks (e.g. potential 
maximum losses) are handed over to a reinsurance company.  
3.  Semi-autonomous pension funds include two cases: a) a pension fund hands over 
                                                 
51 This classification is actually a relic from the period prior to the introduction of the BVG as a mandatory 
occupational pension agreement. The reason was the following: Before the occupational pension system was 
rendered mandatory, there were already many personnel-care (employee benefit) institutions 
(Personalfürsorgeeinrichtungen). However, the means collected by the employers to provide this voluntary 
service had to be strictly segregated from the rest of employer assets, i.e., they had to be transferred to an 
independent legal entity. Thus, the employers were allowed to either give the money to an insurance company 
(that operates under private law) or create a foundation or a cooperative (likewise subject to private law) or 
lodge the money in an institution under public law. These legal forms were eventually incorporated into the 
BVG. 
52 Recently, some public pension funds considered changing their legal form, as an action against funding 
problems. An example is the pension fund of the canton Zug. 
53 Note that almost all of these funds, i.e., over 99%, are foundations. 
54 “Collective–Institution” (Sammeleinrichtung (dt.), institution collective (fr.))   57
only the risk of death or disability to an insurance company and consequently still 
bears the risk of longevity; b) the pension fund buys the old-age pensions from the 
insurer too. The pension fund still manages the accumulation of retirement capital.  
4.  Non-autonomous pension funds
55: All the risks are covered by an insurance 
company.   
5.  Savings associations: By construction, this form bears no actuarial risks, because 
only old–age savings are accumulated.  
 
Table 16 presents an overview of the classification of pension funds. The number of 
non-autonomous pension funds has more than halved, but the number of individuals in such 
funds has remained constant. This reduction is mainly due to a decrease in the number of 
“Institutions of firms” (almost -40 percent since 1994) and of “Institutions for one 
employer”. Autonomous pension funds with reinsurance contracts show an increase in both 
the number of funds by almost 20 percent and the number of covered individuals by more 
than 85 percent. They almost doubled their relative market share. This could suggest a 
general tendency toward handing over potential maximum losses. However, autonomous 
pension funds with reinsurance count less than 800 members on average. In comparison, 
autonomous pension funds have on average 2,500 members. This higher number allows 
them to bear more risk on their own. 
 
Table 16  Risk Coverage of Pension Funds under BVG 
Characteristics 1994 2002  Change 2002 
   %    %  %  #Members/PF 
autonomous          
# Pension Funds  663 14.0% 457 14.4% -31.1%  
# Members  1,196,376 36.9% 1,143,142 34.5% -4.5% 2,501 




# Pension Funds  488 10.3% 583 18.4% 19.5%  
# Members  242,167 7.5% 450,479 13.6% 86.0% 773 
   
Semi-autonomous  
# Pension Funds  2,120 44.8% 1,404 44.3% -33.8%  
# Members  592,556 18.3% 504,291 15.2% -14.9% 359 
   
non-autonomous  
# Pension Funds  1,300 27.5% 620 19.6% -52.3%  
# Members  1,186,639 36.6% 1,205,320 36.4% 1.6% 1,944 
   
savings association   
# Pension Funds  156 3.3% 106 3.3% -32.1%  
# Members  21,617 0.7% 8,146 0.2% -62.3% 77 
   
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004b), p.32, T8 
 
Table 17 combines the two characteristics “Administrative Form” and “Degree of 
Risk Coverage” for the most recently available data. As Table 16 shows, the autonomous 
and the non–autonomous pension funds cover the largest number of individuals. Within the 
group of autonomous institutions, the mixed forms (544,841) and the institutions of firms, 
holdings or parent companies (401,738) encompass the largest number of covered 
                                                 
55Non-autonomous pension fund = Kollektive Pensionskasse (german)    58
individuals. Together they cover 83 percent of all the individuals insured in an autonomous 
pension fund. Concerning the absolute number of institutions within the group of non-
autonomous institutions, the institutions for one employer are very prevalent with a share of 
63 percent per fund, but since this administrative form only insures a modest number of 
individuals, its importance is limited compared to the 903,320 insured individuals in the 
collective–institutions (which equals 75 percent of total insured in non–autonomous funds). 
The latter group also constitutes the largest pool of members. 
 
Table 17  Administrative Form and Risk Coverage in 2002 
Pension Funds  Autonomous  Autonomous Semi-  Non-  Savings  Total 
   (with 
reinsurance) 
autonomous Autonomous associations   
         
Collective-Institution  1% 2% 5% 6% 0%  126 
# Members  0%  4%  45%  75%  0%  1,152,448 
         
Common-Institution  4% 7% 2% 6% 0%  130 
#  Members  8%  45% 27% 16%  0%  615,849 
         
Mixed  Form  17%  5% 0% 1% 0%  115 
#  Members  48%  6% 0% 0% 0%  576,975 
         
Institutions of firms, 
holdings 
       
or  mother  companies  41% 38% 21% 15% 16%  804 
# Members  35%  27%  13%  5%  42%  659,576 
         
Institutions of 
another 
       
pooling reason  6%  8%  11%  8%  10%  288 
#  Members  1% 3% 3% 1% 3%  43,923 
         
Institution for one 
employer 
32% 40% 61% 64% 74%  1,707 
#  Members  8% 15%  13% 3% 55%  262,607 
         
Total  457 583  1,404  620 106  3,170 
# Members  1,143,142  450,479  504,291 1,205,320  8,146 3,311,378 
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004b), p.34, T9 
 
Table 15 has shown that the number of pension funds with active contributors has 
decreased by 33 percent from 1994 to 2002, indicating a consolidation and reallocation 
process of the whole pension fund industry. Potential explanation is a shift in the choice of 
administrative form and risk coverage. The only funds that increased the number of covered 
individuals were the autonomous funds with reinsurance and the non–autonomous funds 
(Table 16), i.e., both funds that hand over at least part of the risk to another party. Table 18 
documents the relocation within the administrative forms. Employers have become more 
likely to join collective–institutions and common–institutions (often organized by 
professional associations). From 1994 to 2002, their respective share has increased by 15 
percent and 19 percent, respectively. On the other hand, employers have become more 
reluctant to organize the pension fund “in–house.” 
 
Several possible reasons explain the outsourcing of occupational old–age provision. 
First, outsourcing reduces the administrative efforts of employers. Second, large institutions   59
that are specialized in the provision of old–age insurance can handle and manage the old–
age credit balances in a more professional and potentially more successful way. Third, 
already the choice of the administrative form often defines the degree of risk coverage by 
another party. Table 17 shows that 75 out of 100 collective–institutions have all their risks 
covered by an insurance company. 
 
Table 18  Shift in the Choice of Administrative Form 
  1994  2002  Abs. change  Rel. change 
        
Collective-Institution 139  126  -13  -9% 
# Members  1,079,964  1,152,448  72,484  7% 
# attached employer  158,643  183,002  24,359  15% 
# attached employer per PF  1,141  1,452  311  27% 
        
Common-Institution 147  130  -17  -12% 
# Members  562,129  615,849  53,720  10% 
# attached employer  94,354  111,948  17,594  19% 
# attached employer per PF  642  861  219  34% 
        
Institutions of firms, holdings  1,309  804  -505  -39% 
or mother companies         
# Members  667,732  659,576  -8,156  -1% 
# attached employer  6,682  4,862  -1,820  -27% 
# attached employer per PF  5  6  1  18% 
 Source: 1: Bundesamt für Statistik (1999), p.43 
2: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004b), p.30, T7 
  
To summarize, the dominant form of pension funds is registered and subject to 
private law. It manages funds in a centralized way for more than one employer. The degree 
of risk coverage displays a wide range of options, but there is an increasing tendency to 
reinsure certain risks, or to hand them over to an insurance company. 
 
5.2  Contributions, Old–Age Capital and Annuities 
 
Contributions: 
Table 19 shows the contributions collected by all Swiss pension funds since 1996. In 
2002, the total amount of contributions paid by employers, employees and others amounted 
to 31.3 billions CHF, or approximately 7 percent of Swiss GDP. Almost 50 percent went to 
autonomous pension funds and over 25 percent to non-autonomous pension funds. The 
remaining contributions were evenly distributed among the other forms. Pension funds 
under public law contribute 7,117 million CHF or equivalently 23 percent of the total premia 
volume. The fraction paid by the employers is 63.4 percent, which is higher than the average 
of 57 percent, indicating more rigorously sponsored pension plans at pension funds under 
public law. In contrast, employers affiliated to Collective– and Common–Institutions 
contribute around 54 percent. In total, contributions to Collective– and Common–
Institutions make up 35 percent of the overall premia paid in 2002. This share can be 
considered as an upper bound approximation for the contributions managed by life insurance 
companies.
56  
                                                 
56It is an approximation since 91% of the insured in non-autonomous pension funds and 72 percent of the 
insured in semi-autonomous pension funds belong to Collective– and Common–Institutions.   60
 
Table 19  Size of Contributions 
in m. CHF  1996 1998 2000 2002 PF under Collective– and 
  Total Total Total Total public law Common Instit.
 
Employees 9,139 9,440 10,398 11,835 2,608 4,857
 Employers  16,260 17,894 16,712 17,946 4,509 5,836
Other Contributions  699 1,325 1,101 1,549 0 138
Total Contributions  26,098 28,659 28,211 31,330 7,117 10,831
%  Employers  62.3% 62.4% 59.2% 57.3% 63.4% 53.9%
 
 
Swiss GDP (current 
prices) 
373,993 390,191 415,529 431,064
Tot. Cont. as % of 
GDP 
7.0% 7.3% 6.8% 7.3%
            
Total Members (mn)  3.15 3.14 3.23 3.31 0.51 1.77
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004a) 
 
Old–age Credit Balances: 
In 2002 accumulated balances on the notional old-age credit accounts amounted to 
CHF 123 billion. This represented 28 percent of the total assets of pension funds and 
corresponded to 29 percent of GDP. Total old-age credit balances grew by almost 8 percent 
per year since 2000, when they amounted to CHF 106 billion or 26 percent of that year's 
GDP. 
 
Old-age credit balances represent the contributions and minimum interest income 
that must be credited to these accounts under the mandatory system. Since the system was 
introduced in 1985 and applies only to the so-called coordinated earnings of members (i.e., 
earnings that range approximately between 40 and 120 percent of average earnings of all 
Swiss workers), it is not surprising that they account for a fraction of total pension fund 
assets. 
 
Currently available data do not report the amounts of contributions that are made to 
the mandatory part of the system, nor the payouts of accumulated mandatory balances due to 
retirement or death. A more complete picture will become available in 2006 following the 
implementation of the new reporting and accounting standards.  
 
Annuities: 
Table 20 presents several factors that describe the Swiss annuities market. Total 
annuity and capital payments are shown in values and as a fraction of GDP. In 2002, annuity 
payments were more than three times their level in 1987, i.e., two years after the 
introduction of the mandatory system. During the same time span, annuity payments more 
than doubled as a fraction of GDP, reaching 4.22 percent of GDP in 2002. The yearly 
increase is due to both an increase in the number of recipients and an increase in the average 
annuity payment. The same is true for capital (lump sum) payments. From 1987 to 2002 
they rose from 0.36 to 0.82 percent of GDP. During this period, they increased as a 
proportion of total payments from 15 percent in 1987 to 19 percent in 2000 but then fell to 
16 percent in 2002.  The fall in the relative share of capital payments in 2002 is probably 
due to the increase in the incidence of early retirement since early retirement packages are 
often tied to an annuity. Figure 20 illustrates the different growth patterns for annuity and   61
capital payments. 
 
Table 20  Size of Annuity Market 
 1987 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
 
in m. CHF 
Annuity Payments
(AP) 
5,503 9,000 10,751 12,533 14,492 16,292 18,127
Capital Payments
(CP) 
948 1,830 2,320 2,842 2,993 3,910 3,525
 
Total Payments  6,451 10,830 13,071 15,375 17,485 20,202 21,652
GDP (current prices)  263,743 350,807 367,729 373,993 390,191 415,529 431,064
 
# Recipients (AP)  609,875 647,111 694,912 748,124 803,064
Average Annuity 
(AA) 
17,628 19,368 20,854 21,777 22,572
# Recipients (CP)  29,684 30,342 29,145 31,164 28,308
 
CP (% of AP)  17% 20% 22% 23% 21% 24% 19%
AP (% of GDP)  2.09% 2.57% 2.92% 3.35% 3.71% 3.92% 4.21%
CP (% of GPD)  0.36% 0.52% 0.63% 0.76% 0.77% 0.94% 0.82%
Note: Form year 1994 on, annuity payments are current payments as at 31.12 
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik 
 
Available data do not report the proportion of accumulated capital of newly retired 
workers (both under the mandatory and super-mandatory parts of the system) that is 
withdrawn as a lump sum and the part that is converted into an annuity. They also do not 
report the number of new retirees who convert all their accumulated capital into an annuity, 
those who withdraw the total capital, and those who withdraw a fraction of the available 
capital and convert the rest.  
 













1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Annuity Payments (AP) Capital Payments (CP)
# Recipients (AP) # Recipients (CP)
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations   62
However, Switzerland has a very high annuitization rate within the second pillar 
compared to other countries despite the fact that the first pillar already offers a basic annuity 
stream which is close to the subsistence level. As there are no detailed representative 
statistics on the annuitization rate within the second pillar, we have to use proxy estimates.  
Using the number of new first pillar claimants and second pillar coverage rates, the number 
of new second pillar recipients is approximately 55 thousand each year. So departing from 
the 28,000 recipients of capital payments approximately 50 percent use a combination of a 
lump sum and an annuity. Bütler and Teppa's (2005) not representative dataset and 
preliminary evidence from labor force surveys also suggest that approximately 40 to 50 
percent choose a (fractional) lump sum. All together approximately 20 percent of the 
accumulated capital is withdrawn as a lump sum for all three data sources (aggregate 
numbers, Bütler and Teppa (2005), and labor survey data). This fraction seems to have 
increased during the last decade, predominantly due to more sponsors allowing the lump 
sum option. Within companies that have always offered the capital option, the increase is 
less pronounced.  
 
Another question is why the annuitization rate is so high. The first possible reason 
lies in the structure of the Swiss pension scheme with its close links between the 
accumulation and decumulation phases. During the accumulation phase (in which the 
individuals do not have any choice of provider and/or savings plan), the second pillar 
contributions are not only used to accumulate old age pension capital in quasi-individual 
accounts, but also to stock reserves to be used to cushion market fluctuations and other risks 
such as longevity increases of the current retirees in the scheme. At retirement the notional 
capital stock is translated into an annuity stream using high conversion rates mandated by 
law. In a way, individuals are compensated for lower accruals during the contribution period 
by higher annuity conversion rates when old. The second reason probably is tradition. The 
second pillar grew out of private occupational pension plans which predominantly offered 
defined benefits in the form of annuities long before the first pillar came into existence. So if 
people follow a habit, more people would annuitize than without such a tradition. Bütler and 
Teppa (2005) show, that there are large company effects even after controlling for pension 
plan and company characteristics, supporting the hypothesis that people follow a habit (or 
their peers and forerunners). 
 
5.3  Assets, Liabilities and Investments 
 
Table 21 shows the consolidated balance sheet of all pension funds since 1987. Total 
assets have increased by a factor of more than 2.5. Expressed as a fraction of GDP, assets 
have increased from 64 percent to over 100 percent. Due to unfavorable developments in the 
financial markets, pension wealth experienced a temporary decline after 2000. In accordance 
with a more favorable evolution of financial markets, the pension wealth did increase again 
thereafter.  
 
The same holds true for reserves. Since 1987, accumulated reserves have increased 
substantially. In 2000, they amounted to over 12 percent of fixed and non-fixed capital. This 
is comparable to the yearly volatility of the Swiss Market Index (SMI) as a measure for 
market uncertainty - 15 percent in 2000.   63
 
Fixed and non–fixed capital reached the size of the Swiss GDP in 2000.
57 This 
position comprises present values of current annuities, contributions for income exceeding 
the mandatory threshold, all accruals for the risks of longevity, disability and death, some 
contributions that are dated before 1985, and the old-age credit balances of active 
contributors. (Again, due to data limitation a more complete picture will only be available in 
2006.) Finally, debt capital, which more than doubled to almost CHF 17 billion over the last 
15 years, mainly includes accounts payable and passive debt, as well as some passive 
mortgages.  
 
Table 21  Total Assets and Liabilities of Swiss Pension Funds 
in M. CHF  1987 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
 
Direct Investments  148,667 236,129 267,759 305,676 372,141 412,092 359,335
Indirect Investments  9,846 18,488 25,498 38,833 52,928 74,902 77,745
Other Assets  9,170 2,059 2,770 3,786 3,182 3,889 3,475
Total Assets  167,683 256,676 296,027 348,295 428,251 490,883 440,555
 
Dept Capital  7,449 8,953 10,854 10,821 14,646 15,861 16,964
Funding Status 
and Provisions  2,831 5,214 7,299 19,207 37,273 51,156 17,958
Employer’s Reserve  0 0 6,436 6,682 8,410 8,788 8,529
Fixed and 
Non-Fixed Capital  157,403 242,513 271,438 311,585 367,922 415,078 397,104
Total Liabilities  167,683 256,680 296,027 348,295 428,251 490,883 440,555
 
Ind. Inv (% of Dir Inv.)  6.6% 7.8% 9.5% 12.7% 14.2% 18.2% 21.6%
Total Assets (% of GDP)  63.6% 73.2% 80.5% 93.1% 109.8% 118.1% 102.2%
Fixed & Non-Fixed 
Cap. (% of GDP)  59.7% 69.1% 73.8% 83.3% 94.3% 99.9% 92.1%
Provisions in % F&NF Cap.  1.8% 2.15% 2.69% 6.16% 10.13% 12.32% 4.52%
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik 
 
Table 22 shows the investments in more detail. Total investments increased between 
1996 and 2000, but decreased by over 10 percent to 437,080 million CHF in 2002, mainly 
due to the general decline in financial market returns. Investments in both Swiss and foreign 
shares, representing almost one fourth of total investment assets, decreased by more than 33 
percent. Hence, it is not surprising that net investment income dropped by almost 22 percent 
to 11,947 million CHF during that period. On the other hand, investments in “other assets
58” 
increased each year. Especially, the allocation to alternative investments has been rising. 
This diversification of the portfolios with alternative assets, such as hedge funds, private 
equity and commodities, can raise returns while diversifying and reducing overall 
investment risk. 
 
Figure 22 shows the average allocation of the investments made by pension funds. 
Three trends (or consequences of the decline in financial market values and returns) are 
apparent and worth mentioning. First, the relative investments in securities that are issued by 
the employer (i.e., shares or other receivables) decreased sharply. Second, the proportion of 
bonds held by pension funds increased after 2000. Third, the relative amounts invested in 
shares fell to slightly below 25 percent in 2002. The latter two trends mainly reflect the 
                                                 
57 Fixed capital includes savings, the capital used to cover pension liabilities plus sufficient reserves. Non-fixed 
capital thus is the amount exceeding fixed capital. 
58Included in this position are accounts receivable, alternative investments, and mixed investments.   64
current situation in financial markets, the economic situation of the pension funds 
themselves, and possibly an increased risk aversion of pension fund managers. 
 
Table 22  Investments 
in M. CHF  1996  1998  2000  2002 
    in %    in %    in %    in % 
Liquid  assets  and              
short-term 
Investments 
33,045 9.6% 39,614 9.3% 36,051 7.4% 44,821 10.3%
Investments in 
employer 
44,085 12.8% 46,918 11.0% 30,448 6.3% 11,735 2.7%
Bonds 108,084 31.4% 131,720 31.0% 152,936 31.4% 155,193 35.5%
Mortgages 26,552 7.7% 26,338 6.2% 24,731 5.1% 22,486 5.1%
Shares 66,201 19.2% 108,212 25.5% 160,947 33.0% 107,412 24.6%
Real estate  54,347 15.8% 56,346 13.3% 61,242 12.6% 64,610 14.8%
Others 12,195 3.5% 15,921 3.7% 20,639 4.2% 30,823 7.1%
Total 344,509 425,069 486,994 437,080
              
Net Inv. Income  14,092    14,478    15,234    11,947   
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004a) 
 






















Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004a) 
 
Figure 23 breaks down the positions held in bonds. Bonds of Swiss debtors make up 
almost half of the investments in bonds. Another quarter of the investments are effected in 
foreign bonds in foreign currency. In 2002, foreign bonds in CHF and Swiss mortgages were 
equally important, although the share of mortgages has decreased, and the share of foreign 
bonds in CHF has increased. Mortgages in foreign properties are not important at all. 
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Figure 23  Investments in Bonds 
50.3% 47.7% 47.2% 47.3%
8.4% 9.9% 11.6% 11.8%
20.5% 24.7% 26.3% 27.3%
19.4% 16.4% 13.7% 12.5%
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Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004a) 
 
Figure 24 shows the relative investments of pension funds with different degrees of 
risk coverage in 2002. Table 23 presents the total investment and the average investment per 
member for different forms of pension funds. It is not surprising that the autonomous 
pension funds have the largest balances. First, they insure many individuals, and second, 
they bear all the risks themselves. As a direct consequence, they have a huge stock of 
capital, both in total and per member. Apparently, the amount of capital per member 
decreases with the degree a pension fund hands over its risks to an insurance company. 
Hence, non–autonomous pension funds have just a tiny stock of capital left. This can be 
traced back to the fact that their risks are exclusively managed by an insurance company. De 
facto, they hand over directly most of their premiums, i.e., they merely act as intermediary 
between the members and the insurance company. 
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autonomous autonomous (with reinsurance) semi-autonomous non-autonomous
 
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004b), p.53 sqq., Tab. A.05   66
 
Table 23  Investments of Pension Funds with different degrees of Risk Coverage 
in CHF (2002)  Total Inv. # Members Inv./Member
 (in  billions)
autonomous 298,6 1,143,142 261,199
autonomous (with reinsurance)  63,3 450,479 140,606
semi-autonomous 39,8 504,291 78,861
non-autonomous 10,9 1,205,320 9,031
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004b), p.32, T8 
 
Finally, Figure 25 depicts the relationship between the amount invested in different 
assets for pension funds under private law and under public law. This figure reveals that 
there is no apparent difference between the investment strategy of pension funds managed 
under private and those managed under public law. 
 
















Bonds Morgages Shares Real estate Others
under private law under public law
 
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004b), p.53, Tab. A.05 
 
5.4  Financial Situation of Pension Funds 
 
Extensive discussions about the financial situation of pension funds have been 
recurrent in recent years. The reason is threefold: Firstly, the decline in financial market 
returns reduced the value of investments in securities. Secondly, not all pension funds had 
enough reserves to balance out those fluctuations in asset values. Thirdly, the accumulated 
increase in life expectancy could not be fully compensated anymore by market returns 
exceeding the minimum interest rate specified in the law.  
 
In 2002, nearly 20 percent of all pension funds (excluding Collective-Institutions) 
were underfunded. In 2003, this figure decreased to 12 percent and in 2004 even further to 
10 percent. A pension fund is deemed as underfunded if its required old–age capital is more 
than the available capital plus reserves. This calculation is based on the report submitted by 
each individual fund. By law, the technical rate is fixed between 3.5 percent and 4.5 percent 
(Art. 8 FZV). The specific rate, however, is incumbent on the technical expert. The expert   67
takes into account the pension fund's specific characteristics and the long term evolution of 
influential (exogenous) factors.  
 
Table 24 indicates to what extent pension funds differ in their technical interest rate. 
Firstly, the min/max spread ranges from 2.5 percent to 4.5 percent. Technical rates below 
3.5 percent are almost never used to compute actuarial liabilities of retirees, but only of 
active contributors. Secondly, on average, the technical rate slightly decreased from 2004 to 
2005. Thirdly, pension funds under public law generally use higher rates than those funds 
under private law. A higher technical rate generates a higher funding ratio. A 1 percent 
increase in the technical rate increases the funding ratio by approximately 10-15 percent by 
decreasing the present value of future liabilities. Note that pension funds under public law 
not only feature higher technical rates, but also lower funding ratios on average. 
 
The pension funds (and thus their submitted reports) are supervised by two different 
agencies. Firstly, each pension fund has to choose a private supervisor as well as an expert 
for occupational provision (i.e., the technical expert). The former agency checks the 
administration of the business, its accountancy, and the investments. The latter expert audits 
the pension fund's ability to fulfill its obligations (at any point in time) and checks for 
compliance with the actuarial requirements (i.e., of both the provision of services and its 
funding). Secondly, each pension fund is supervised by a governmental supervisory 
authority. This authority, which is responsible for all pension funds in each canton, inspects, 
among other things, the reports of the fund's supervisor and of the technical expert. 
 
Table 24  Technical Interest Rates 
 Private  Public  Total 
  2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
       
Max  4.00% 4.00% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50%
Mean  3.85% 3.81% 4.07% 4.06% 3.90% 3.87%
Min  2.75% 2.50% 3.50% 3.50% 2.75% 2.50%
Source: Swisscanto (2005), p.48, Graph 2 
 
5.4.1  Underfunding of Pension Funds 
 
The financial situation of pension funds is reviewed annually
59. Since the review is 
based on balance sheet data, the reference points are 31.12.2003 and 31.12.2002, 
respectively
60. The first overview of the extent of underfunding of pension funds in recent 
years is given in Table 25.  Note that the “collective-institutions” were excluded from the 
analysis, and that the following numbers of pension funds with funding deficits would be 
greater if a lower technical discount rate had been used. Recall that a 1 percent decrease in 
                                                 
59According to Art. 44a BVV 2, the responsible agency is the Federal Office for Social Security, and the data is 
provided by the regulation authority. 
60All pension funds are legally obligated to submit a detailed report on their business and their financial 
situation each year. If a pension fund does not submit this report, a strict procedure is enforced. Obviously, not 
all pension funds handed in their documents on time. Hence, the explored data represent 83.8 percent of all 
pension funds in 2003, and 81.1 percent of the pension funds in 2002. Still, the data is reliable, especially since 
subsequent statements did not change the data substantially.    68
the technical rate decreases the funding ratio by approximately 10-15 percent. Consequently, 
the amount of the funding gap would also increase. In 2003, 11.9 percent of all pension 
funds reported an underfunding. In 2002, this number had been considerably higher, 
amounting to 20 percent. This improvement can partly be explained by the recovery of 
financial markets, starting in April 2003. Another reason for this amelioration is selective 
action that had been taken to correct the funding gap.  
 
The group of registered pension funds is split into two subgroups. The larger part 
consists of all pension funds under private law and of those pension funds under public law 
without a public warranty. In 2003, 16.4 percent of this subgroup was underfunded. In 2002, 
this figure was 28.7 percent. The worst situation in terms of underfunding, however, 
concerns pension funds under public law with a public warranty. This is not surprising, 
given the state–financed reinsurance, which covers potential financing gaps. Thus, they have 
a weaker incentive to prevent a funding deficit. In 2003, more than half of pension funds 
with a public warranty reported an underfunding. 
 
The financial situation of pension funds from the perspective of members is as 
follows. In 2003, the fraction of members belonging to a pension fund (without “Collective–
Institutions”) with a funding deficit amounted to more than 30 percent. Even though the 
situation has greatly improved since 2002, where this fraction was almost 50 percent, it 
remains somewhat critical. 
 
Table 25  Extent of Underfunding
61 
Pension Funds  2003  2002 
  With  in %  With  in % 
 underfunding   underfunding   
 Registered PF:         
PF without public warranty  339  16.40%  604  28.70% 
PF with public warranty  45  54.90%  38
62 49.4% 
Total registered  384  17.80%  642  29.40% 
Total PF with underfunding  431  11.90%  722  20.00% 
Source:  1: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2004a), p.4, T2 
2: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2003), p.4, T2   
 
Table 25 provided an idea of how many pension funds have a potential solvency 
problem. In 2003, the total amount of the funding gap comprising all the pension funds was 
25,376 million CHF (16,720 m Euro or 21,884 m dollars). This corresponds to a funding gap 
of almost 20 percent of the total assets of underfunded pension funds or 6.3 percent of the 
total assets for all pension funds. The number of underfunded pension funds decreased from 
2002 to 2003 and so did the size of the funding gap in absolute terms. The corresponding 
numbers are reported in Table 26. 
                                                 
61  without “Collective-Institutions” 
62  This figure can not be compared with the one in 2003. This is due to the fact that in 2002 not all pension 
funds under public law with a funding gap reported their figures.   69
 
Table 26  Money Value of Shortage
63 
Pension Funds  2003  2002 
  Under- % of total % of tot. Under- % of total % of tot.
  funding assets of PF assets of funding assets of PF assets of
  m CHF with DC
64 all PF m CHF with DC all PF
Registered PF: 
PF, no public warranty  8,960 12.00% 2.80% 13,278 11.90% 4.40%
PF with public warranty  16,343 31.00% 23.30% 29,253 40.30% 36.10%
Total registered  25,303 19.80% 6.50% 42,531 23.00% 11.10%
Total all PF  25,376 19.60% 6.30% 42,709 22.90% 9.90%
Source:  1: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2004a), p.5, T3 
2: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2003), p.6, T3 
 
Panel A of Table 27 shows the evolution of pension funds with underfunding in 
recent years. For institutions under private law, this number fell form 583 to 331 cases. The 
situation of pension funds under public law with a public warranty, however, is different. 
The number of underfunded funds within this group increased from 38 cases in 2002 to 45 
cases in 2003. 
 
Panel B presents the corresponding data for the size of the funding deficit. The 
number of pension funds under private law with a funding gap improved, but the percentage 
of the funding shortage with respect to the total assets of these pension funds remained the 
same. This implies that the average funding ratio increased for those pension funds affected 
by a shortage in 2002 (assuming that the funds that were close to a funding ratio of 100 
percent could recover). For the pension funds under public law with a public warranty the 
number of underfunded pension funds increased, while the relative deficit with respect to 
total assets decreased. Nevertheless, the average situation improved considerably, as the 
total funding gap decreased from 42,531 million CHF to 25,303 million CHF. 
 
Table 27  Underfunding and Legal From
65 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  PF with DC In % of total PF  Underfunding % of total assets 
        (m CHF)  of PF with DC 
 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003  2002
 
PF under private law  331 583 16.02% 28.02% 7,406 11,213 11.63% 11.89%
 
PF under public law  8 21 (34.80%) (84.00%) 1,554 2,065 13.80% 11.70%
(with no public warranty) 
 
PF under public law  45 38 54.90% 49.40% 16,343 29,253 31.00% 40.30%
(with public warranty) 
 
Total 384 642 17.80% 29.40% 25,303 42,531 19.80%  23.00%
Source:  1: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2004a), p.7, T6 
2: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2003), p.9, T7 
 
                                                 
63without “Collective-Institutions” 
64DC = deficient cover 
65without “Collective-Institutions”   70
5.4.2  Funding Ratios of Underfunded Pension Funds 
 
The aim of this subsection is to get an idea of the number of pension funds suffering 
from serious funding problems. By definition, a pension fund experiences a serious funding 
problem if its funding ratio, defined as the ratio between its net assets and the present value 
of its actuarial pension liabilities, is less than 90 percent. The funding ratio provides 
information about the financial ability to pay debt when it matures. In other words, it is a 
measure of solvency. Liquidity, in contrast, refers to the feasibility with which an asset can 
be converted into fungible means. The latter is also important for Swiss pension funds, for 
according to the law, the pension capital is fully portable. Data on pension funds were 
analyzed separately for all administrative forms, except collective institutions (Table 28), 
and for “collective-institutions” (Table 29). 
 
Table 28 displays pension funds with a financial shortage according to their funding 
ratios
66. Panel A refers to pension funds without a public warranty. In 2003, 57 pension 
funds (15 percent) had a funding ratio below 90 percent and thus a serious liquidity problem. 
The money value of their underfunding was 5,222 million CHF, which is equivalent to 21 
percent of their total assets. Nevertheless, the majority of the pension funds with an 
underfunding had a funding gap of less than 10 percent. The situation of pension funds with 
a public warranty is more critical (Panel B). In 2003, the majority (29 pension funds or 65 
percent) had a funding gap of more than 10 percent. These pension funds reported a deficit 
of 15,779 million CHF, or in relative terms, for 95 percent of the overall deficit. In terms of 
their total assets, the funding gap is alarming. Even though the situation of these pension 
funds has improved, the lack of financial resources of almost 40 percent of their total assets 
is still sizeable. 
 
Table 29 presents the situation of “collective–institutions”. Recall that a “collective–
institution” is an aggregate of many independent employers, in which each employer is 
shown separately. In 2003, 7,832 employers who were attached to a “collective–institution” 
had an underfunded old-age credit balance. In this group, nearly 5 percent of the accounts 
(372) had a serious funding problem. In terms of money, their underfunding was equal to 
113 million CHF, which is almost 41 percent of the overall deficit and equivalent to roughly 
31 percent of their total assets. Totally, 100,262 people were threatened by a possible 
problem of solvency in 2003. In 2002, the situation was even worse. 151,178 insured 
(belonging to 9,477 different employer accounts) were affected by an underfunding. Recall 
from  Table 17 that the total of insured individuals within the group of “collective–
institutions” was almost 1.2 million, hence the fraction of affected individuals is small. In 
2002, slightly more than 13 percent of the insured were affiliated to an underfunded 
“collective–institution”. The fraction of affected employer–accounts was 5.2 percent in 2002 
(9,477 out of 183,002). 
 
                                                 
66Funding Ratio= Deckungsgrad (german)   71
Table 28  Funding Ratios
67 
Panel A: PF without a public warranty 
  PF with DC  Underfunding  % of total assets 
Liquidity    (m CHF)  of PF with DC 
Ratio  (%)  2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 
       
95 – 99.9  221  272  666  1,175  2.80%  3.30% 
90– 94.9  108  227  3,145  3,524  11.20%  9.90% 
< 90  57  185  5,222  8,757  21.00%  20.60% 
Total 386  684 9,033  13456  11.80%  11.80% 
       
Panel B: PF with a public warranty 
  PF with DC  underfunding  % of total assets 
Liquidity    (m CHF)  of PF with DC 
Ratio  (%)  2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 
       
95 – 99.9  10  4  263  167  3.20%  11.30% 
90– 94.9  6  8  301  489  9.20%  7.30% 
< 90  29  26  15,779  28,597  38.40%  44.40% 
Total 45  38  16,343  29253  31.00%  40.30% 
Source:  1: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2004a), p.10 sqq, T 10 and T11 
  2: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2003), p.12 sqq, T11 and T12 
   
Table 29  Funding Ratios of Employer–Accounts in “Collective–Institutions” 
  Accounts in “Collective-  # of policy holders 
Liquidity  Institutions” with DC   
Ratio  (%)  2003 2002 2003 2002 
     
95 – 99.9  7051  5278  75,388  75,229 
90– 94.9  409  4199  12,322  75,949 
< 90  372    12,552   
     
Total 7832 9477  100,262  151,178 
      
  underfunding  % of total assets 
Liquidity  (m CHF)  of PF with DC 
Ratio  (%)  2003 2002 2003 2002 
     
95 – 99.9  96  127  2.07%  2.56% 
90– 94.9  69  513  15.16%  11.86% 
< 90  113    30.71%   
     
Total 278  640  5.09%  6.89% 
Source:  1: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2004a), p.17 sqq, T21 and T22 
  2: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2003), p.19 sqq, T22 and T23 
 
5.4.3  Causes for the Underfunding 
 
Table 30 summarizes the main reasons that were responsible for the funding deficits. 
Note that theses reasons have been self-reported by the pension funds. Losses on securities 
were the main trigger for nearly 60 percent of the pension funds. In 2003 and for pension 
funds except “collective–institutions” (Panel A), an insufficient actuarial funding caused a 
funding shortage in 22 percent of the cases. In 2002, insufficient returns on investments 
were also often the reason for such a situation. 
                                                 
67 without “Collective-Institutions”   72
 
Table 30  Causes for an Underfunding (self-reported) 
Cause  Panel A  Panel B 
  PF (in %)  Collective–Inst. (in %) 
  2003 2002  2003 2002 
Losses  on       
Securities  59% 50%  59% 46% 
       
Insufficient       
Returns on Investments  4%  30%  22%  20% 
       
Insufficient       
Actuarial Funding  22%  9%  4%  5% 
       
Losses on Other         
Investments 9%  4%  4%  26% 
       
Other 6%  8%  11%  3% 
       
Total  100% 100%  100% 100% 
Source:  1: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2004a), p.20, T25 and T26 
  2: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherung (2003), p.22 sqq., T26 and T27 
  
The same causes also apply to “collective–institutions” (c.f. Panel B). Nevertheless, 
this administrative form needs a closer examination. Table 17 shows that 113 “collective–
institutions” out of 126 ( 90% ≈ ) hand over their risks inherent in old age provision (at least 
part of them) to a life insurance company. As mentioned before, insurance companies are 
basically not allowed to have any funding shortage. Thus, how can the figures in Table 29 
be explained?  For the few “collective–institutions” that handle their risks autonomously, the 
same reasons as above apply. However, for the semi– and non–autonomous institutions, 
three more reasons have to be considered: 
  
1.  Since  semi–autonomous institutions manage at least the accumulation of 
retirement capital themselves, they are subject to market risks.  
2.  In the case of non–autonomous institutions, all risks are covered by an 
insurer. Nevertheless, some non–autonomous “collective–institutions” may 
offer “separate investment accounts” to their affiliated employers. As a direct 
consequence of these “separate investment accounts”, employers bear part of 
the investment risks.  
3.  The insurance company may refuse to guarantee the minimum interest 
requirement.  
 
5.4.4  Measures to Correct the Funding Gap 
 
This subsection discusses some measures that have been taken to remedy the 
financial situation of pension funds.
68 To show the variability of actions across different 
pension funds and years, “collective institutions” are discussed separately, and two 
successive years are explored. 
 
                                                 
68 Note that these measures have been reported by the pension funds.   73
In 2003, the most popular measures (taken by pension funds that are not “collective–
institutions”) were additional contributions of employers (26 percent), cutbacks of benefits 
(20 percent) and reductions in the interest rate paid on accumulated old-age credit balances 
(16 percent)
69. All of these measures are easier if the proportion of retirees is low. If retirees 
constitute a large fraction within the group of insured individuals, the recapitalization is 
more difficult. In such a case, either a cutback of current benefits is possible, or the pension 
fund relies on an increase in financial market returns. However, the former action was quite 
rare (7 percent in 2003).  
 
In 2002, the most common instrument to correct the underfunding was the reduction 
in the interest rate on the accumulated pension capital (36 percent). Consequently, it was 
either reduced (22 percent) or even set to zero (14 percent). Another frequent measure was 
additional contributions of employees. The last common action refers to the investment 
strategy. In 7 percent of all the actions, the strategy was adjusted and in 10 percent it was 
maintained. The reason for the latter decision on the investment strategy is the belief that in 
the long run the underfunding will be eliminated by the performance of the portfolio. 
 
In 2003, the measures taken by “collective–institutions” were the maintenance of the 
previous investment strategy (16 percent) and/or the improvement of the present risk 
management (16 percent). The actions listed above in the first place, i.e., cutting back the 
provisions and lowering the interest rate were only of minor importance. While pension 
funds (except for “collective–institutions”) used capital contributions of employers (16 
percent) as their primary instrument, the “collective–institutions” did not use this method. 
 
To sum up this last section, a broad range of measures have been taken in order to 
remedy the financial situation of pension funds. However, demanding additional 
contributions of employers, lowering the interest rate and cutting back the performance were 
the most frequent measures. The “Collective–institutions” on the other hand, focused more 
on their investment strategies and on the improvement of their risk management.  
                                                 
69 Example: A pension fund lowers the interest rate on accumulated old-age credit balances by 0.5 percent for 
one year. The implied costs for contributors can be expressed as a fraction of the coordinated salary or of the 
accumulated old age savings at retirement (reduction in future benefits):  
  
Age 30 40 50 60 
As a fraction of salary (in %) 0.2  0.7  1.6  2.9 
Reduction in projected pensions 
(in %)
0.006 0.17  0.3  0.45 
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VI.  THE THIRD PILLAR 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
The third pillar in the Swiss old-age insurance system comprises additional savings 
directed at providing income in old age. Its main goal is to fill potential gaps in the provision 
of old-age income. In view of the high replacement rates offered by the first and second 
pillar for individuals with an uninterrupted work history, the additional insurance is 
primarily important for the self-employed (who are not covered by the second pillar) and 
people with contribution gaps (foreign workers, career breaks, etc). Up to a certain amount 
(i.e., contributions within the limits of the so-called pillar 3a), third pillar savings are fully 
tax deductible. Thus, pillar 3a has also become a popular instrument to save taxes. 
 
It is very difficult to get reliable data on the volume of the third pillar as related 
retirement savings are provided not only by insurance companies, but also by most banks 
and other financial intermediaries. This caveat is probably of lesser importance for the scope 
of this paper as only a tiny fraction of the accumulated third pillar capital is annuitized. 
 
The low level of annuitization is not surprising given the predominance of annuities 
in the first and second pillars. Individuals with a higher demand for an annuity are much 
more likely to explore the option to increase the tax-favored contributions to the more 
generous second pillar.
70 Moreover, very few of the third pillar annuity contracts are 
standard annuity contracts that would allow a comparison of returns across companies and 
over time. 
 
6.2  Overview 
 
The privately organized third pillar is characterized by a broad scope of design. 
Thus, it is not only focused on providing old-age insurance. Other solutions provided within 
the third pillar are Securities in case of death, Saving and Securities in case of occupational 
disability. Consequently, the products offered by life insurance companies or banks differ in 
terms and characteristics.  
 
An overview with respect to the different characteristics of insurance and bank 
products is given in Table 31. Precautionary capital is either classified as conditional (called 
3a) or unconditional (called 3b). The key distinguishing features of each form are listed in 
Table 32.
71 The most important characteristic of pillar 3a is that its contributions are tax 
deductible within the limits specified in the law. 
                                                 
70 The law limits additional tax-exempt contributions to the second pillar. However these restrictions hardly 
bind for individuals that would otherwise contribute to the third pillar. Shortages of retirement capital due to 
divorce, career interruptions and migration in and out of Switzerland can be fully replaced. 
71 The term “conditional” originates from the fact that this capital is exclusively used in the form of old-age 
provisions.   75
 
Table 31  Differences of Insurance and Bank Products 
Characteristics Insurance  Bank 
 Company  
   
Conditional Saving only  Saving 
(Pillar 3a)  Risk-Coverage   
   
Unconditional Saving  Saving 
(Pillar 3b)  Risk-Coverage  Investment 
Source: Allianz Suisse 
  
Table 32  Differences of conditional and unconditional precautionary capital 
Differences 3a  3b 
   
Individuals  Employed and aged below the 
AHV-age 
all 
  and having a Swiss Tax-Domicile  
   
Products limited unlimited 
   
Maturity  Limited to AHV-age,  no limitations 
  but it cannot be paid out earlier   
  than 5 years before the AHV-age  
   
Contributions Limited  to  the maximum amount no limitations 
  that is tax deductible:   
  with a 2nd pillar: 6,192 CHF   
  without a 2nd pillar: 30,960   
  or 20% of total earned income   
   
Beneficiary in case of death  specified by law  free 
   
Repurchase under  certain  conditions  possible 
   
Pledging  possible for the use of own real 
estate 
possible for every reason 
   
Tax deductible  Premiums can be fully deducted  Lump–sum deduction possible 
contributions from  taxable  income   
   
Taxation during the  None  Repurchase Value 
contract period    and Profit Shares 
   
Taxation at the redemption  Taxation as income  No taxation of insurances 
  applying a reduced rate  that are based on premiums 
Source: Allianz Suisse 
 
The basic third pillar instruments offered by life insurance companies are listed 
below. Only products that contribute in some aspects to old-age insurance are mentioned. 
Thus the detailed terms are negotiated bilaterally.  
 
•  Private Annuity: A private annuity provides a lifelong annuity. Some features can be 
added to the standard case. Hence, it is possible to include the spouse as beneficiary 
or to agree that the outstanding balance is repaid to the spouse in case the main 
beneficiary dies. 
•  Endowment Insurance: This contract provides insurance in case of death. Otherwise   76
it constitutes a saving account. Both in the event of death and in the event of living 
the beneficiary is entitled to a provision.  
•  Variable Annuity: In addition to the mixed Life–Assurance, there is an explicit 
participation in the development of financial markets. The corresponding funds are 
chosen according to the risk profile and the investment horizon of the policy holder.  
•  Saving Accounts  
 
All products can be financed either by regular premiums/contributions (annually, 
quarterly or monthly) or by a lump–sum transfer. Apart from their main purpose as a 
specific investment instrument (mainly 3b products), third pillar assets are also widely 
accepted as a collateral for credits. 
 
6.3  Volume of the Third Pillar (Life Insurance Companies) 
 
Table 33 shows the evolution of capital accumulated in the third pillar by insurance 
companies. In 2003, 244 billion CHF were invested in the form of capital insurance, i.e., a 
product that yields a capital payment (CP) at a later date (around the statutory retirement 
age). Thereof, 35 percent is conditional precautionary capital. The remaining 65 percent are 
invested in pillar 3b and are therefore unconstrained in their purpose. The total investments 
in annuity products (A) amount to only 2 billion CHF. Compared to the investments 
resulting in a lump sum, the total of 2 billion does not even account for 1 percent of this 
amount. Both types of products have shifted from pillar 3b to pillar 3a over the last years 
(see Figure 26): annuities, especially during the 1990s, and capital payments, during the last 
years. As mentioned above, the low degree of annuitization in the third pillar reflects the fact 
that annuities are still the dominant pay-out option of the first two pillars. 
 
Table 33  Evolution of Capital Invested in the Third Pillar 
Balances 1996 1997 1998 1999 




Pillar 3a (CP)  52,680  29.89% 60,829 32.07% 64,503 31.27% 72,694 31.05%
Pillar 3b (CP)  123,549  70.11% 128,858 67.93% 141,806 68.73% 161,459 68.95%
Total  (CP)  176,229 100% 189,687 100% 206,309 100% 234,153 100%
Annuities    
Pillar 3a (A)  109  9.40% 135 10.49% 200 14.01% 229  13.78%
Pillar 3b (A)  1,050  90.60% 1,152 89.51% 1,228 85.99% 1,433 86.22%
Total  (A)  1,159 100% 1,287 100% 1,428 100% 1,662 100%
  2000 2001 2002 2003 
  CHF mn  %  CHF mn %  CHF mn %  CHF mn  % 
Capital-
Payments 
        
Pillar 3a (CP)  77,954  32.84% 77,489 31.99% 79,448 32.50% 85,429 35.08%
Pillar 3b (CP)  159,388  67.16% 164,772 68.01% 164,970 67.50% 158,100 64.92%
Total  (CP)  237,342 100% 242,261 100% 244,418 100% 243,529 100%
Annuities    
Pillar  3a  (A)  240 13.70% 217 11.79% 212 11.16% 210 10.79%
Pillar 3b (A)  1,512  86.30% 1,624 88.21% 1,687 88.84% 1,737 89.21%
Total  (A)  1,752 100% 1,841 100% 1,899 100% 1,947 100%
Source: Bundesamt für Privatversicherungen (2003), p.66 sqq.   77
 









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Pillar 3a (CP) Pillar 3b (CP) Pillar 3a (A) Pillar 3b (A)
 
Source: Bundesamt für Privatversicherungen (2003) 
 
Seventy-five percent of the accumulated pillar 3a capital in insurance companies is 
invested in one of the top five players, i.e., Basler Life, Generali Person, Rentenanstalt 
(Swiss Life), Winterthur Life and Zürich Life. Within this group, Rentenanstalt (Swiss Life) 
is the leader, with a share of almost 22 percent of the total capital. The remaining 25 percent 
is distributed among many different insurance companies. Note that even some foreign 
companies, such as Império, are active in this part of the Swiss pension system. The 
situation with respect to pillar 3b is similar. The same few companies cover the majority of 
the invested capital. Nevertheless, with Patria and Providentia there are two additional 
players in that market that have no weight in the market of pillar 3a. 
 
6.4  Volume of the Third Pillar (Banks) 
 
Table 34 presents the conditional precautionary capital (i.e., pillar 3a with capital 
payments
72) managed by banks. In 2004, the total amount reached almost 24 billion CHF. 
This corresponds to an increase of 46 percent, compared to the 16.4 billion CHF in 2000. 
Prior to this date the investment remained almost constant around 17 billion CHF (c.f. also 
Figure 27). In 1997, the money allocated to banks represented 29 percent of the amount at 
life insurance companies (IC). The different growth patterns of banks and insurance 
companies can be seen in Figure 27. 
                                                 
72Some banks also offer annuities, but on behalf of life insurance companies. Thus, these annuities appear in 
the balances of the insurance company.   78
 
Table 34   3a Capital managed by Banks 
Total 3a (m 
CHF) 









# of banks  3 24 83 1 227 338
Year–end values 
1997 7,929 5,614 1,812 1,460 866 17,681
1997 in %  45% 32% 10% 8% 5% 100%
1998 7,452 5,836 2,402 1,715 834 18,239
1999 7,122 5,822 2,018 1,758 836 17,556
2000 6,321 5,475 1,946 1,777 877 16,396
2001 6,323 5,916 2,137 2,082 1,041 17,499
2002 6,692 6,638 2,360 2,506 1,239 19,435
2003 7,108 7,422 2,595 3,026 1,553 21,703
2004 7,357 8,116 2,830 3,563 2,110 23,976
2004 in %  31% 34% 12% 15% 9% 100%
Total increase  -7.21% 44.56% 56.16% 144.06% 143.64% 35.60%
Source: Schweizerische Nationalbank (2005), p.A72 sqq. 
 











1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Big Banks Kantonalbanken
Regional Banks Raiffeisnenbanken
All Banks All IC
 
Source: Schweizerische Nationalbank (2005), p.A72 sqq. 
 
Table 34 also presents the allocation of the 3a–capital relative to the different types 
of banks in Switzerland. In 2003, the big banks (UBS, Credit Suisse and Credit Suisse First 
Boston) and the different “Kantonalbanken
73” each controlled one third of the total 3a–
capital. The “Raiffeisenbanken” with a 15 percent market share and the different regional 
banks with a 12 percent market share are the other important players in this business. The 
remaining fraction of 9 percent is allocated to all other banks (as e.g. commercial banks, 
private banks, and foreign banks) operating in Switzerland. In 1997, the market of 
conditional precautionary capital was more concentrated, i.e., the big banks controlled 45 
percent of the market and the “Kantonalbanken” 32 percent. The “winner” over the last 7 
                                                 
73In Switzerland, each canton (except Solothurn) has its own Kantonalbank (cantonal bank). Most of them are 
administrated under public law and enjoy public warranty.   79
years were the “Raiffeisenbanken”. They increased their 3a–capital stock by 144 percent and 
they almost doubled their market share. The fact that the last three annual growth rates were 
over 10 percent mirrors the increasing awareness of the importance of retirement 
arrangement beyond the first and second pillar. 
 
6.5  Summary 
 
The third pillar is supposed to finance potential gaps in old–age insurance, especially 
for self-employed individuals and those with interrupted work histories. However, its 
alternative use as a tax-favored investment device has now become the more important goal 
for well-insured middle and high income individuals. The products offered by life insurance 
companies and banks range from saving accounts to products that also cover some specific 
risks. In 2003, the capital invested in lump-sum contracts offered by insurance companies, 
which constitutes the most important savings instrument, amounted to 244 billions CHF. 
Annuity contracts are very rare. The bulk of the invested third pillar capital is found in a few 
leading life insurance companies. The capital invested in conditional savings accounts (i.e., 
pillar 3a) at banks represented 24 billions CHF in 2004. Two thirds are managed by the big 
banks and the “Kantonalbanken”.   80
VII.  MAJOR RISKS AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE SECOND PILLAR 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
The major risks faced by the different parties in the second pillar parallel those in 
other countries.
74 The usual suspects are market (return) risks, longevity, inflation, and, as a 
consequence of all of these, the potential bankruptcy of a pension provider. By fixing the 
annuity conversion factor, the second pillar legislation puts a large weight on reducing the 
risk for individuals close to retirement. Moreover, people already retired are protected from 
a potential bankruptcy of the plan sponsor within the mandatory part of the scheme, but not 
from inflation. 
 
As outlined in previous chapters, Switzerland has extensive legislation concerning 
the design and operation of pension plans. However, it has relatively few constraints on how 
the pension funds should deal with risk. In particular, asset and liability management is left 
to the discretion of the pension fund. Given the large fragmentation of the second pillar, it is 
also very difficult to obtain representative data as to how the pension funds deal with these 
issues. Personal conversations with fund managers and actuaries show a huge variation of 
strategies that cannot easily be summarized. 
 
This section first reviews the major risks faced by the different players. The second 
part focuses on the risk management of pension providers. Due to data limitations, this 
information will not be representative of the asset and liability management strategies of 
Swiss pension funds. The Appendix provides some case studies from a selection of pension 
funds. Again, these examples can be expected to have a clear bias toward sound and 
successful practices of financially healthy pension funds or insurance companies, as these 
are much more likely to disclose their strategies. 
 
7.2  Major Risks Faced by Involved Parties 
 
7.2.1  Workers 
 
•  Changes in the BVG legislation usually do not (much) affect people less than 5 years 
prior to retirement. For all others, changes in the annuity conversion factor (implied 
by increases in longevity and decreases in market returns) can substantially reduce 
anticipated benefits.  
•  Market returns affect the level of retirement capital directly (via the minimum 
interest rate and the investment performance of the plan sponsor) and indirectly (via 
the conversion factors). Short run fluctuations of market returns around a constant 
level do not constitute a risk for workers as annuities are not priced in the market, the 
annuity rate risk is thus very small.  
•  Bankruptcy of the pension fund constitutes a potential risk for (accumulated) 
                                                 
74Bohn (2005) discusses the impact of alternative tax, pension, and health care policies on different cohorts. 
The motivation is that traditional retirement programs largely exempt retirees from sharing risk and that 
consequently a more than proportional risk is imposed on the younger cohorts and future generations.   81
contributions that exceed 150 percent of the coordinated salary, as the Guarantee 
Fund does not insure this part.  
 
7.2.2  Pensioners 
 
Pensioners face the following risks:  
 
•  Purchasing power risk as pension providers only have to adjust the benefits to 
changes in the CPI if the financial situation of the fund allows it.  
•  Bankruptcy of the pension fund constitutes a potential risk for the benefits exceeding 
the level implied by 150 percent of the coordinated salary, as the Guarantee Fund 
does not insure this part.  
•  A longevity risk for those choosing the lump-sum. The risk of running out of assets 
too early is especially high if the regular first pillar benefits are low due to an 
interrupted work career. As all pensioners have access to means-tested 
supplementary benefits of the first pillar, this risk is somewhat limited, but it may 
still imply that the pensioner cannot keep the pre-retirement living standard.  
 
7.2.3  Pension Providers 
 
The risks faced by pension funds do not differ from those faced by annuity providers 
in other countries with one big exception: The provider has little choice in setting the terms 
of the annuity contract due to the fixed conversion factors. If the conversion factor does not 
correspond correctly to estimated mortality tables and market returns, the provider faces a 
considerable shortfall risk. 
 
Another feature to which pension funds are exposed is the fact that the old–age credit 
balances are accumulated and decumulated in the same pension fund. This is in contrast to 
the Chilean system, where workers can choose freely among different pension funds 
(accumulation phase). Thereafter, they purchase an annuity from an insurance company or a 
withdrawal from a pension fund (decumulation phase). Thus, the asset side and the liability 
side exhibit different characteristics in these two models (e.g. duration). 
 
7.2.4  Government 
 
The government faces two main risks:  
 
•  Different layers of government (federal and cantonal) often have to guarantee the 
promised benefits and other contractual agreements of affiliated pension funds under 
public law with a warranty. As it has been previously demonstrated, many of these 
(large) funds suffer from significant funding deficits and, therefore, constitute a 
threat to state finances.
75 
•  The risk of a large number of bankruptcies that might threaten the viability of the 
                                                 
75As per 31.12.2004, the Swiss Government payed 34 billions CHF into the accounts of pension funds under 
public law. This amount equals 7.7% of the Swiss GDP in 2004 or equivalently 26.7 percent of Government 
debts in 2004.   82
Guarantee Fund. As the latter is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis without capital 
reserves, a large number of failures are likely to trigger a very high contribution rate 
for healthier funds, which in turn may drive more of these into financial difficulty. 
The financing structure of the Guarantee Fund (which should be operated as a re-
insurer in the pension business) has thus a built-in amplifier in case of crises. 
 
  It is hardly imaginable that the government would not intervene in such a situation as 
the pensions and old-age credits guaranteed by the fund are mandated by law. 
 
 The  bailing-out risk is directly related to the regulation of the pension fund itself. 
The more the minimum interest rate requirements and the conversion factors deviate from 
the value dictated by medium-run market conditions and demographics, respectively, the 
higher is the risk of bankruptcy for an individual pension fund.  
 
7.3  Risk Management in the Second Pillar 
 
The major risks faced by pension funds are market and longevity risks. Figure 28 
depicts the distribution of risks
76 for the two (life) insurance companies Swiss Life Group 
and  Winterthur Group. For both companies, the market risks are among the largest 
quantifiable risks. In the case of the Swiss Life Group they amount to over 81 percent of all 
quantified risks. The underwriting risks, which are defined (in a pure life insurance 
company) as the risk of longevity, death, and disability (13 percent) and the credit risks (6 
percent) complete the risk exposure of Swiss Life Group. At Winterthur Group these latter 
two risk categories constitute a larger fraction of the quantified risks. Thus, the risk 
exposures of Winterthur and Swiss Life differ and so does their risk management.  
 
Risk management identifies, evaluates and manages these different types of risk and 
ensures that the respective pension fund is able to meet its (long–term) obligations. The 
concrete strategies and techniques depend on the internal capacities of the pension fund, on 
the skills of its risk manager, on the availability and affordability of financial instruments 
(e.g., hedging with derivatives is costly, thus it may not be affordable nor appropriate for a 
small autonomous pension fund), and finally on the constraints imposed by regulation. 
                                                 
76Note: The underlying figures refer to the whole business of the respective company. Nevertheless, they allow 
the reader to have an idea about the size of the different risk categories. Given that the risks in the general/main 
business of life insurance companies are similar to the risks in old–age provision, the figures approximate the 
situation of pension funds. This is particulary true for the figures of the Swiss Life Group, since the underlying 
activities of the Winterthur Group also includes a Non–Life part.   83
 












Source: Swiss Life (2004), p.59 and Winterthur (2004), p.63 
 
Winterthur Group for instance, evaluates risks and its capital requirements by the 
measurement method of Economic Risk Capital (ERC). This method measures all risks on 
the basis of their potential economic loss, irrespective of how they are handled. Thereby it 
distinguishes between (c.f. also Figure 28):  
 
•  Market Risks: Market risks cover adverse changes in interest rates, foreign exchange, 
equity prices, private equity, and real estate values. ERC calculates for each risk type 
separate figures, which are measured on a 99 percent confidence level and for a 1-
year holding period. Assets and liabilities are marked to market, where the cash 
flows of the liabilities are determined by actuarial projection methods. Equity prices, 
interest and foreign exchange rates are calculated by applying historical simulations. 
Numbers related to the real estate ERC are obtained by using a variance–covariance 
approach. It uses historical country-specific data, i.e., real estate indices. 
•  Credit Risks: Expected losses in the portfolio are calculated by the use of ratings. A 
component that captures the possible change in the rating of the underlying assets as 
well as a spread risk component on traded positions are included.  
•  Underwriting Risks: Central reference figures from ALM (asset and liability 
management) are used to calculate the required ERC from unplanned risk 
accumulations, such as deviations from expected mortality, disability, longevity, and 
expected surrender rates (in the life and pension business part).  
•  Business Risks: In general, the risks that the ongoing income from the business is not 
able to cover the ongoing expenses subsequent to a severe crisis.  
•  Operational Risks: Operational risks result either from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, systems or employees or from external events like e.g., fraud or system 
breakdowns. 
 
The method ensures that Winterthur Group remains able to pay its liabilities up to a 
specific prescribed level of solvency, even in the case of extraordinary market, business and 
operational situations. Since ERC is the common denominator for all risks it strengthens the 
ability to monitor and control them. Furthermore, it contributes to greater risk transparency 
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7.3.1  Risk Management Strategies: Market Risks 
 
On the asset side of the balance sheet, market risks refer to fluctuations in the value 
of securities (e.g. stocks, bonds, real estate) as well as to changes in foreign exchange rates. 
On the liability side, the risk stems form the guaranteed minimum interest rate. To mitigate 
these risks and to additionally achieve an adequate investment performance, suitable 
investment strategies and derivatives are used. The following listing presents designated 
hedging instruments: 
 
•  Interest Rate Derivatives  
•  Interest Rate Swaps  
•  Currency Derivatives  
•  Currency Forward Contracts  
•  Equity Derivatives  
 
As the most hedging strategies use derivatives, having access to a fully developed 
capital market is necessary to manage market risks efficiently. This condition is obviously 
satisfied for Switzerland. 
 
7.3.2  Risk Management Strategies: Longevity Risk 
 
Pension funds have little scope to set the terms of the annuity contracts in the 
mandatory part of the system. (They are free to set annuity conditions in the non-mandatory 
part.) The risks related to the fixed conversion factor are incorrect assumptions about 
mortality and market returns. These risks can be substantial. If the conversion factor is set 
too high, it will be difficult to meet the obligations mandated by the law. This has important 
implications for the asset and liability management of a fund. High conversion factors may 
induce funds to choose investment strategies with a high expected return and thus more risk 
to compensate for this. 
 
Almost all pension funds base their estimates on mortality tables provided by the 
Federal Insurance Fund (FIF), with possible adjustments based on past experience. Note that 
due to a relatively high degree of homogeneity among the annuitants of a given pension fund 
(construction workers, teachers, bank employees), the average life expectancy may well 
differ from the population average. 
 
The implied sorting in the second pillar facilitates tailor-made adjustments of the 
benefit structure. A recent example in Switzerland is provided by the generous early 
retirement schemes for construction workers that can be financed to a large extent by a well 
below average life expectancy. As mortality rates are negatively correlated with lifetime 
income, the sorting of annuitants prevents extensive redistribution from the short-lived poor 
annuitants to the long-lived richer annuitants. 
 
Most pension funds do not update their mortality rates on a yearly basis. Often 
liabilities are computed using the published FIF mortality rates and then augmented by 0.4   85
percent to 0.5 percent every year, until the new FIF mortality rates become available, i.e., 
every 10 years. The 0.4 percent per year adjustment causes an increase in longevity over 10 
years that coincides almost exactly to the rise in longevity using the SFSO or FIF 
improvement rates for all groups of annuitants. Thus it constitutes a good approximation for 
the anticipated increase in longevity. The 0.5 percent per year adjustment is a more prudent 
estimate. When the new mortality tables become available, the pension funds adjust their 
longevity reserves that had been accumulated over the previous 10 years. 
 
7.3.3  Asset and Liability Management 
 
In the 1990s, the chief tasks of asset and liability management (ALM) were rather 
eclipsed. The high returns rendered an appropriate matching of assets and liabilities 
unnecessary, especially, since existing reserves were considered as more than adequate. 
During the last years, unfavorable developments in financial markets scaled back the 
pension funds ability to take risks. As a direct consequence, many pension funds ran into a 
funding deficit. This situation triggered a regulatory reaction that involved the imposition of 
a new risk definition. This new definition stresses the fulfillment of the obligations, i.e., 
provision for old age, as the main goal. The old version was more focused on the adherence 
to the minimum interest requirement. Thus, the new version pursues a long term view. In 
addition, it requires that the pension fund matches its investment strategy to its proper risk 
profile. The investment restrictions, which were presented in Table 10, remained unaffected. 
Compliance with these few regulations and the chosen strategy are supervised and approved 
by the technical expert and the supervisory agency, the rest is left to the discretion of the 
pension fund. 
 
As mentioned above, the asset and liability management, i.e., getting the right fit 
between assets and liabilities, is now one of the most important aspects of risk management 
in pension funds. It aims to ensure that actuarial reserves are sufficiently high to meet 
current and future benefits. ALM concepts comprise therefore the following aspects: fair 
valuation of assets and liabilities, asset allocation, and compliance with external constraints. 
 
7.3.4  Fair Valuation of Assets and Liabilities 
 
The liability side of the balance sheet of a pension fund consists mainly (c.f Table 
35: in 2002, 92 percent) of capital related to provision of old–age insurance, disability and 
death. This so–called fixed and non-fixed capital comprises mainly accumulated old–age 
credit balances of the active insured, the present value of current annuities, and technical 
accruals to cover the risk of longevity, disability and death. 
 
What factors (interest rates) determine the size of “fixed and non-fixed capital”?  In 
the case of the accumulated old–age credit balances it is the MIR that controls its size (apart 
from the contributions of employer and employee).
77 In the case of the present value of 
annuities it is the so–called technical interest rate. While old–age credit balances are not 
                                                 
77 This view is actually only correct for defined contribution plans. In the case of defined benefits plans, there 
is no direct effect of the MIR. This is due to the fact that the size of the individual pension depends on the last 
salary earned.   86
very sensitive to changes in the MIR in the short run, the present value of annuities is 
extremely sensitive to changes in the technical interest rate. The reason is that the MIR is 
merely applied on accumulated capital and does not affect future benefits to be paid. Thus, 
in the short run there are no compound interest effects.
78 Recall that the MIR is set by the 
Swiss Federal Council, and is not therefore directly influenced by pension funds (c.f. 
Section 3.2.2), but they can decide if their performance is better and – under certain 
conditions – if it is worse.  
 
Table 35  Aggregated Liabilities of all Pension Funds 
Liabilities (in M CHF)  2002 in %
 
Deposits and Borrowed Funds  11,315 2.72%
Mortgages 1,443 0.35%
Funding Status (Schwankungsreserven) 16,805 4.03%
Reserves of employer  3,160 0.76%
Fixed and non-fixed Capital  383,795 92.14%
 
Total Liabilities  416,518 100%
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2004b), p66 
 
The technical interest rate discounts all future cash flows and enters via compound 
interest rate effects into the calculation of present values of annuities. Hence, these positions 
are highly sensitive to the choice of the exact discount factor. Responsible for the use of the 
technical rate is the so–called technical expert.  In accordance with guidelines for experts in 
retirement pension insurance the technical interest rate should be a reasonable amount of 
basis points below long run market returns and take into account specific characteristics of 
the fund.
79 It is advisable to use a technical interest rate that is quite low. As a direct 
consequence, the present value of future cash flows is larger. Using a lower technical 
interest rate comes at the cost of a less favorable looking balance sheet (in the short run).
80 
Common practice is to use a rate of 3.5 percent. High values of the technical interest rate are 
only sustainable when assuming a recovery of financial market returns and/or international 
diversification. So far, there have been no moves to adopt more objective market indicators, 
such as the zero-coupon yield curve on AA corporate bonds, to value future (actuarial) 
liabilities. 
 
The  asset side of the balance sheet, consisting of investments in securities (c.f. 
Figure 22 and Table 36 for the valuation rules), is directly affected by changes in market 
returns (which are exogenous for pension funds), whereas the liability side is mainly 
affected by the MIR and the technical interest rate, which both do not directly depend on 
market interest rates.  Asset Management has therefore two particular objectives: First, the 
management of assets in such a way that they meet the contractual and statutory (e.g., MIR 
                                                 
78 Obviously, the effect on an individual balance can be considerable, especially in the case of older members 
as they have already accumulated a relatively high credit balance. 
79 Keel and Frauendorfer (2003) examine the impact of the technical interest rate on the ability to take risks.  
80 As an Example: The pension fund of the City of Solothurn reduced the technical interest rate from 4.5% to 
4% in the financial year 2004. As at 01.01.04, the resulting funding ratio was 78.7 percent (with a rate of 4 
percent). In contrast, by still assuming a rate of 4.5%, the funding ratio would be 83.8 percent, i.e., due to 
increased liabilities the underfunding grew by 5 percentage points.   87
payments) commitments towards members. Since old–age insurance is mainly of long–term 
nature, investment portfolios consist therefore of a large share of fixed-income instruments 
(c.f. section   5.3). The second objective is to follow an absolute return strategy, to generate 
positive returns from which the insured can profit in the form of higher benefits (such as 
inflation indexing) or lower contribution rates for both employers and employees. Positive 
returns can be used to increase the funding status of the pension fund. Most pension funds 
follow a dynamic approach on the basis of existing commitments and risk capacity. 
 
Table 36  Valuation Rules for Pension Funds 
Valuation Rules: 
 
Fixed-Interest Securities with fixed currency and 
maturity: 
- at most at face value 
 
Securities with a market value: 
- maximal at market value 
 
Derivatives: 
- maximal at market value  
 
other securities:  
- at most at face value 
 
Real estate and investments in real estate companies: 
- at most at market value 
Comments 
 















Table 37 presents the strategic asset allocation of some selected pension funds. (All 
the listed pension funds are also presented in the Appendix.) Additionally, the funding ratio, 
the technical interest rates (to allow for a comparison of funding ratios) and the number of 
total insured are given. The presented strategies differ from each other, but each pension 
fund invests a high fraction of its portfolio in at least one asset class (either Swiss currency 
bonds, foreign shares or real estate). It is likely that the chosen class represents the risk 
capacity of the pension fund. Almost all investment strategies are focused on global 
diversification and have a long–term focus. Furthermore, there are no explicit investment 
strategies to hedge mortality risks directly.   88
 
Table 37  Strategic Asset Allocation of Selected Pension Funds 
PF PFZH  PF  SBB  PF  ABB CIA  Contraves  Credit 
Suisse 
  public private private public private private 
Asset Classes  2004  Jun 05  2005  2002  2004  2004 
         
Bonds  in  CHF  25.0% 42.0% 37.0% 16.5% 11.0% 25-60% 
Foreign  Bonds  12.5% 11.0% 15.0% 17.5%  9.0%  " 
Domestic Shares  8.0%  8.0%  8.0%  15.0%  17.0%  0-40% 
Foreign  Shares  32.0% 16.0% 11.0% 20.0%  6.0%  " 
Real  Estate  10.0% 8.0% 20.0%  30.0%  37.0%  15-28% 
Mortgages  none 7.0% none none 4.0%  " 
Liquidity none  4.0%  5.0%  1.0%  5.0%  0-35% 
Private Equities  5.0%  0.5%  1.0%  none  n.a.  0-4% 
Commodities 2.5%  2.0%  none  none  n.a.  0-5% 
Hedge Funds  5.0%  1.5%  3.0%  none  6.0%  0-11% 
Foreign  Currency        10-40% 
Others       5.0%   
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100% 
         
Funding  Ratio  120.0% 83.0% 103.2% 62.8% 106.7% 112.2% 
Technical Rate  4%  4%  3.75%  4.5%  3.5%  4% 
Total  insured  39,766 58,931 15,472 34,928  3,204  18,510 
Source: Individual Pension Funds   89
 
VIII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Switzerland has had a long experience with a fully funded pension system. The 1985 
law that mandated occupational pension coverage for all workers above a certain income 
merely institutionalized what had been common practice in medium and large firms before. 
Not surprisingly, the current structure still reflects the long history of the system, and the 
preferences of workers and employers with all its advantages and disadvantages. 
Occupational pension plans have always played, and still do play, an important role in 
attracting and keeping skilled and motivated workers. Annuity schemes are thus considered 
to be primarily a part of the labor market, but not of the financial market. 
 
Economic, demographic and socio-economic changes during the last decades have 
uncovered a number of shortcomings of the system. Its structure is tailored to the needs of 
single-earner families under relatively stable (market) conditions. Fixed minimum interest 
rates and benefit conversion factors do not go along well with the large increase in life 
expectancy and the fall in market returns during the last decades. On the other hand, high 
divorce rates and a sizeable increase in the labor market participation of women have 
changed the desired structure of the second pillar. All these changes have led to several 
modifications of the law, including a greater flexibility for pension funds to set the 
parameters of their scheme.  
 
The second pillar is well integrated with the PAYG first pillar with respect to the 
coverage of labor income. However, in the payout phase, the law does not require a 
minimum amount of annuitization (together with the first pillar) to prevent the elderly from 
outliving their savings. Beneficiaries have the right to withdraw at least 25 percent of their 
accumulated assets as a lump sum, even if the resulting total pension benefits fall short of 
the subsistence level. Although the average annuitization rate is still high at approximately 
80 percent, there are very large differences across pension funds with many of them almost 
exclusively cashing out the old-age balances. 
 
Approximately 80 percent of the population above 24 years is covered directly by the 
second pillar. The accumulated assets in the occupational pension system amount to 
approximately 100 percent of GDP and annual contributions to approximately 7 percent. 
Given the large size of the second pillar and the high effective replacement rates in old age, 
it is not surprising that there is little scope for an annuity market in the strict sense of a 
market. Market annuities make up less than one percent of pensions. They come in many 
different forms (most containing a minimum capital payment in case of death) and insure a 
highly non-representative part of the population. As a consequence we are unable to report 
any meaningful estimates of MWRs in the market. 
 
A main feature of the system is a seemingly rigid legislation, coupled with the 
possibility for (autonomous pension) funds to deviate from the specified requirements under 
certain conditions. There are at least two important consequences of this approach. Firstly, 
the rules are usually stricter for insurance companies, notably concerning the required   90
funding ratio. This can be justified on the grounds that it is more difficult for the insured 
workers to monitor an insurance company than a pension fund directly organized by the 
employer (and managed by a board composed of employer, employees and retirees). But it 
also makes it more difficult for insurance companies to compete with the autonomous 
pension funds. Secondly, it is very difficult to get a good picture of what is really relevant in 
practice. There are literally hundreds of different schemes with large differences with 
respect to the structure of old age credits (including the degree of the super-mandatory part), 
their practice and conditions of annuitization at various ages, as well as the fund’s asset and 
liability management and risk strategy (mirrored in the organization structure). 
 
As had been mentioned above, the main regulatory issues concern the minimum 
interest rate during the accumulation period, and - even more importantly - the annuity 
conversion factor at which the accumulated assets have to be translated into a life-long 
annuity. A major problem is that the requirements are not rule-based and thus are not 
automatically adjusted to changing market conditions and increases in longevity. As a 
consequence, the rules are susceptible to political pressure, and a too sluggish response to a 
changing environment leading to potential financial problems for the pension providers. 
 
The rationale for minimum standards in the Swiss system is a high emphasis on the 
stability of pension benefits across different cohorts. As a consequence of the conversion 
factor philosophy, the annuity rate risk is basically non-existent. This would not be a 
problem  per se, if the legal requirements were based on prudent estimates of long-run 
market conditions and mortality rates leading to Money’s Worth Ratios that were in line 
with the financial sustainability of the system. Current political initiatives seem to go into 
the direction of maintaining the popular stability aspect of the system (basically hedging 
pensioners from an annuity risk), but also taking into account the projected increases in 
longevity and the fall in the long-run market interest rate. 
 
The computation of money’s worth ratios in the occupational pension scheme is 
complicated by a number of specificities of the Swiss system: Firstly, pension funds can 
deviate from the legal conversion factor under certain conditions. The reported MWRs thus 
constitute an upper bound for the annuities’ values. Secondly, it is difficult to integrate the 
existing forms of inflation indexing. Almost all funds use conditional indexing in the spirit 
of “if the financial situation of the pension fund allows it”. Moreover, as there are no 
inflation indexed bonds in Switzerland, the discounting is somewhat tricky. Thirdly, the 
discounting itself constitutes a major problem. By using the nominal yield curve, one 
ignores the fact that higher returns can be achieved at relatively low costs (in terms of 
additional risks), due to the still substantial interest rate differential with respect to other 
countries. Again, the reported MWRs are possibly too high. The values computed by the 
customary technical interest rate (which should reflect long-run market returns), which is 
applied in most pension funds, is also open to critique. 
 
Despite the seemingly high conversion factors, more than 90 percent of pension 
funds report funding ratios above 100 percent. However, the reported funding ratios may 
result from an understatement of pension liabilities because of the use of high technical 
discount rates in calculating their present value. Since the crisis in the early 2000s, the   91
financial situation has improved in most funds. One reason for this finding might be that the 
MWRs computed with the nominal yield curve overestimate the true MWRs as argued 
above. Many pension providers claim that the realized return on the assets had been well 
over the minimum interest rate, allowing for the financing of “excess benefits” and an 
accumulation of reserves. Nonetheless, it is not easy to generalize this result due to the high 
variance in the realized returns across pension providers. 
 
Pension funds under public law that enjoy an explicit warranty from the cantonal or 
federal authority are in a much more delicate financial situation, with many of them well 
below a sufficient funding level. This demonstrates that incentives matter a lot more than 
investment regulations (which are the same for all legal forms of pension funds). 
 
Transparency has been an important policy issue in the Swiss occupational pension 
scheme, a problem exacerbated by the large fragmentation of the system. The new 
transparency requirements make it much easier for insured individuals to assess the 
performance and standing of their pension provider. It also facilitates the supervision of the 
system, although the large differences between the providers still complicates a standardized 
assessment of the pension funds. It also seems as if some internal mechanisms (notably the 
structure of governance of the pension funds) have compensated for the lack in transparency 
and insufficient supervision in the past. 
 
It is not easy to draw conclusions for other countries. The history of old-age 
provision and the structure of the labor market are very important for the successful 
implementation of any system. Nonetheless, two big risks can be identified that should be 
borne in mind in setting up an annuity scheme. The first is an explicit guarantee of the state 
that seems to lead to excessive risk taking and to generous benefits. If the second pillar is 
large enough as in the Swiss case, this constitutes a big threat for public finances. The 
second, and equally important, risk stems from an inadequate regulation of the scheme. If 
the rules are not adjusted to market conditions and demographic changes in some 
standardized way at least in the medium run, they will become a punch ball of politics and 
may thus threaten the viability of the pension funds and the equitable treatment of different 
generations.    92
 
Appendix: Structure and Performance of Selected Pension Funds  
 
This appendix examines in greater depth a number of selected pension funds. The 
aim is to provide the reader with information on pension funds that are different from each 
other. Each pension fund is described first by its most specific characteristics. Afterwards, 
the focus is on their early retirement schemes and on their investment strategies. 
 
Regarding early retirement, there are no rules on that issue in the BVG. Within their 
financial limits pension funds are free to define specific benefits in their own pension fund 
rules. Early retirement conditions differ considerably across pension funds. Recall that 
pension benefits are defined by total accumulated credit balances at retirement and by the 
conversion factor. Due to a shorter period of contribution and interest payments the credit 
balances are smaller for an earlier exit out of the labor market. Pension funds also reduce the 
conversion factors to counteract the effects of the increased period of retirement over certain 
age spans. Some pension funds offer a bridging pension until the statutory AHV retirement 
age is reached. This bridging pension is repayable, but is also often subsidized by the plan 
sponsor. 
 
Examples of Pension Funds 
 
PF City of Zürich
81  
 
The pension fund of the city of Zürich was founded in 1913. Since 2002, it is 
organized as a foundation under public law and covers approximately 25,000 active 
contributors and 14,000 retirees. It is now a defined contribution plan, and up to 50 percent 
of the accumulated capital can be withdrawn as a lump sum. Retirement is possible from the 
age of 58 onwards. The pension fund of the city of Zürich is very healthy, i.e., its funding 
degree equals approximately 120 percent. The technical interest rate used in computing the 
liabilities was 4 percent in 2005. (Following the advice of the technical expert the interest 
rate will be reduced to 3.5 percent over the next 2 years.) Furthermore, it has a transparent 
structure, including a web page that contains all the relevant information.
82 
 
Early Retirement: At the pension fund of the City of Zürich the insured individuals 
are eligible for early retirement from age 58 onwards. The pension on early retirement is 
calculated on the basis of the savings at the time of retirement and the applicable conversion 
rate. The corresponding rates are listed in the table below (year 2005) and are valid for both 
women and men. Compared to the conversion factor of 7.15 percent as specified by law (c.f. 
Table 13), this pension fund uses lower rates even at the statutory retirement age of 65. This 




                                                 
81c.f. Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich (2004) 
82We would like to thank Dr. Vera Kupper, head of the investment group and member of the executive board 
of the “Pensionskasse der Stadt Zürich” for valuable insights and information.   93
Table 38  PF City of Zurich:  Early Retirement Ages and Conversion Factors, 2005 
Retirement  Age  65 64 63 62 61 60 59  58 
Conversion  Factor  (in  %) 6.89 6.72 6.56 6.42 6.28 6.15 6.02  5.90 
Source: Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich (2004), p.26, Tab. 3 
 
The bridging pension may equal up to the maximal amount payable under the 
AHV/AVS. As a consequence, the accumulated old–age credit balance is reduced by the 
present value of the bridging pension less the part that is sponsored by the employer. The 
reduction can be compensated by a lump–sum payment. 
 
Investment: The investment strategy of the pension fund of the City of Zürich is 
focused on a high long run return on assets and global diversification. The assets are chosen 
in a way as to benefit from the global real economic growth. As a consequence, the portfolio 
(at 31.12.04) contains a high fraction of foreign shares (33.7 percent)
83 , in particular from 
emerging markets, but also hedge funds (4.6 percent) and private equities (1.9 percent). 
Other instruments are domestic currency bonds and foreign bonds (27.4 percent and 12 
percent, respectively), domestic shares (8.2 percent), real estate (9 percent), and 
commodities (2.2 percent). The investment strategy is complemented by a relatively high 
level of reserves. 
 
Common with most other pension funds, there are no explicit investment strategies 
to hedge mortality risks directly. The accrued liabilities computed with constant mortality 
tables are augmented by 0.5 percent each year. FIF mortality tables are used. 
 
PF SBB (Swiss National Railways)
84: 
 
The pension fund of the Swiss national railway company (SBB) was founded in 1906. 
Since 1999, it is organized as a foundation under private law. It covers almost 28,000 active 
contributors and over 30,000 retirees, from 12 affiliated companies. The majority of the 
insured are organized in a defined benefit system. This system covers insured incomes up to 
100,000 CHF. The maximum pension equals 60 percent of the last insured income. Early 
retirement is possible from the age of 58 years onwards. Up to 50 percent of the capitalized 
pension can be withdrawn as a lump sum. Income above the level of 100,000 CHF is 
managed in a defined contribution system, where up to 100 percent of the accumulated 
capital can be withdrawn as a lump sum. With total assets amounting to 11.5 billions CHF 
in 2004, the pension fund of SBB is one of the biggest pension funds. Since liabilities related 
to old–age benefits - computed with a technical interest rate of 4 percent - exceed total 
assets by 2.3 billions CHF the funding ratio is only slightly above 83 percent, which is 
considered as a heavy underfunding. 
 
Early Retirement: Early retirement at SBB is possible at age 58. The ordinary 
pension is proportional to the length of the contribution period. For each year of 
contributions the pension increases by 1.5 percent of the insured wage, but it cannot exceed 
60 percent (=40*1.5%). Early retirement between 62 and 65 does not result in a reduction of 
                                                 
83This number exceeds the 25 percent specified in the law. The reason is that investment requirements do not 
bind in the non-mandatory part of the scheme. 
84c.f. Pensionskasse SBB (2004)   94
the pension, if the number of contribution years is at least 40. In the case of retirement 
between 60 and 62 the pension is reduced by 0.2 percent per month and between 58 and 60 





Table 39  PF SBB: Early Retirement and Pension Benefits, 2005 
Retirement  Age 65 64 63 62  61  60  59  58 
P e n s i o n   i n   %               
of insured wage  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 97.6% 95.2% 89.2%  83.2% 
Source: Pensionskasse SBB (2004), p.12 
 
The bridging pension equals up to the maximal amount payable under the 
AHV/AVS. The repayment starts at the ordinary AHV/AVS age and is charged against the 
annuity payments. For the period of age 60 to age 65 the bridging pension is subsidized by 
the employer. This does not hold for the bridging pensions before age 60. 
 
Investment: The asset management invests the old–age credit balances with a long–
term focus and well diversified. The investment horizon extends over a period of 10 to 15 
years. Taking into account their ability to take risks, they assume a return on investment of 
4.5 percent. As at 31.03.05, the portfolio comprised a high fraction of bonds issued in CHF 
(46 percent). Foreign bonds (11 percent), domestic shares (9.9 percent), foreign shares (16.8 
percent) and mortgages (7.7 percent) were among other important asset classes apparent in 
the portfolio. For the period 31.12.04 to 31.03.05, the return on investment was 1.95 percent, 





The pension fund that is set up for employees of ABB is organized in the form of a 
foundation. Economically or financially associated companies can join the pension fund. 
The ABB pension fund accounts for more than 7 thousand active insured and slightly more 
than 8 thousand retirees in total. The old–age insurance system is organized in the form of 
defined contributions, where the member can choose among three different types: Standard 
(i.e., same contributions of employer and employee), Standard plus (i.e., higher 
contributions of employee), and Standard minus (i.e., higher contributions of employer). 
Early and late retirement is possible, but not earlier than at age 57 and not later than at age 
70, respectively. Retirement benefits can be drawn in the form of pensions, or in the form of 
a capital payment, or as a mixture of both. The risk insurance (i.e., invalidity and death) is 
organized in the form of defined benefits, where the contributions are fully paid by the 
employer. The asset side of the balance sheet accounts for 3.2 billions CHF, which covers 
liabilities related to old–age benefits at a rate of 103.2 percent. The liabilities were 
computed by using a technical interest rate of 3.75 percent. 
 
Early Retirement: At ABB, members may at their request retire from the age of 58 
                                                 
85c.f. ABB Pension Fund (2005)   95
years onwards, or may postpone retirement until age 70. The corresponding conversion rates 
are listed below (year 2005). 
 
Table 40  PF ABB:  Early Retirement Ages and Conversion Factors, 2005 
Retirement  Age  65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58  57 
Conversion Factor  7.10 7.10 7.10 7.10 6.82 6.58 6.36 6.14  5.97 
            
Retirement  Age  66 67 68 69 70         
Conversion Factor  7.24 7.39 7.54 7.69 7.84        
 Source: ABB Pension Fund (2005), p. 28 
 
The bridging pension corresponds to the maximum AHV/AVS retirement pension 
and is fully repayable. 
 
Investment: The investment strategy of the ABB pension fund was tracking an 
index
86, i.e., all purchases and sales aimed at reproducing a given market index. Thus, this 
strategy should achieve the market return. Consequently, participating in higher market 
returns is not possible. On the other side, the risk of achieving a lower return is mitigated. 
From the above strategy are deviating the investments in the Swiss money market, in 
domestic bonds, in emerging market shares, and in private equity. These securities are 
managed more actively. Generally, all the securities are managed by a specific and 
specialized institution that is supervised by the foundation board. The portfolio (as at 
31.12.04) contained a high fraction of bonds issued in CHF (36.4 percent) and real estate (20 
percent). Foreign bonds (14.7 percent), domestic and foreign shares (8 percent and 11 
percent, respectively), money holdings (5 percent), private equity (1.6 percent), and hedge 
funds (3.1 percent) complete the portfolio. The return on investments was 4.67 percent in 
2004. 
 
PF Oerlikon Contraves AG
87:  
 
The pension fund of Oerlikon Contraves provides old-age benefits to its employees 
and economically or financially associated companies. Old–age and risk insurance are 
funded by defined contributions, where both the employer and the employee pay the same 
amount. From the age of 60 onwards, members may at their request take early retirement. 
Additionally, the option of a full or partial capital payment exists. In 2004, this pension fund 
covered 1084 active contributors and 2120 retirees with old–age insurance. Despite the fact 
that the majority of the insured are retirees, the pension fund is quite healthy. Since 2002, 
the funding ratio has been increasing again, and reached 106.7 percent in 2004. Thereby, a 
technical interest rate of 3.5 percent was applied. As at 31.12.04, total assets amounted to 
1.2 billions CHF. 
 
Early Retirement: Employees of Oerlikon Contraves can chose the early retirement 
option at age 60. The corresponding conversion factors (year 2005) are: 
 
                                                 
86in 2001 
87c.f. Pensionskasse der Oerlikon Contraves AG (2005)   96
Table 41  PF Oerlikon Contraves AG:  Early Retirement Ages and Conversion Factors 
Retirement  Age  65  64 63 62 61  60 
Conversion Factor (in %) 6.75  6.60  6.45  6.30  6.15  6.00 
Source: Pensionskasse der Oerlikon Contraves AG (2005), p.7 
 
The bridging pension equals the amount of the ordinary retirement pension payable 
under the AHV/AVS. Consequently, the accumulated old–age credit balance is reduced by 
the present value of the bridging pension. 
 
Example: A man retires at age 62, his old–age credit balance at age 62 equals to 
650,000 CHF and he asks for a bridging pension of the maximum AHV/AVS retirement 
pension, i.e., 25,800 in 2005.  
Reduction in the credit balance:  650,000 - 25,800*2.855 = 576,341 
Reduced Pension:  576,341*0.063 = 36,310 
Total Annuity Payment (from 62 to 65)  36,310 + 25,800 = 62,110 
Total Annuity Payment (at age 65)  36,310 + ordinary AHV/AVS pension 
  
Investment: The investment in securities follows a strategy with predefined weights, 
which are orientated on diversification. Additionally, to also participate in short– and 
medium–term market developments, a deviation margin from the fixed weights is defined. 
As a consequence, shares were increased (due to the positive market trend) and bonds were 
sold (due to unfavorable interest rates) in 2004. The management of securities is partly 
delegated to a specific and specialized institution, i.e., 65 percent are managed externally 
and the remaining 35 percent are managed internally. At 31.12.04 the biggest balance in the 
portfolio was real estate (35.9 percent), followed by bonds (17.2 percent), shares (17.2 
percent) and other investments (29.8 percent). The return on investment was 6.4 percent. 





The pension fund of the employees of the canton Geneva was founded in 1929. Like 
other public pension funds it adopted a defined benefit system. In the best case, retirees are 
eligible for a rate of 75 percent of the last insured wage. Members that contributed for at 
least 25 years are eligible for early retirement at age 50. In all other cases, early retirement 
is possible at most 5 years before the ordinary retirement age. Retirement benefits are 
normally drawn in the form of pensions. The capital payment option is only available if 
pensions are small. In 2003, the CIA insured over 25,000 active contributors and almost 10 
thousand retirees and its total assets were 4.9 billions CHF. In line with other public 
pension funds, the CIA exhibits a large underfunding. In 2002, its funding ratio decreased 
by 10 percent to 61.1 percent. Due to the good financial year 2003, the funding ratio rose 
slightly to 62.8 percent. To calculate future liabilities a technical interest rate of 4.5 percent 
was assumed. 
 
Early Retirement: The early retirement scheme at CIA is a function of the age of the 
retiree and the length of the contribution period. The pension increases in both arguments, 
but it cannot exceed 75 percent of the last insured wage. In addition, the two arguments are 
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positively correlated, i.e., for each year of contributions the pension increases according to 
the following table. 
 
Table 42  CIA:  Early Retirement and Pension Benefits 
Retirement  Age  57 58 59 60  61 
Increase in pension (as % wage)  1.68  1.74  1.80  1.86  1.91 
Retirement  Age  62 63 64 65  66 
Increase in pension (as % wage)  1.97  2.03  2.09  2.15  2.21 
Source: CIA du Canton de Genève (2002), p. 48 
 
The bridging pension equals up to the maximal amount payable under the 
AHV/AVS. The repayment starts at the ordinary AHV/AVS age or before, on a voluntary 
basis. 
 
Investment: The investment strategy is focused on long run returns. In 2001, it 
additionally focused on global diversification of stocks. As a consequence, Swiss shares 
were reduced and European shares were bought in 2002. Another special characteristic of 
the investment strategy is the fact that the whole portfolio was actively managed (with only 
one exception). As a result of the bad performances of actively managed mandates, the 
pension fund changed this strategy in 2003. Consequently, part of the portfolio was invested 
in passively managed mandates. The management of all securities is delegated to a specific 
and specialized institution. As at 31.12.2003 the portfolio contained a high fraction of real 
estate (33.2 percent) and bonds issued in CHF (18 percent). Foreign bonds (13.9 percent), 
domestic shares (14.2 percent), foreign shares (14.3 percent), and money holdings (6.4 
percent) were the remaining investments. The returns on investment before and after 
deductions for value fluctuation reserves were 8.39 percent and 5.12 percent, respectively. 
 
PF of Credit Suisse Group
89: 
 
The Pension fund of Credit Suisse Group (Switzerland) ensures its employees and 
those from companies that are legally or commercially closely associated with Credit Suisse 
Group. The annuity plan is a defined benefits scheme. The insured is entitled to a retirement 
pension from the age of 55. A bridging pension until attainment of the ordinary retirement 
age is only possible if the event of retirement after the 60th birthday. Without providing any 
reasons the insured can request a lump sum payment of up to 50 percent of the capitalized 
annual pension. In 2004, the pension fund of Credit Suisse accounted for almost 19,000 
insured. Thereof were almost 8,500 retirees. The funding ratio at year–end (2004) was 
112.2 percent. The underlying total assets amounted to almost 9 billion CHF. 
 
Early Retirement: Individuals who work for Credit Suisse are eligible for early 
retirement at age 55. Pension payments that are drawn before attainment of the ordinary 
retirement age will be reduced for each month according to the following table: 
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Table 43  PF Credit Suisse Group:  Early Retirement and Pension Benefits 
Retirement  Age  62-63 61-62 60-61 59-60 58-59 57-58 56-57 55-56 
Monthly  Reduction  0.250% 0.250% 0.250% 0.333% 0.417% 0.500% 0.583% 0.667%
Annual  Reduction  3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 
Source: Pension Fund of Credit Suisse Group (Schweiz) (2005), p.14 
 
Contrary, if the pension payments are postponed beyond the 65th birthday, the 
retirement pension will increase by 0.25 percent for each additional month at work. Early 
retirement after the age of 60 implies a bridging pension, which equals the amount of the 
retirement pension, but shall not exceed 50 percent of the maximum retirement benefits 
payable under the AHV/AVS. This bridging pension does not cause any reduction and can 
be considered as “for free”. In addition, the insured can purchase an additional bridging 
pension. This purchased bridging pension causes a reduction of the retirement pension 
(according to the above table). The reduction, which can be compensated, equals to 5 
percent of the additional bridging pension . However, the total amount of the bridging 
pension cannot exceed the maximum retirement pension payable under the AHV/AVS. 
 
Investment: The investment strategy is focused on long–term asset allocation. The 
Board of Trustees defines a strategic range for different asset classes and the representative 
benchmark. The tactical investment range for securities (which lies within the strategic 
investment range) is defined on a quarterly basis. The chief strategy thereby is Timing and 
Selection. The asset allocation as at 31.12.2004 is the following: Swiss bonds (36.2 percent), 
direct and indirect real estate (14.8 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively), liquidity (12.5 
percent), foreign and convertible bonds (9.3 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively), foreign 
equities (7.7 percent), Swiss equities (6.5 percent), hedge funds (5.6 percent), and private 
equity (1.6 percent). The performance of the above assets was 5.1 percent. 
 
PF City of Solothurn
90  
 
The pension fund of the city of Solothurn is an institution under public law and insures 362 
active contributors and 274 retirees. It uses as pension plan a defined benefit system, where 
the employer contributes 60 percent (i.e., 13.65 percent of the insured wage per annum) and 
the employee the remaining 40 percent (i.e., 9.1 percent of the insured wage per annum)o. 
The contributions to term insurance are equal for both parties (i.e., 1 percent of the insured 
wage per annum). Pension benefits are paid in the form of annuities and reach maximal 60 
percent of the last insured wage. The accumulated capital can only be withdrawn as a lump 
sum for low income levels. The retirement age can be postponed in both directions by 5 
years. In 2003, the guaranteed (by the employer!) interest rate on the old–age credit 
balances was 4.5 percent and in 2004 it was 4 percent (due to the decrease of the technical 
interest rate from 4.5 percent to 4 percent it was adjusted accordingly). As at 31.12.03, total 
assets were 108 million CHF and the funding ratio - using 4.5 percent as the technical 
interest rate - was 83.8 percent. As a consequence of the reduced technical interest rate the 
funding ratio decreases to78.7 percent. 
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Early Retirement: Employees of the City of Solothurn can retire 5 years before the 
ordinary retirement age. Their pension, which equals at most 60 percent of the last insured 
wage (i.e., with 40 years of contribution), is reduced according to the following table: 
 
Table 44  PF City of Solothurn:  Early Retirement and Pension Benefits 
Retirement  Age  65 64 63  62 61  60 
Reduction per year  -  9%  8%  7%  6%  5% 
%-Reduction of the annuity 0%  9%  17% 24% 30%  35% 
Source: Pensionskasse der Stadt Solothurn (2005), p.55 
 
The bridging pension equals at the best, the maximal amount payable under the 
AHV/AVS. The corresponding reduction of the annuity payments amounts to 6.8 percent of 
the drawn bridging pension. In the case of late retirement the pension increases each month 
by 0.567 percent. 
 
Investment: The investment strategy is of long–term nature and optimized with 
respect to the risk capacity of the pension fund. Depending on the type of securities, the 
investment management is handed over to a specific bank. In 2003, the largest positions in 
the overall portfolio were domestic currency and foreign currency bonds (31.4 percent and 
19.5 percent, respectively), followed by mortgages (12.6 percent). Foreign shares (9.4 
percent), Swiss shares (9.3 percent) real estate (8.1 percent), estate funds (5 percent), and 
hedge funds (1.7 percent) complete the investment in securities. The remaining fraction is 
held in cash (3 percent). 
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